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T H E S I S A B S T R A C T
In the first half of this Thesis, we introduce a framework of “quantum
cryptographic agility,” which allows for a resource-efficient swap of an
underlying cryptographic protocol. Specifically, we introduce several
schemes which perform the tasks of Digital Signatures and Secret
Sharing. Our first achievement is an investigation of Quantum Digital
Signatures (QDS) over a continuous-variables platform, consisting
of phase-encoded coherent states and heterodyne phase detection.
QDS allows for secure authentication of a classical message, while
guaranteeing message transferability. For the first time, we prove
security of CV QDS in the presence of an eavesdropper on the quantum
channels.
We then introduce a continuous variable (CV) Quantum Secret
Sharing (QSS) protocol. Our security proof allows for classical infor-
mation to be split and shared between multiple potentially dishonest
recipients, while retaining security against collective beamsplitter and
entangling-cloner attacks. In the last chapter of this half, we introduce
another QDS scheme which runs over identical hardware setup to
our QSS protocol. We analyse experimental data in which quantum
coherent states were distributed at a rate of 1 GHz, which for QDS
allows us to securely sign a message in less than 0.05 ms.
In the second half of this Thesis we suggest and discuss a determin-
istic source of nonclassical light, which we call “PhoG”. Our source is
based on the coherent diffusive photonics, relying on both coherent
and dissipative evolution of the quantum state, and may be realised
in an array of dissipatively-coupled laser-inscribed waveguides in a
χ(3) glass. We analyse the PhoG device with several analytical and
numerical models and demonstrate that a coherent state input leads
to a bright output state with strong photon-number squeezing. With
minor reconfiguration our system can generate entangelement be-







I would like to first thank my supervisor, Professor Natalia Korolkova, for her support and help 
over the past four years. My PhD has been fun, long, thrilling, difficult, enjoyable, frustrating, 
brilliant and always sinusoidal, and I am grateful to Natalia for her guidance and help in navigating 
each of these aspects. I should thank the many colleagues (and now friends) within the School 
of Physics and Astronomy who have contributed fun conversation and probing questions, and 
who have helped make the last four years so much fun. I have deeply appreciated these 
opportunities to grow in self-management and self-leadership, in scientific ability, in public 
speaking, in teaching, in writing, and in understanding and appreciation for our wonderful 
universe. Thank you to every undergraduate student I have taught or interacted with - you have 
reminded me that “yes I actually do quite enjoy physics, let me tell you why”. Thanks, Anton, for 
helping me understand Mathematica and Git. Thank you also to Hamish, to Jesús and to Cailean 
for giving me the privilege to work with you and explore fun aspects of quantum physics. I enjoyed 
it and I hope you did too.  
 
I acknowledge deep support from my family. Thanks for listening to me trying to explain my 
research time and time again, and thanks especially to my parents for instilling in me a love and 
an appreciation for science and mathematics. I am grateful to Dad for convincing me to pursue 
physics (instead of Chemistry), and to both Mum and Dad for working so hard to support me 
financially through my first degree, and emotionally during this one. And thanks to my siblings 
Peter, Naomi, Annalise, Abigail and Andy for many years of friendship and encouragement. 
 
I could not have survived without a little help from my friends. I am grateful, in particular, to those 
at St Andrews Baptist Church, who have put up with my potent combination of too-little-sleep and 
too-much-coffee for the last nine years. You have reminded me that there are bigger things to 
focus on and enjoy than the PhD, and more important places to find my self-worth and satisfaction 
than in my own productivity and scientific output. Thank you to Jesus for making (quantum) light 
in the first place. Thanks to everyone in the “Commune”. Thanks especially to James and Belinda, 
David, Daffyd, Jordan and Tamara, Emily, Gavin, the Milkman, the Irregulars, and so many more. 
I should say “thank you” to Andrew Rollinson for encouraging me towards a PhD in the first place 
(though he's probably forgotten about it) and say “hello” to Jason Isaacs. 
 
Finally, I am deeply indebted for the love and support I have received from my wife Hannah. She 
has encouraged me when the PhD has just been plain annoying and rejoiced with me when it has 
just been plain brilliant. Thank you for allowing me to lock myself away to write for the last few 













Research Data/Digital Outputs access statement 
 
 
Research data underpinning this thesis are available at https://doi.org/10.17630/6ba10862-
4bdd-478f-8bd7-4f4b4d383374 









1.1 Introduction to Thesis 1
1.2 Introduction to Quantum Physics 3
1.3 Modelling the quantum state 20
1.4 Quantum measurement 22
1.5 Entropy and probability 26
1.6 Summary 30
i agile cryptography : signatures and secrets
2 introduction to quantum cryptography 33
2.1 Conventional (classical) cryptography 33
2.2 Quantum digital signatures 37
2.3 How to share a secret 53
3 quantum digital signatures 61
3.1 Our QDS protocol 61
3.2 Security against repudiation 69
3.3 Robustness 75
3.4 Security against forgery 77
3.5 Bounding pe 78
3.6 Attack analysis 81
3.7 Signature length L 93
3.8 Postselection 94
3.9 Protocol performance 100
3.10 Outlook 102
4 quantum secret sharing 105
4.1 Our QSS protocol 105
4.2 Security against Eve 110
4.3 Security against a dishonest player 116
4.4 Protocol performance 118
4.5 Outlook 123
5 agile quantum cryptography 127
5.1 Introduction 127
5.2 CV agile quantum systems 133
5.3 Agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK 134
5.4 Agile system QDS-f-QKD-f-CV-QPSK 143
5.5 Experimental implementation 145
xv
5.6 Data analysis 149
5.7 Outlook 161
ii phog : generation of sub-poissonian light
6 phog : photon gun 167
6.1 Introduction 167
6.2 Single-mode model 171
6.3 Including loss 182
6.4 Three-mode model 193
6.5 Realistic parameters 200
6.6 Multi-mode model 201
6.7 Modal entanglement 209
6.8 Outlook 213
iii appendices
a cryptography : thermal noise channel 217
b cryptography : numerical methods 221
b.1 Truncation 221
b.2 Attack BS0 222
b.3 Attack BS1 222
b.4 Attack EC 223
c cryptography : larger qds alphabets 225
d phog : adiabatic elimination 227
e phog : numerical methods 231
e.1 Direct integration 231
e.2 Quantum Monte Carlo 233
e.3 Mean-field single-mode model 236
e.4 Linearized single-mode model 236
e.5 Mean-field multi-mode model 237




I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 introduction to thesis
This Thesis consists of two halves. In the first half, we consider several
related cryptographic protocols which securely perform the tasks
of Quantum Digital Signatures (QDS) and Quantum Secret Sharing
(QSS). Our goals here are, firstly: to remove an assumption of secure
quantum channels from continuous-variable (CV) QDS, and provide
a security proof when an eavesdropping attack is permitted; and
secondly: to demonstrate that several CV quantum cryptographic
protocols may be performed over identical hardware setups, while
the hardware at the quantum level is agnostic to the protocol being
implemented. This so-called “agile” approach illustrates a translation
of cryptographic agility from classical (conventional) cryptography
to quantum cryptography, and allows for a move towards secure and
practical quantum cryptosystems which can perform multiple tasks.
In the second half we consider the task of quantum state generation.
We design and analyse a system which is capable to deterministically
produce highly non-classical states at the output, from a coherent state
input. Using methods from the fields of nonlinear pulse propagation
in fibers and of open quantum systems, we analytically and numer-
ically analyse a large multimode system and reduce it, step-by-step,
to a single-mode system which is much more numerically tangible.
The device, which we denote PhoG (Photon Gun), will soon be imple-
mented in a waveguide array structure and will provide a practical
and cheap source of nonclassicality for quantum enhanced imaging
and metrology, and may even improve the performance of quantum
cryptographic systems.
The two halves of this thesis can be interpreted as studying different
aspects of quantum networked systems, in which both the individ-
ual systems, and the geometry of coupling between them, play an
important role. The first half considers quantum communications net-
works and cryptographic tasks which are inherently multipartite. By
studying the simplest networks of just three players (in two different
configurations) we move towards cryptosystems which can be imple-
mented entirely agnostic to the network structure. In the second half
we consider large structures of waveguide arrays, where the dynamics
are intimately connected to the underlying geometry. We focus on
quantum correlation flow and coherent signal propagation in this





This Thesis is structured as follows. In the remainder of this Chapter
we will introduce and outline several of the theoretical and analytical
tools which we make extensive use of in the rest of the Thesis. We
will show how the electromagnetic field may be quantized, discuss
several common and useful quantum states of the field, and examine
some methods for their description and visualization. In Chapter 2 we
outline some of the developments in conventional cryptography which
underpin our modern communications infrastructure, and discuss
how two cryptographic tasks – digital signatures and secret sharing –
may be translated to the quantum realm. In particular we will look at
several recent and historic attempts to build such quantum protocols.
part one : In Chapter 3 we introduce our own QDS protocol, and
prove its security against several classes of attack. Ours is the first CV
QDS protocol to allow for an eavesdropper on the channels, and we
show that despite this we attain very short signature lengths over prac-
tical distances. In Chapter 4 we introduce our QSS protocol, prove its
security, and analyse its performance. Crucially, unlike several recent
QSS protocols, our protocol does not require generation and distri-
bution of large-scale entangled states, nor does it require dedicated
hardware for a sequential “round-robin” style of approach. In the last
chapter of Part One, Chapter 5, we introduce and discuss the concept
of quantum cryptographic agility, and demonstrate how it may apply
to the protocols discussed in earlier chapters. We additionally intro-
duce a new QDS protocol which runs in a modified configuration,
and discuss how a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol which
already exists in the literature may be adopted into our agile system.
We finish with a figure-of-merit graph which demonstrates that our
QDS scheme, in addition to being practical and compatible with com-
mercial telecommunications hardware, is also the fastest QDS protocol
over comparable distances.
part two : In Chapter 6 we motivate and introduce the PhoG
device which will be the focus of the second half of this Thesis. We
demonstrate that dissipation, far from being a hindrance to the desired
evolution of our quantum system, is actually an asset and the main
driver towards target nonclassicality. We introduce an exotic form of
dissipation, called Nonlinear Coherent Loss, and show that in the
ideal limit it will deterministically lead to single photons at the output.
We then introduce progressively more complex models involving
additional bosonic system modes, and demonstrate that a realistic full
multi-mode model of the system can be used to effectively simulate the
Nonlinear Coherent Loss decay channel. Finally, we end the chapter
by demonstrating that in addition to generating highly sub-Poissonian
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states, a slight modification to the PhoG device will lead to generation
of entanglement at the output.
part three : We finish the Thesis with the inclusion of several ap-
pendices containing results which are used at multiple points through-
out the Thesis. Appendix A contains results describing the output
state of a channel in which an initial coherent state is mixed with
thermal noise. This result is used multiple times throughout Part
One. Appendix B contains the forms of quantum states which are
used under various channel attacks in Chapter 3, and a description of
how the states may be numerically modelled. Appendix C contains
a generalization of the QDS protocol from Chapter 3 to allow for
larger alphabets of coherent states. Appendix D provides a tool which
is used multiple times in Chapter 6 to reduce the complexity of a
model by effectively ignoring a mode which reaches its steady state
much quicker than the typical decay time of the system. Finally, in
Appendix E we describe several numerical methods which may be
applied to model the PhoG device. We compare them for speed, mem-
ory usage and accuracy, and then explicitly display several systems of
coupled differential equations which approximate the PhoG device.
1.2 introduction to quantum physics
In this Thesis we are primarily interested in the quantum properties
of single- or few- mode states of light. This Chapter will serve as a
short introduction to several of the key concepts which we deal with,
and some of their main properties. We first introduce the state vector
and density matrix formalisms for description of quantum modes, in
which the physical state is completely described by sums and outer
products of vectors chosen from a countably infinite Hilbert space. We
introduce single-mode operators and several single-mode states, and
visualise them using a quantum analogue of a classical phase-space
probability distribution known as the Wigner function. Multi-mode
quantum states are introduced as states on larger vector spaces which
are formed via a tensor product operation.
We introduce a third description of the quantum state which cap-
tures the second moments (co-variances) of multi-mode states, the
so-called covariance matrix. This allows for a complete description of
properties of a state which is Gaussian in phase-space, otherwise it
offers a partial description which is nonetheless useful.
Evolution of the quantum state is described by the von Neumann
equation (no dissipation) or the Lindblad master equation (including
dissipation). The latter allows for us to model the dynamics of a few
modes chosen from much larger multi-mode system, provided that the
two are weakly coupled and the larger system (environment/reservoir)
is effectively unchanged by the system evolution.
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Finally, we display several selected entropic and probabilistic rela-
tions and quantities which we use in this Thesis. In particular, the
notion of conditional probability, and the intimately related Bayes’
theorem, will prove useful both as helpful quantities in their own
right, and as foundational building blocks for conditional classical and
quantum entropies.
1.2.1 State vectors and density matrices
An ideal quantum state is denoted in the Dirac notation by |ψ〉. This
state has been perfectly prepared with no noise, loss, or additional
uncertainty due to the preparation. The |ψ〉 is a vector living in a
vector space denoted H, which we call a Hilbert space. The space has
dimension |H|, typically taken to be countably infinite, but there will
be several points in this Thesis where we consider a finite |H|.









cj |ej〉 , (1.1)
where the number of basis vectors typically equals |H|.
The state |ψ〉 should be normalized, that is
〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1. (1.2)
The notation 〈ψ|ψ〉 means ∑
j
∣∣cj∣∣2 . (1.3)
We define an eigenstate of an arbitrary quantum operator r̂ to be the
state |r〉 such that
r̂ |r〉 = r |r〉 (1.4)
with eigenvalue r ∈ C.
The basis we choose for vector |ψ〉 is not unique and we may simi-




|r〉 〈r|ψ〉 , (1.5)
where the 〈r|ψ〉 ∈ C is such that its square modulus |〈r|ψ〉|2 is the
probability that a measurement of r on |ψ〉 will give outcome r.
For convenience any basis vectors we use are chosen to be orthonor-
mal, that is 〈
êj
∣∣êk〉 = δj,k (1.6)
where δj,k is the Kronecker δ function.
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The fact that a state |ψ〉 may be written as a sum of basis vectors
corresponding to different possible measurement outcomes is a cu-
rious one, and is a key feature of quantum mechanics known as the
superposition principle. A superposition state is one of the form
|ψ〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
(1.7)
where the constant factor 1/
√
2 ensures normalization. We have chosen
an abstract orthonormal basis set {|0〉 , |1〉}, and here |H| = 2. The
superposition state possesses a fundamental uncertainty about its
measurement outcomes, that is to say, if many identical copies of |ψ〉
are created, and on each copy a measurement which distinguishes
between |0〉 and |1〉 is performed, then the measurement will output
0 half of the time, and 1 the other half of the time. If, however, we
are able to perform a measurement which distinguishes between
(|0〉 ± |1〉) /
√
2, then we will find the output (|0〉+ |1〉) /
√
2 100% of the
time. This is markedly different from a statistical mixture, involving
classical ignorance about whether the state is |0〉 or |1〉.





where 〈i| ∈ H∗ is dual to |i〉 (H∗ is the dual space to H). We shall often
use the terms density operator and density matrix interchangeably.
Any state vector |ψ〉 can be described as a density operator. For
example, the state |ψ〉 in Eq. 1.7 may equivalently be described as
ρψ = |ψ〉〈ψ| =
1
2
(|0〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|) . (1.9)
However, there are density operators which do not correspond to a




= |φ〉〈φ| . (1.10)
The density operator formalism may be interpreted as encoding two
distinct forms of uncertainty: quantum and classical. The quantum
uncertainty arises from states which may be written as superposition
state vectors, while the classical uncertainty arises from states which
cannot. We refer to the first type of summation as superposition, and
the second type of summation as classical mixing (or a statistical
mixture). The classical mixing represents classical uncertainty about
which state the system is in, and may in principle be removed by
building better equipment.

















The quantum nature of a state ρ is therefore intimately connected
to the off-diagonal elements of its density matrix, which are often
referred to as coherences. The density matrix ρ will be our primary tool
for describing a quantum state in this Thesis.
1.2.2 Introduction to quantum optics
In the absence of currents or charge, classical electromagnetic fields
obey Maxwell’s equations:
∇ ·B = 0, ∇×E = −∂B
∂t
, ∇ ·D = 0 and ∇×H = ∂D
∂t
.
We may quantize these electric and magnetic fields by replacing the
vectors B,E,D,H with the corresponding operators B̂, Ê, D̂, Ĥ , and
imposing that the classical fields should be regarded as expected
values of these quantum operators:
E = 〈ψ|Ê|ψ〉 etc. (1.12)
By analogy with the classical vector potential, let us introduce the




, B̂ = ∇× Â, and ∇ · Â = 0. (1.13)
As in classical electromagnetism, the first two of these requirements
automatically imply that the first two of Maxwell’s equations are sat-
isfied, while the third requirement (“coulomb gauge”) is merely a
convenient choice which immediately satisfies the third Maxwell equa-
tion1. The final Maxwell equation is then equivalent to the following
wave equation




These equations contain all of the same information as Maxwell’s equa-
tions, just involving the quantized vector potential. This Â contains
all information about our light wave.
The Hamiltonian of our electromagnetic field takes the same form





Ê · D̂+ B̂ · Ĥ
2
. (1.15)
1 Since light in linear media behaves as D̂ = ε0εÊ, where ε0 is the vacuum per-
mittivity and ε is the electric permittivity of the medium in question. The other
“constitutive equation” is Ĥ = µ−10 µ
−1B̂, for permeability µ of the medium, and
vacuum permeability µ0.
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The electromagnetic wave equation, Eq. 1.14, is a linear differential
equation, and so we may sum any two solutions together to form a
new solution. Let us define a set of monochromatic classical waves
Aj
(−→r , t) = Aj (−→r ) exp−iωjt (1.16)
oscillating at frequency ωj. We have assumed that the temporal and
spatial aspects of the wave can be separated, and let the vector Aj
(−→r )
contain all spatial information. We expand the quantum vector poten-
tial Â as
Â




(−→r , t) âj +A∗j (−→r , t) â†j] , (1.17)




(−→r , t), expanded in a basis of monochromatic



















= δj,k. We are thus led
to identify the âj, â
†
j as the raising and lowering operators of a simple
harmonic oscillator which obeys the Hamiltonian Eq. 1.18.
We have effectively split the full quantum description of light into
two parts, classical and quantum. The classical quantities Aj
(−→r , t)
fully describe all wave properties of the light, while the quantum
operators âj describe the quanta present in a single mode. For this
Thesis we will focus on these quantum systems and ignore the wave
nature of light. That is to say, we will regard the mode operators
âj as accurately describing the full system of interest, irrelevant of
its classical properties. This proves to be a helpful distinction as it
allows for us to make general quantum statements which are true for
any bosonic system of quantum modes, regardless of their physical
implementation.
In Sec. 6.8 we will briefly return to the classical A
(−→r , t) in a 1+ 1D
system (one spatial dimension plus time). The A (z, t) are discussed
there in the context of light pulse propagation in waveguides where,
with physical implementation in mind, we must pay great attention
to the wave properties. We discuss there some methods to efficiently
model such classical behaviour, and then mention as outlook several
strategies which may be used to model the full propagation of a
quantum pulse, taking into account both classical and quantum effects.
For a more detailed discussion of the derivation presented here, we
refer the reader to the textbooks Refs. [1–3].
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1.2.3 Single-mode operators
The bosonic operators â, â† create and destroy a quantum of energy





and are crucial for modelling the quantum properties of our light.
We define the photon-number operator n̂ as
n̂ = â†â, (1.20)
which counts the number of photons in our mode. Letting ω denote
















which are known as the “quadrature operators”, and can be shown to
obey the commutator
[q̂, p̂] = i h. (1.22)
The quadrature operators q̂ and p̂ correspond to field amplitudes
which are π/2 out of phase with each other. The annihilation operator




(ωq̂+ ip̂) . (1.23)
The quadrature operator for a general quadrature q̂θ is given by
q̂θ = q̂ cos θ+ p̂ sin θ, (1.24)
and the operators q̂, p̂ are recovered as special cases with θ = 0 and
π/2, respectively. The quadrature operators q̂, p̂ may be used to write
the well known Heisenberg uncertainty principle as
Var (q̂)Var (p̂) >  h2/4, (1.25)
where the variances in a general quantum state |ψ〉 are defined as
Var (q̂) = 〈ψ|q̂2|ψ〉− 〈ψ|q̂|ψ〉2 ,
Var (p̂) = 〈ψ|p̂2|ψ〉− 〈ψ|p̂|ψ〉2 . (1.26)
The uncertainty principle Eq. 1.25 implies that we cannot simultane-
ously measure q̂ and p̂ with arbitrary precision - in other words q and
p are conjugate variables.
The 〈ψ|q̂|ψ〉 denote the expectation value of q̂ in state |ψ〉. We
may equivalently write this as 〈q̂〉ψ, or simply just 〈q̂〉 when the
corresponding state is obvious or irrelevant. The expectation value of
an operator corresponds to the average measurement outcome when
many measurements of that operator is performed on the given state.
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The commutator Eq. 1.22 is equivalent to the commutator between
operators which describe position and momentum of a quantum
particle, and so we identify q̂ as the position operator and p̂ as the
momentum operator (thus corroborating Eq. 1.25). Indeed, it is easy














the middle terms of which describes the energy of a simple harmonic
oscillator in what follows we will set  h = 1 for convenience.
1.2.4 Wigner function
An equivalent way to describe the quantum state ρ is to use a (quasi)-
probability distribution known as the Wigner function. The Wigner
function, W (q,p), allows operator expectation values to be calculated
using an averaging method similar to classical mechanics in phase
space.
One immediate observation is that a quantum phase space must be-
have qualitatively very differently to the classical one. Because of
Heisenberg’s principle, we cannot accurately define a joint probability
distribution of position q and momentum p as this would require pre-
cise knowledge of both quantities. This leads to interesting behaviours
of the phase space “probability” distribution, such as becoming neg-
ative (for Wigner functions) or highly singular (for “P-functions”).
Indeed, one may even measure the “quantumness” of a given state by
checking for these properties.
















The marginal distributions of W are genuine probability distributions,




dp W (q,p) and P (p) =
∞∫
−∞
dq W (q,p) . (1.29)
A useful feature of the Wigner function is that traces over operators










dq dp W1 (q,p)W2 (q,p) (1.30)
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where Wi (q,p) is the Wigner function corresponding to operator
Ôi. Operator expectation values with respect a given state ρ̂ may be
calculated using Eq. 1.30.
The Heisenberg uncertainty relation further expresses itself in the
Wigner function picture by imposing a minimum area which a quan-
tum state must occupy. In the following sections we will see some
examples of quantum states and their corresponding Wigner functions.
In all plots of Wigner functions, the colour blue denotes W (q,p) > 0
while red denotes W (q,p) < 0. Negativity (red, in this Thesis) of the
Wigner function is a clear sign that the underlying state is nonclassi-
cal2.
Finally, we must note that the Wigner function is not the only quasi-
probability distribution which one could define on the phase space,
and because in general quantum operators do not commute there
are multiple ways to consistently define a phase space description.
Other common quasi-probability distributions are: the Hussimi Q
function [4], which is intimately related to heterodyne measurement;
Glauber-Sudarshan [5] P function, which is often used to describe
mixtures of coherent states and becomes highly singular in all other
cases; and the positive-P function, which is a generalization to the P
function and is defined to be non-diagonal in the coherent state basis,
and which allows quantum effects such as squeezing to be described
[2]. One may also use these quasi-probability distributions to predict
dynamics of the system using a Fokker-Planck diffusion equation [6],
analogously to a classical stochastic process.
We use the Wigner function in Appendix A to simplify a calculation
which is analytically difficult in the density matrix picture, and the
Wigner functions offer an excellent visualization tool in the following
few sections.
1.2.5 Fock states
Fock states (also called photon-number states) are defined as eigen-
states of the photon-number operator n̂ = â†â:
n̂ |n〉 = n |n〉 . (1.31)
In other words, n̂ measures the number of photons in |n〉. The states
have perfectly defined photon-number and find many applications in
quantum information processing [7, 8]. The creation and annihilation
operators â†, â act on |n〉 as
â |n〉 =
√
n |n− 1〉 ,
â† |n〉 =
√
n+ 1 |n = 1〉 .
2 Indeed, the only pure quantum states with non-negative Wigner functions are those
with Gaussian Wigner function, i.e. the Glauber coherent states and the quadrature
squeezed states.
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The Fock states form an orthogonal basis for H:
〈m|n〉 = δn,m, (1.32)
and so we will often seek an expansion of other states in the Fock-state
basis. In particular, our density matrix ρ is written in a Fock state
expansion as
ρm,n = 〈m|ρ̂|n〉 . (1.33)
Wigner functions corresponding to some example Fock states are
displayed in Fig. 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Wigner functions for Fock states |1〉 and |2〉. Blue signifies that the
Wigner function is positive, while red signifies that the Wigner
function is negative.
1.2.6 Quadrature states
We define the eigenstates of quadrature operators q̂ and p̂ as
q̂ |q〉 = q |q〉 and p̂ |p〉 = p |p〉 . (1.34)
These |q〉 , |p〉 are known as quadrature states. Although they are not
normalizable, the quadrature states are a useful tool in quantum optics.
For example, we will use them to describe ideal homodyne detection,
Sec. 1.4.1, and they are also required for the definition of the Wigner
function in Eq. 1.28.
1.2.7 Coherent states
Coherent states3 are among the most important quantum states which
we discuss in this Thesis. The coherent state |α〉 is defined as the
eigenstate of annihilation operator â:
â |α〉 = α |α〉 . (1.35)
3 Also known as Glauber coherent states [5].
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This coherent state has amplitude α ∈ C, and we display an example
of a coherent state Wigner function in Fig. 1.2. It can be shown that
the area occupied by the coherent state is the smallest allowable area
of phase space for a Wigner function to cover. In other words, the
coherent state saturates the Heisenberg bound and is a minimum
uncertainty state.
Figure 1.2: Wigner function for coherent state |α〉 with α = 1+ 1i.












where α∗ denotes the complex conjugate of α, and so we will regularly









In the first part of this Thesis we will consider several quantum
cryptographic protocols involving distribution of coherent states. We
will regularly use an alphabet of coherent states known as the QPSK
(Quadrature Phase-Shift Keying) alphabet,
QPSK alphabet: {|α〉 , |iα〉 , |−α〉 , |−iα〉} , (1.38)
and we display a mixture over the QPSK alphabet in Fig. 1.3. We
will not explicitly distinguish between whether we refer to the set
of quantum states {|α〉 , |iα〉 , |−α〉 , |−iα〉} or the corresponding set of
complex amplitudes {α, iα,−α,−iα}, since it should always be obvious
which is meant.
A special case of the coherent states is that with eigenvalue 0,
â |0〉 = 0 |0〉 . (1.39)
This state is known as the “vacuum” state, and is a special example of
a quantum state, since |0〉 is also an eigenstate of n̂, and is thus a Fock
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state4 with a photon number 0. The coherent state possesses the same
uncertainty properties as the vacuum state.
(a) (b)
Figure 1.3: The Wigner function for a mixture over the QPSK alphabet is
a sum of individual Wigner functions for each of the coherent
states. QPSK alphabet with (a) α = 1.5; (b) α = 0.8.
(a) (b)
Figure 1.4: NPSK coherent state alphabet withN = 8. (a) |α| = 1.5. (b) |α|=0.8.
A generalization to QPSK is the so-called NPSK alphabet, in which
N coherent states are chosen. The states are again equally distributed
around the origin of phase space, and we note that QPSK is the special
case N = 4. We display an example in Fig. 1.4.
1.2.8 Thermal states






e−nβ |n〉〈n| , (1.40)
4 It can also be viewed as a thermal state with n̄ = 0, c.f. Sec. 1.2.8.
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with β = ( hω) / (kBT), reduced Planck’s constant  h, angular fre-
quency ω, Boltzmann’s constant kB and thermal equilibrium tem-
perature T . As we see from the form of Eq. 1.40, the thermal state
is a classical mixture of Fock states (c.f. Eq. 1.10). Typically we will
parametrise the thermal state using the average thermal photon num-





which measures the average number of photons in the thermal state.
We display the Wigner function of a thermal state in Fig. 1.5, where
we have also displayed the vacuum state variance, for comparison.
Figure 1.5: The thermal state Wigner function is Gaussian, with variance
greater than the vacuum state variance, which is depicted in
orange.
1.2.9 Squeezed states (quadrature)
We have already encountered the Heisenberg relation, which imposes
a minimum phase space area which a state can occupy. The coherent
state was a minimum uncertainty state and so occupied the minimum
possible area while possessing symmetry: Var (q̂) = Var (p̂). Of course,
it is possible to satisfy the Heisenberg relation while also taking
Var (q̂) 6= Var (p̂), and this is precisely what (quadrature) squeezed
states do. We display some examples of quadrature squeezed states
in Fig. 1.6. In the limit of infinite squeezing one obtains quadrature
states |q〉 and |p〉.
Quadrature squeezing is generated by application of the squeezing
operator








which may be realised, for example, by degenerate parametric amplifi-
cation [9].
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Figure 1.6: Quadrature squeezed states. Squeezing operator Ŝ (ζ) has been
applied to vacuum. (a) ζ = 1.0. (b) ζ = −1.0. Orange circles denote
vacuum variance. Squeezed states allow for reduced uncertainty
in one quadrature, at the expense of increased uncertainty in the
conjugate quadrature.
1.2.10 Squeezed states (photon-number)
We have seen that the coherent state |α〉 may be expanded in Fock
basis as Eq. 1.37. From this equation it may be shown that the photon-
number distribution of |α〉 is






which obeys Poissonian statistics, i.e. its mean is equal to its vari-
ance. The thermal state can be shown to possess super-Poissonian
photon statistics, with variance larger than its mean. Conversely, a
sub-Poissonian state has reduced photon-number variance, with a vari-
ance smaller than its mean. The Fock state, with zero photon-number
uncertainty, is the limiting example of a sub-Poissonian state.
In addition to the quadrature squeezing discussed above, in which
the variance in one quadrature was reduced at the expense of the other,
we may think of a photon-number squeezed state in which the photon-
number variance is reduced, at the expense of an increase in the
phase variance5. We display the Wigner function of a photon-number
squeezed state in Fig. 1.7.
5 Note that quantifying such a statement is tricky, and we refer the reader to Ref. [10]
for discussion.
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Figure 1.7: A photon-number squeezed state has reduced photon number
uncertainty, at the expense of increased uncertainty in phase. In
the limit of zero photon number uncertainty one obtains a Fock
state, Fig. 1.1. This state displayed here is only slightly photon-
number squeezed, but more closely represents a Fock state Wigner
function than a quadrature squeezed state does.
1.2.11 Mixing, purity, and entanglement
Purity
We have already seen in Sec. 1.2.1 that the density matrix ρ can en-
code two types of uncertainty, quantum and classical. The quantum
uncertainty is related to superpositions of basis states and is insur-
mountable, while the classical uncertainty represents ignorance of
which quantum state was prepared, and can in principle always be
reduced. A state possessing only the first type of ignorance may in
general be written as




where without loss of generality we have used the Fock basis, and
the cn are complex coefficients. We call the the state Eq. 1.44 a “pure”
state. Any state which is not pure is “mixed”. A state with only the





where without loss of generality we have used the Fock basis, and dn
are real coefficients. The state Eq. 1.45 only has diagonal elements in
its density matrix, and if there are two or more nonzero dn then the
state is completely mixed.
Given a density matrix ρ, it is time consuming and difficult to check
by hand which of these forms it takes, and in most situations it will
not fit neatly into either form. We therefore desire a function which
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will identify and quantify which type of ignorance the state possesses,
and which may be easily computed on ρ. To do this, we first introduce





where without loss of generality we have used the Fock basis, but we
note that we may instead sum over any orthonormal basis for H. By
definition, the trace of a normalized state must be 1. We introduce
the notion of purity of a quantum state as a measure of how close to






which we will simply call the purity. It can easily be shown that state
Eq. 1.44 has purity 1 while state Eq. 1.45 has purity 0.
Entanglement
Let us now turn to consider two-mode quantum states. We have
already seen that a single-mode quantum state exists as a vector on
Hilbert space H. To describe two modes, we introduce an additional
Hilbert space and write Htot = H1 ⊗H2, where H1,2 are Hilbert
spaces of the individual modes, ⊗ represents the tensor-product, and
Htot is the total Hilbert space. We may tensor product any two single-
mode quantum states together to form a state on Htot, for example
|α〉1 ⊗ |n〉2 (1.48)
represents a state on Htot, consisting of a coherent state with ampli-
tude α on H1, and an n photon Fock state on H2. For convenience we
will often write |α,n〉 instead of |α〉1 ⊗ |n〉2.
Now, there are many states which we can write in the form Eq. 1.48.
The general form of this type of “product-state” is
ρproduct = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| with |Ψ〉 = |ψ〉1 ⊗ |φ〉2 . (1.49)






called “separable” because the total two-mode state can be separated
out into distinct single-mode density operators of modes 1 and 2
individually. The separable state may be interpreted as a classical
mixture of product states.
Any state which cannot be written in the form Eq. 1.50 is known
as a “non-separable” or “entangled” state. Entangled states cannot be
written as a classical mixture over single-mode density operators, and
so even full information about each individual mode is not sufficient
18 introduction
to fully describe the total system. Such a remarkable feature is one of
the key departures of the quantum world from the classical one, and





i,j,k,l ci,j,k,l |i, j〉 〈k, l| be a general two-mode density opera-

















ci,j,k,l (〈n|l〉 〈k|n〉) |j〉 〈l|
=: ρ2.
The partial trace over mode 2 (yielding state ρ1) is defined analogously.
In the specific case that the total state ρ is pure, it can be shown that









< 1 then the total state ρ must be entangled.
1.2.12 Two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV)
Each of the states we have seen so far are single-mode states. Here
we meet our first specific example of a two-mode state, the two-mode





(tanh ζ)n |n,n〉 . (1.51)
The parameter ζ controls the level of two-mode squeezing of the state,
and thus parametrises both its energy and its level of entanglement.
The reduced states of |TMSV〉 are thermal states with thermal photon
number n̄ = sinh2 ζ, which we display in Fig.1.8. Remarkably, the
state has strong quadrature correlations between modes:
q1 ∼ q2,
p1 ∼ −p2,
where the position quadratures are correlated and the momentum
quadratures are anticorrelated. We explicitly show this in the two-
mode squeezed vacuum wavefunction in Fig. 1.9. The correlations
between modes are a direct consequence of entanglement, making the
two-mode squeezed vacuum a canonical resource state for quantum
information processing. We shall use the TMSV extensively in the
first part of this Thesis, since possession of one of its modes allows
information about its second mode to be gained.
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Figure 1.8: Wigner functions of reduced states of a TMSV with ζ = 0.65.
The corresponding quadrature wavefunctions are displayed in
Fig. 1.9. Locally the modes look like thermal states with n̄ = 0.5,
c.f. Fig. 1.5. The vacuum variance is depicted in orange.
Figure 1.9: Quadrature wavefunction of the TMSV with ζ = 0.65, with
corresponding reduced state Wigner functions in Fig. 1.8. (a)
Position representation. (b) Momentum representation. We see
that position quadratures are strongly correlated, q1 ∼ q2, while
momentum quadratures are strongly anticorrelated, p1 ∼ −p2.
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1.3 modelling the quantum state
Let us introduce some additional tools which will help us to describe
the quantum state and its dynamics.
1.3.1 Covariance matrix
We define a “Gaussian” state as one with a Gaussian Wigner function.
A Gaussian function can be entirely described by its first and second
moments; the first moment is its mean, and the second moment is its
(co)-variance. We introduce the “covariance matrix” of a multi-mode
Gaussian state as a quantity which contains all information about the
state’s second moments. Then, for a Gaussian state, the covariance
matrix offers a description of the quantum state which is equivalent
to the Wigner function or density matrix descriptions.
Let two modes be labelled 1 and 2. Then the covariance matrix


















d = [x̂1, p̂1, x̂2, p̂2], with the natural generalization to N
modes. The covariance matrix σ is thus a 4× 4 (or 2N× 2N) matrix .
A key quantity of the covariance matrix is its “symplectic eigenval-










We use the symplectic eigenvalues in Chapter 6 to quantify the en-
tanglement between two modes described by their covariance matrix.
Additional properties of the covariance matrix which we require will
be introduced as needed, and we refer the reader to classic texts such
as Refs. [13, 14] for further information.
1.3.2 Beamsplitter relations
The beamsplitter is one of the most important devices in quantum
optics. On an ideal beamsplitter, two input quantum states interfere
to produce two output states. The beamsplitter always requires four
beams (two input and two output). We depict the beamsplitter in
Fig. 1.10.
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Figure 1.10: The beamsplitter transforms â1, â2 into â3, â4 via the matrix
equation 1.55.














which transforms two input modes into two output modes as
â3 = τâ1 − ρâ2 and â4 = ρâ1 + τâ2. (1.56)
To conserve energy we require |τ|2 + |ρ|2 = 1. Finally, we will make
extensive use of the following relation, which describes the output
state when two input Fock states interfere on the beamsplitter. As in
Ref. [1] we take τ and ρ to be real6, such that τ =
√
T and ρ =
√
1− T ,
























(k1 + k2)! (n1 +n2 − k1 − k2)!× |k1 + k2,n1 +n2 − k1 − k2〉 .
(1.57)
We later identify T with channel transmission.
1.3.3 Master equation
We now introduce some formalisms which will account for dynamics
of a quantum system described by density matrix ρ. In a closed system,
in which ρ is a (potentially large) density matrix describing all degrees
of freedom, the evolution is entirely governed by the von Neumann
equation7
6 Reflectivity coefficient ρ has no relation to density operator ρ̂.









with Ĥ the Hamiltonian which controls the time-evolution of ρ. Al-
though exact, the von Neumann equation is often difficult to solve,
especially in the case of very large ρ.
There are many instances, however, where we do not care about
modelling precise evolution of all degrees of freedom of ρ. One may
think, perhaps, of a few quantum modes of interest which are weakly
coupled to many more modes. We denote the interesting modes as
“system” and the uninteresting ones as “reservoir”, and write ρS =
trR [ρ]. In this case, instead of solving the von Neumann equation we












where ĤS describes evolution of the system state only, γ is the decay



















as the Lindbladian, and Â is the collapse operator which describes
decay into the reservoir. The first term in Eq. 1.59 describes unitary
(reversible) evolution of ρS, while the second term describes dissipative
(irreversible) evolution.
We will make use of the Lindblad master equation with several
different collapse operators in Chapter 6. For derivation of the master
equation, including a detailed accounting of the requisite assumptions,
we refer the reader to Refs. [6, 15].
1.4 quantum measurement




which act on a
quantum state |ψ〉, each measurement operator corresponding to a
different possible measurement outcome j. The probability that j is
observed after measurement on |ψ〉 is given by the overlap
P (j) = 〈ψ| M̂†jM̂j |ψ〉 , (1.61)














jM̂j = 1, (1.63)
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which encodes the normalization requirement for the probability dis-
tribution ∑
j
P (j) = 1. (1.64)
Let us identify M̂†jM̂j with an operator Êj, which we shall refer to




is known as a “POVM”8 [16]. The
POVM measurement formalism allows for a convenient description of
quantum measurement statistics, as
P (j) = 〈ψ|Êj|ψ〉 (1.65)
with no reference to the post-measurement state.
To illustrate the advantage of the POVM formalism, let us briefly
consider an example, which we will revisit in later chapters. Suppose
that Alice sends Bob one of two quantum states, either |ψ1〉 = |0〉 or
|ψ2〉 = (α |0〉+β |1〉), with α2 +β2 = 1. We assume that α,β ∈ R for
simplicity. Bob wishes to perform some measurement on his received
state to determine whether he received |ψ1〉 or |ψ2〉. To do so, let Bob

























Ê3 := 1− Ê1 − Ê2.





there is zero chance he will record outcome E1. Therefore, if Bob
receives outcome E1 he knows with certainty that Alice sent him |ψ2〉.
Likewise, if Bob receives outcome E2 then he knows with certainty
that Alice sent |ψ1〉. However, should Bob receive E3 then he gains no





thus performs an unambiguous discrimination
[16] between the non-orthogonal states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉, and Bob will
never misidentify the state which Alice sent. This comes at a cost:
sometimes Bob gains no information at all. Designing POVMs and
measurement schemes to optimally distinguish between a known
set of states is a difficult problem which has received considerable
attention over the years. We will revisit this question in Chapters 3
and 4 in the context of quantum cryptography, where bounding a
malicious party’s ability to distinguish between quantum states is of
critical importance.
8 Which stands for positive operator valued measure, for historical reasons.
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1.4.1 Homodyne measurement
Homodyne measurement is a frequently used technique for measur-
ing the quadrature components of the quantum state. A homodyne
detection scheme consists in measurement of quadrature operator
q̂θ = cos θq̂+ sin θp̂, which gives outcome probabilities
P (qθ) = 〈qθ|ρ|qθ〉 (1.66)
where |qθ〉 is the eigenstate of q̂θ (c.f. Eq. 1.34). The set of operators
|qθ〉〈qθ| form the homodyne POVM.
In practice the homodyne POVM is realised by mixing ρ with a
strong coherent state |α〉, |α|  1 (the so-called “local oscillator”),
on a balanced (50/50) beamsplitter, and subtracting the measured
photocurrents at the output arms from each other. We depict this
process in Fig. 1.11. We assume in the ideal case that the photocurrents
I1 and I2 are such that
I1 ∝ n̂1 and I2 ∝ n̂2 with n̂i = â†iâi, (1.67)








Then the difference in photocurrents I2 − I1 is




I2 − I1 ∼
√
2 |αLO| q̂θ, (1.70)
where θ is the phase of the local oscillator |α〉. Varying the phase
θ thus allows any general quadrature q̂θ of ρ to be measured. The
prefactor
√
2 |αLO| does not affect our measurement, and may be taken
into account by an appropriate rescaling of measurement outcomes. A
more realistic treatment of homodyne detection, including discussion
of the range of validity of the above expressions, may be found in
Refs. [14, 17].
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Figure 1.11: The homodyne detector mixes the mode to be measured, â1,
with a strong local oscillator. The photocurrents are measured
and subtracted I2 − I1, which gives measurement information
about q̂θ. The quadrature angle θ is controlled via the relative
phase of the local oscillator.
1.4.2 Heterodyne measurement






d2α |α〉〈α| . (1.71)
The measurement gives outcome α with probability (1/2π) 〈α|ρ|α〉.
This scheme may be realised as a “double-homodyne” protocol, in
which an input state ρ is split on a balanced beamsplitter, and con-
jugate quadratures q̂1, p̂2 are measured on different output arms.
Since they operate on different modes, the operators q̂1, p̂2 must com-
mute. Simultaneous measurement of conjugate quadratures on the
same mode cannot be performed with arbitrary accuracy, and so the
heterodyne measurement outcomes must pay the penalty of increased
variance in P (q), P (p). Physically this arises from mixing with ρ with
vacuum on the first beamsplitter.
The heterodyne detector allows us to consistently define a joint
probability distribution of the measurement outcomes q1, p2. This
function is known as the Hussimi Q function and is a well-defined
probability distribution on the phase space9. The Hussimi function




〈α|ρ|α〉 with α = q+ ip√
2
. (1.72)
In the main body of the Thesis we will speak of the heterodyne
measurement as effectively giving two outcomes, qout,pout, one from
9 Unlike others such as Wigner function or P function, which we refer to only as
quasi-probability distributions
26 introduction
each homodyned arm. The α required for Eq. 1.71 are then given by
α = (qout + ipout) /
√
2.
1.5 entropy and probability
We will introduce and discuss some quantum entropies which are used
in the first part of this Thesis. Quantum entropies are a marvellous and
interesting area of quantum information theory, and there are many
interesting similarities with and departures from classical information
theory. Below we summarise some of the key results which we will
make use of in this Thesis, and the reader is referred to Refs. [16,
18–20] for further information.
1.5.1 Conditional probabilities
Let X and Y denote random variables, with their associated probabil-
ity distributions P (X) , P (Y). The conditional probability of X given Y,
P (X | Y) measures the probability of event X, given prior knowledge of
event Y. The probabilities P (X), P (Y) are known as the marginal prob-
abilities, and are related to the conditional probability by summing




P (X | Y = y)P (Y = y) . (1.73)
Bayes’ theorem may be used to relate conditional probabilities to each
other:




and we make extensive use of this formula in the first part of this
Thesis.
1.5.2 Hoeffding’s inequalities
Let X = X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be n independent binary random variables.




be its expected value.
Then ∀ε > 0 we may bound the probability that the empirical mean X̄































These inequalities are known as Hoeffding’s inequalities [21] and
will provide a necessary tool for analysis of our Quantum Digital
Signatures protocol.
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1.5.3 Shannon entropy
Let X be a random variable, which takes values X1,X2, . . . XN with
probability P (X1) , P (X2) , . . . , P (XN). The Shannon entropy associ-
ated with this variable is defined as












The Shannon entropy represents the degree of uncertainty which one
possesses about the variable X. If the value of X is known (minimum
uncertainty) then10 H (X) = 0. Conversely, if all possible values of X
are equally likely (maximum uncertainty) then H (X) = logN.
1.5.4 Binary entropy
Let X be a binary random variable, which takes value 0 with probabil-
ity p and value 1 with probability 1− p. Then the binary entropy of X
is defined as
h (X) = −x log x− (1− x) log (1− x) . (1.78)
The binary entropy is a special case of the Shannon entropy for a binary
random variable. We display the binary entropy h (X) in Fig. 1.12.
Figure 1.12: The binary entropy h (x) is bounded by log 2.
1.5.5 Mutual information
We define the joint entropy H (X, Y) of two random variables X and Y
as the Shannon entropy of the joint probability distribution P (X, Y).
The conditional entropy of X, conditioned on Y, is
H (X | Y) = H (X, Y) − H (Y) , (1.79)
10 By convention we take 0 log 0 = 0.
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which measures the average uncertainty we have about variable X
given that we know Y.
One may expand the conditional entropy as [19]
H (X | Y) =
∑
Y=y
P (Y = y)H (X | Y = y) , (1.80)
where the expansion is over particular outcomes of the prior variable.
Equation 1.80 admits a natural extension to the case when the prior





The mutual information between X and Y may be defined as
I (X : Y) = H (X) − H (X | Y) , (1.81)
which is a measure of how much knowledge of one variable reduces
uncertainty about the other variable. The mutual information is sym-
metric in its arguments.
1.5.6 Von Neumann entropy
The von Neumann entropy of a quantum state ρ is
S (ρ) = − tr [ρ log ρ] , (1.82)
which may be equivalently calculated as
S (ρ) = −
∑
j
λj log λj, (1.83)
where λj are the eigenvalues of ρ. The von Neumann entropy is always
non-negative, and is zero when ρ is pure.
By analogy with the Shannon entropy we will additionally define
the joint entropy of a composite system ρA,B in the obvious way
S (ρA,B) = − tr [ρA,B log ρA,B] . (1.84)
The conditional von Neumann entropy between quantum systems A
and B may then be defined:
S (A | B) = S (A,B) − S (B) , (1.85)
where the von Neumann entropy of a quantum system A or B should
be understood as the entropy of the corresponding reduced state ρA,
ρB.
1.5.7 Holevo information
The Holevo information χ is an upper bound on the mutual informa-
tion I, and plays a crucial role in many areas of quantum information
processing.
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We introduce two players, Alice and Bob. Let Alice prepare a state
ρj, j = 1, 2, . . . ,N, with probability p1,p2, . . . ,pN. Bob wishes to dis-
tinguish which of the ρj Alice has prepared.
Bob may perform any measurement described by POVM elements
{EK}, and he receives a measurement outcome K. Then the mutual
information I (j : K) describes the knowledge of which ρj was pre-
pared, given Bob’s measurement outcome K. The mutual information
is upper bounded by the Holevo information
I (j : K) 6 χ (j : K) , (1.86)
with the Holevo information χ defined as













For a pleasing proof that I is bounded by χ we refer the reader to
Ref. [16].
Throughout this Thesis we will refer to the first term in Eq. 1.87 as
the a priori entropy (with its corresponding a priori state ρ), while we
refer to the second term as the a posteriori entropy (with its correspond-
ing a posteriori state ρj). The bound in Eq. 1.86 will be used extensively
in the cryptographic security proofs in the first part of this Thesis.
1.5.8 Conditioning cannot increase entropy
A useful property of both Shannon and von Neumann entropies is
that “conditioning cannot increase entropy.” This directly encodes the
intuition that gaining more information about a system cannot lead
to increased uncertainty - at worst it will leave the uncertainty in our
knowledge unchanged. Quantitatively, we have for a quantum state
ρA,B
S (A) > S (A | B) , (1.89)
where the entropy of system A should be understood as the entropy
of ρA = trB [ρA,B]. Similarly, for classical random variables X, Y:
H (X) > H (X | Y) . (1.90)
1.5.9 Chain rule for conditional Shannon entropy
Let X1, . . . ,Xn and Y be random variables. Then [16, 19]
H (X1, . . . ,Xn | Y) =
n∑
i=1
H (Xi | Y,X1, . . . ,Xi−1) . (1.91)
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This property is known as the conditional Shannon entropy chain rule
and is readily proven by induction (see e.g. Ref. [16]) using Eq. 1.79.
1.6 summary
In this chapter we have provided a brief overview of several key
concepts and tools which underpin this Thesis. Additional material
which is required will be introduced as it is used. We have introduced
the density matrix formalism and discussed how it relates to other
methods for describing quantum states of light, such as the Wigner
function and the covariance matrix. Although in this Thesis we work
primarily in terms of the density matrix, the Wigner function has pro-
vided us with a useful visualization tool in this Chapter. Furthermore,
the Wigner function simplifies calculations in Appendix A which are
in principle possible, but difficult in general, using density matrices.
The covariance matrix is another useful tool which warrants exten-
sive study in its own right. We use the covariance matrix only in
Chapter 6 to measure the Gaussian entanglement properties of a state.
The Wigner function representation for a multimode quantum state is
intertwined with the covariance matrix description, and we refer the
reader to Ref. [14] for an excellent discussion of how to move between
the two pictures.
In the first half of this Thesis, Chapters 3-5, we will use the density
matrix description, along with the beamsplitter relation for input fock
states, in order to model the passage of a quantum state through a
channel. In the cryptographic protocols discussed there, a malevolent
party is assumed to replace the channel with an ideal beamsplitter.
They have control over the second input port, and receive the reflected
output state. We model this interaction and then use the entropies
introduced above to bound the ability of a dishonest player to break
the protocol.
In the second half of this Thesis we will examine in depth the
dynamics of a coherent state in several different scenarios. Our key
tool here will be the Lindblad equation which describes the evolution
of our density matrix. When possible we draw conclusions analytically,
but our main techniques will be the numerical methods discussed at
length in Appendix E. These allow us to gain an understanding of the
state evolution, sometimes even if computational constraints prevent
us from accessing the full density matrix.
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2.1 conventional (classical) cryptography
Cryptography is a field probably as old as civilization itself. For as
long as communication has existed, so too has the desire to keep
information hidden. Both the Greeks and the Romans are known to
have used ciphers to encrypt messages [22]. A cipher, after being
applied to a message, allows the encrypted message to be freely
transmitted and intercepted without an adverse party interpreting its
meaning. The intended recipients, however, can undo the effects of
the cipher and read the original message.
One famous example is the Caesar cipher. In the Caesar cipher, each
element of the alphabet which makes up the message (“plain”) is
assigned a new symbol (“cipher”). Typically this is done by shifting
the alphabet by a known quantity, Fig. 2.1. The plaintext message
is encoded with the cipher, replacing letters from the plain with
letters from the cipher. This encoded message is known as “ciphertext”
and now may be freely distributed. At face value, the ciphertext is
unreadable to anyone without access to the cipher.
Plain: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
Cipher: FGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDE
Plaintext: I like physics
Ciphertext: N qnpj umdxnhx
Figure 2.1: The cipher alphabet is formed of the plain alphabet shifted 5
elements to the left. Knowledge of the cipher allows the plaintext
message to be recovered.
Cryptanalysis – the art and science of breaking cryptographic sys-
tems – has existed for as long as cryptography, and history of crypto-
graphic development can be viewed as an arms-race between cryptog-
raphers and cryptanalysts. The cryptographers, which we canonically
call Alice and Bob, continually invent new schemes to perform their
secure communication task. The cryptanalyst, which we canonically
call Eve, continually tries to break these schemes in order to interfere
in Alice and Bob’s communication and obtain their messages. For
example, the Caesar cipher can be broken by trying all possible shifts
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of the alphabet and checking which give a sensible message at the
output. Against a more general cipher, Eve can perform a statistical
analysis on the ciphertext, provided that she knows the language
of the message. In English, for example, Eve knows that “e” is the
most frequently occurring letter, and so the most common letter in the
ciphertext is likely to decode to “e”.
Many advances on the Ceasar cipher have been developed, in which
a key (a shared secret piece of information) is used to encrypt and then
decrypt a message. While many schemes are secure against decryption,
they meet significant practical issues to actually distribute the key.
Indeed, the key distribution problem was one of the longstanding and
difficult problems which cryptographers have faced over the millenia.
Should the shared keys fall into enemy hands, secret messages may
be freely decrypted and their sensitive information made public.
One potential method to distribute keys requires Alice and Bob to
meet face-to-face in advance of their communication, in order to share
the keys which they will use for the next round of communication.
While secure, this is impractical. A third party courier could instead
be used as a go-between, but this places an assumption about the
trustworthiness of the messenger, and requires an unweildly overhead
for large-scale communications. In the second half of the 20th Century,
the following critical question became the focus of intense study of
a small group of cryptographers: “How can Alice and Bob share a
secret key, without ever meeting each other?”
To solve this problem, Diffie and Hellman [23] required a funda-
mental paradigm shift to the structure of conventional encryption.
Normally, as with the Caesar cipher, Fig. 2.1, the same key is used to
encrypt and to decrypt the message, Fig. 2.2 (a), a structure known as
“private-key (symmetric) cryptography”. It is the sharing of this key
which is the weak link in the encryption protocol. Diffie and Hellman
realised that it is possible to share the key without Alice and Bob ever
meeting1 face-to-face. The central idea behind the new “public-key
(asymmetric) cryptography” was the existence of so-called one way
functions, which are easy to perform but difficult to invert.
Diffie and Hellman’s proposal runs as follows. At the start of com-
munication, Alice and Bob publicly agree on a function, Yx modulo P,
with Y < P. The Y and P are assumed to be public knowledge. For
example, they may choose the function f (x) = 13x modulo 19. Now,
Alice and Bob each choose a number, labelled A,B, and keep it secret,
e.g. A = 2 and B = 4. Each number is fed into f: α := f (A) = 17
and β := f (B) = 4. The outputs α,β are shared between Alice and
Bob. Crucially, although calculating α,β was simple, it is tricky to
find A and B from this public information. Finally, Alice calculates
βA modulo 19 = 16 and Bob calculates αB modulo 19 = 16: Alice
1 Of course, at the beginning of the protocol Alice and Bob must be sure that they are
actually talking to each other [24].
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and Bob reach the same number, 16, which can then be used as the
encryption key. This discovery allows Alice and Bob to establish a key
entirely over public and insecure communication channels.
m 7→ EncryptK (m)
DecryptK [EK (m)] 7→ m
(a)







Figure 2.2: (a) Private-key encryption. The same key K allows Alice to en-
crypt and Bob to decrypt message m. (b) Public-key encryption.
Alice and Bob use different keys, E and D to encrypt and decrypt
m. The key E can be public knowledge without affecting the
security of the key D.
Security of this key exchange system relies on the fact that A and
B are kept secret, and it is the distinctions and relationships between
public and private information which underpin public key cryptog-
raphy. The function f is sometimes referred to as a “trapdoor” or
“one-way” function, and is typically based on a mathematical problem
which is deemed to be computationally hard: that is, even the most
powerful computers cannot hope to solve it in a feasible amount of
time. Typically the time taken to solve scales exponentially in the
size of the key. Perhaps the most well-known hard problem is that of
factoring a large integer into primes, which underlies the commonly
used RSA protocol [24, 25].
This type of security, relying on assumptions about computing
power, is known as computational security. In principle these cryptosys-
tems could be broken with a sufficiently powerful computer, or with
algorithmic advances. It has been shown, however, that while these
problems are hard for a classical computer, there exist algorithms for
a future quantum computer which can break them. The most well
known of these is Shor’s algorithm [26], which provides an exponen-
tial speedup in the ability to split an integer into its prime factors.
The existence of such algorithms which successfully solve the hard
problems poses a threat to many commonly used cryptosystems [16,
24–27]. One must therefore carefully consider how to respond to this
threat posed by quantum computers.
One solution will be to switch the underlying hard problem to a
different class of problems, which even a quantum computer cannot
solve. This is the approach adopted by the Post-Quantum Cryptog-
raphy (PQC) community, whose aim is to design protocols based on
problems for which no good quantum algorithm is yet known [28–
33]. However, it is still an open question which problems a quantum
computer can hope to solve, and so a premature implementation of a
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secure system based on a PQC hard-problem may still be threatened
by a quantum computer as new algorithms are developed.
The second solution to the threat posed by quantum computers is
to begin to adopt cryptosystems which are provably secure against
a quantum computer. There exist classical protocols for which this is
possible [34, 35], and we will discuss some of them in Sec. 2.3. However
for many applications classical cryptography does not allow for such
provably secure systems without an initial face-to-face interaction2,
and so one must move to the quantum realm.
Quantum cryptography bases its security not on the assumption of
a mathematical problem’s difficulty, but on physical laws. Instead of
aiming for computational security (albeit security against a quantum
computer), quantum cryptography aims to build the stronger uncon-
ditionally secure (or information-theoretically secure) protocols, which
cannot be broken even in principle. By basing security on physical
laws, quantum cryptography requires the sharing of physical systems
between players, and we shall see in the remainder of this Thesis
that quantum light is a natural object with which to perform such
cryptographic tasks.
One may think of the advantage provided by quantum cryptography
in terms of the one-way functions discussed earlier, Fig. 2.3. While
the classical one-way functions are only computationally hard, the
quantum analogue of the one-way function is provably impossible
to invert. For example, if the unknown quantum states are chosen
to be non-orthogonal then it is impossible to perfectly determine the
classical information which they encode [16, 36]. Any malevolent party
attempting to gain information will not do so perfectly, and will thus
leave evidence of their intrusion.
xi 7→ f (xi) easy
f (xi) 7→ xi hard
(a)
xi 7→ |xi〉 easy
|xi〉 7→ xi impossible
(b)
Figure 2.3: (a) A classical one-way function f is easy to perform but computa-
tionally difficult to invert. f is typically based on a hard problem.
(b) A quantum one-way function. If the quantum states |xi〉 are
chosen to be non-orthogonal then it is impossible to perfectly
determine the classical information x, given a quantum state |x〉.
This forms the basis for quantum cryptosystems, whose security
is guaranteed by the no-cloning theorem [16, 36]
2 To facilitate, for example, the sharing of large, random, secure keys.
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2.2.1 Classical digital signatures
Although encryption is perhaps the most well known cryptographic
protocol, it is by no means the only important task which is accom-
plished daily by modern cryptography. Digital signatures, for example,
are ubiquitous in our everyday information infrastructure, and they
are crucial to digital communication such as software distribution or
financial transactions. In many countries, a digital signature is even
legally meaningful. The aim of a digital signature scheme is to provide
a way to securely sign a classical message, such that it can neither be
forged nor tampered with. Additionally, every player should be able
to agree about the validity of the message.
One method which may be used to perform this task requires a
symmetric (private-key) cryptosystem, Fig. 2.2a, and a trusted arbiter.
Assume that Alice wishes to securely sign a message to Bob. We will
denote the arbiter as David. David should share one secure key κA
with Alice, and another κB with Bob. Alice encrypts her message m
with κA and sends it to David, who decrypts it. David adds to m a
statement that m definitely originated with Alice, and encrypts the
entire thing with κB and send it to Bob. Bob can decrypt and read
m, and is confident that it definitely originated with Alice, because of
David’s stamp of approval.
Such a scheme will accomplish all of the requirements of a digital
signature, including transferability, but the requirement that all com-
munication be mediated by arbiter David is a strong one, and David
will become a bottleneck in this system.
A more practical scheme uses asymmetric (public-key) cryptogra-
phy3, Fig. 2.2b. Assume that Alice has a private key, known only to
her, while Bob possesses her public key, which is freely available to
any interested party. Alice may sign her message by encrypting m and
send it to Bob. Bob decrypts using the public key, and he can freely
read m and be confident that it originated with Alice. Moreover, since
Alice’s public key is freely available her message m is transferable.
This system has the advantage of not requiring any trusted arbiter4
or bottleneck. The scheme described here was first invented by Diffie
and Hellman in 1976 [23].
This idea was expanded upon by Lamport in 1979 [38], whose
proposed signatures scheme uses one-way functions. Alice wishes
to send a one-bit message m to Bob. For each m she will create a
random string θ0, θ1 and input them to her one-way function f. Alice
then freely distributes {f (θ0) , f (θ1)}. Since f is one-way, a potential
3 A fascinating overview of the development of digital signatures may be found in
Ref. [37] which describes historic details which motivated signatures, and which
motivated the additional requirement of encryption-free signatures.
4 Though in practice one will use a certificate authority to distribute the public keys.
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forger cannot discover Alice’s θ0, θ1. When Alice wishes to send her
message, she will declare {m, θm}. Bob applies the function f to θm,
and if the output agrees with Alice’s earlier declaration he will accept
m as genuine.
Lamport’s scheme has the advantage that m is visible to all, and
the scheme does not require encryption of the message. A drawback
is that once the θm have been used they cannot be reused and must
be discarded. We note also that this scheme is inherently very similar
to hash-based signature schemes in which Alice first applies a hash
function h [24] to m, and then signs h (m) (e.g. via the Diffie-Hellman
protocol described above) and distributes m and her signed h (m).
2.2.2 Quantum one-way function
Gottesman and Chuang generalized Lamport’s scheme in 2001 to
build the first Quantum Digital Signatures protocol [39]. The key
contribution of their scheme is to replace the one-way function in
Ref. [38] with a so-called quantum one-way function, thereby securing
the signatures protocol against a quantum adversary.
A direct analogue of public-key cryptography, their protocol relies
on the difficult task, described above in Fig. 2.3, of accurately dis-
tinguishing between non-orthogonal quantum states. Security relies
on the fact that performing measurement on a state of n qubits can
yield at most n bits of information, and so the protocol in Ref. [39] is
designed such that this is insufficient to distinguish between states.
The key tool in the protocol is a quantum SWAP test which proba-
bilistically determines whether two states are identical. To perform this
test, players prepare |fx〉 , |fx′〉 and an additional ancilla (|0〉+ |1〉) /
√
2.
Players perform a Fredkin gate using the ancilla as a control, and then






(|fx〉 |fx′〉 ± |fx′〉 |fx〉) |y±〉
2
(2.1)
with y+ = 0 and y− = 1. Finally, the ancilla qubit is measured in the
0, 1 basis, and since |0〉 , |1〉 are orthogonal they can be distinguished.
Therefore if x = x′ the coefficient of |1〉 is identically zero, and so the
SWAP test always outputs |0〉. If x 6= x′ outputs either |1〉 or |0〉.
The probabilistic nature of this test will cause participants in the
protocol to sometimes mistake distinct states for identical ones, but the
probability that this occurs may be estimated. Crucially, the protocol
may be proven secure when this probability of honest failure is smaller
than the probability to correctly distinguish between states.
Although laying the groundwork for practical QDS protocols, this
original proposal cannot be feasibly implemented. The most pressing
problem is the requirement for long-term quantum memory. State-of-
the-art technology can store a photonic state for O (1) µs [40], and so
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long-term storage of many copies of quantum states with many qubits
will be challenging. Furthermore, the need for every party to be able
to create and distribute the states and the multiple required SWAP
tests render this protocol impractical for implementation.
However, the structure of this protocol is very closely aligned to
classical signatures protocols since the public keys are truly public (all
of them can be handed to Eve). Furthermore, every recipient is given
identical quantum public keys and so the number of recipients does
not need to be fixed before the start of the protocol. These requirements
are subtly changed in later – more practical – QDS protocols.
2.2.3 QDS implementation
A step forward to practical implementation of QDS occurs in Ref. [41],
in which Andersson et. al. replace the tricky to perform SWAP test
from Ref. [39] with a practical state comparison method. The previ-
ously required entangled qubits are also replaced by coherent states.
The requirements for QDS have thus been reduced to the generation,
distribution and storage of coherent states, with only beamsplitters
and photon detectors required at the recipient.
Figure 2.4: Non-destructive comparison method from Ref. [41]. The coherent
states interfere on a balanced beamsplitter. Assuming an ideal
detector, the absence of a detector click implies that α = β. Other-
wise, a click implies α 6= β. A second balanced beamsplitter may
be used to transform |(α+β) /
√
2〉 ⊗ |0〉 → |α〉 |β〉, and hence this
state comparison is non-destructive.
The key step, comparison of coherent states, is displayed pictorially
in Fig. 2.4. If the photodetector clicks it is a strong indication5 that
α 6= β. Furthermore this comparison is non-destructive, and simply
by placing another beamsplitter in the path of the lower beam, with
5 It is a certain indication, in the ideal limit.
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vacuum input to the second input port, one recovers |α〉 |β〉. Otherwise,
for α 6= β the output states of the second beamsplitter are symmetrized
and now identical to each other. This practical state comparison forms




Figure 2.5: Multiport used in Ref. [41] which guards against a cheating
Alice. The multiport symmetrizes Bob and Charlie’s states so they
always receive identical |(α+β) /
√
2〉 at their signal outputs. By
placing a photodetector at the null-ports Bob and Charlie can test
whether |(α−β) /
√
2〉 = |0〉. In the ideal scenario, a detector click
implies that α 6= β, while its absence implies that α = β.
Alice sends coherent states from her alphabet of possible coherent
states, both to Bob and to Charlie, and keeps a record of which states
she sent. To allow both parties to check whether they have received
identical states, an optical multiport Fig. 2.5 is used. The multiport
symmetrizes Bob and Charlie’s received states, thus preventing a re-
pudiating Alice. Each recipient has two outputs of the multiport: a
“null-port” and a “signal-port”. At the null-port is placed a photodetec-
tor which should be monitored for clicks, which in the ideal case will
indicate either that Alice is trying to repudiate, or a malicious party
is interacting with the state distribution. The signal-port yields the
symmetrized quantum coherent states which Bob and Charlie then
store in quantum memory.
Later, Alice sends the classical message, plus classical information
describing which states she had previously sent. Bob and Charlie
create the corresponding coherent states, and compare them via the
method in Fig. 2.4 with the states retrieved from quantum memory. If
no clicks are recorded during this comparison, it is an indication that
the message is genuine and the protocol passes.
This protocol was implemented by Clarke et. al. in Ref. [42], where
an alphabet with 8 phase-encoded coherent states was used. The total
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number of coherent states required to sign a message, the signature
length, was L ∼ 5× 106. The signature length is the main figure of
merit for QDS protocol6. To get around the requirement for quantum
memory, the Messing and Distribution stages occurred at the same
time so the coherent state corresponding to the chosen private key
may be interfered with the distributed quantum signatures. This pre-
vents their scheme from being used in a realistic setting where the
Distribution and Messaging stages can typically occur with a delay of
days, weeks or even years.
2.2.4 Removing quantum memory
The requirement that recipients possess long-term and efficient quan-
tum memory makes the above protocols impractical for realistic im-
plementation. The removal of this requirement by Dunjko et. al. [43]
was one of the major milestones towards a practical QDS which can
be implemented.
The key insight of Ref. [43] was to effectively replace the quantum
public key by a classical one, albeit one mediated by the distribution
and measurement of non-orthogonal quantum states. This physical
requirement is practical, relying simply on beamsplitters and pho-
todetectors capable of distinguishing just between zero and nonzero
photon numbers, such as avalanche photodiodes (APDs). The storage
of classical public keys is clearly no restriction.
The main difference then between Dunjko’s [43] and Gottesman’s
[41] protocols is that in Dunjko et. al. the state recipients perform mea-
surement immediately upon receipt of the quantum states. Remark-
ably, despite this fundamental change to the nature of the protocol’s
one-way function, secure QDS is still possible.






, length L, corresponding to each future one-bit mes-
sage m. The kmj are chosen uniformly at random from an alphabet of
coherent state phases {−α,α}. Alice then forms sequences of coherent
states ρ = ⊗Lj=0 |kmj 〉 which she then distributes to Bob and to Charlie.
Bob and Charlie pass their received coherent states through a shared
optical multiport, which serves to symmetrize their individual quan-
tum states. That is, after the multiport Bob and Charlie’s reduced
density matrices are identical, which guards against Alice’s repudia-
tion attack. Bob and Charlie monitor their null-ports, which guards
against repudiation attack or malicious activity during the state distri-
bution. Bob and Charlie perform unambiguous state discrimination
(USD) on the outputs of their signal ports, which will accurately dis-
tinguish between non-orthogonal states |α〉 , |−α〉 at the expense that
it will sometimes fail to give an answer.
6 Analogously to the key rate in QKD.
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will compare to their USD outcomes. Provided that there are enough
matches between Alice’s phase declarations kmj and Bob/Charlie’s
USD outcomes, messagem is accepted and the protocol has succeeded.
This first protocol avoiding the requirement for quantum memory
shows that QDS may be both practical and secure. Furthermore the
limited physical requirements – tensor-products of coherent states,
beamsplitters and non-photon-number-resolving detectors – are fea-
sible to work with, unlike the large number of superposition qubits
required for Ref. [39] or the quantum memories required for Ref. [41].
An implementation of a variation of Dunjko’s scheme is described
in Ref. [44]. Collins et. al. modify Dunjko’s scheme in two key ways.
Firstly, a QPSK alphabet is used. This is in order to make the second
modification: instead of using unambiguous state discrimination (USD)
measurement, they perform unambiguous state elimination (USE) mea-
surement. If the measurement succeeds, rather than being able to
say definitively which state was received, a recipient can say with
certainty which state was not received. The main advantage of the USE
measurement scheme is that the probability that the measurement
fails is significantly smaller than for USD, and so the resulting QDS
scheme gains a boost in efficiency. Indeed, if the USE eliminates N− 1
of N possible states, then one knows with certainty which state was
sent. USD may be thus viewed as a special case of the more general
USE measurement, and the shift from state discrimination to state
elimination allows for much greater efficiency in QDS schemes.
Collins et. al. estimate a signature length L = 5.1× 1013 in order to
sign a message. Notice the subtle shift between Refs. [39] and [41–44].
While in Gottesman’s protocol the number of recipients did not need to
be determined until the Messaging stage, in later protocols it must be
determined before Distribution. After the coherent states have passed
through the multiport the number of recipients cannot be changed.
Because of the physical requirements for the optical multiport, it
will also be challenging to generalize to more recipients. Realistic
implementation of the multiport also introduces noise and losses due
to misalignment and instability, further reducing the efficiency of the
protocol, and requires Bob and Charlie to be physically connected. In
Ref. [42, 44], for example, Bob and Charlie are separated by 5 m of
optical fibre.
2.2.5 Removing multiport
The fact that the QDS schemes discussed above require dedicated
multiport hardware at the receivers makes implementation in real-
world situations difficult. The multiport introduces losses and noise,
and requires tricky synchronisation between Bob and Charlie in order
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to correctly interfere the states. The experiment in Ref. [44] therefore
has Bob and Charlie only separated by 5 m optical fibre.
To combat this, Wallden et. al. [45] propose two QDS schemes specif-
ically designed to run over the same hardware platform as QKD. In
particular, they get rid of the multiport which was previously used
to symmetrize Bob and Charlie’s reduced output states. Their key
insight is that rather than symmetrizing their states, it is sufficient to
symmetrize their measurement outcomes. Therefore, a step is added
to the distribution stage in which Bob and Charlie randomly swap
half of their measurement outcomes over a secure classical channel. If
Alice can gain no information about which outcomes were swapped
then she cannot repudiate.
This protocol was implemented by Donaldson et. al. in Ref. [46]
in which a message is securely signed over distances 500 m, 1000 m,
and 2000 m, with no requirement on the physical separation between
Bob and Charlie. The secure classical link may be realised via QKD,
and so Refs. [45, 46] begin to explore the close connections between
these two different quantum communication protocols. We explore
this further in Chapter 5. Donaldson et. al. achieve signature length
L = 1.93× 109 using QPSK coherent states and USE measurement,
which is a vast improvement over the L = 5× 1013 required in Ref. [44]
and means that secure quantum signatures may actually be both useful
and practical.
The most difficult assumption which Refs. [41–44] make, however, is
that there should be no eavesdroppers on the quantum channels. This
is a strong and impractical assumption, and one which subsequent
works have endeavoured to remove.
2.2.6 Allowing Eve
All signature schemes considered so far have made the assumption
that the quantum distribution channels are secure and they may not
be attacked or monitored by an eavesdropper, Eve. This is clearly an
unrealistic and unphysical assumption, but was a sensible one while
the pressing impracticalities of early QDS schemes (quantum memory,
multiport, tricky state comparison tests) were overcome. The emphasis
in earlier papers was on dishonesty internal to the protocol, i.e. which
attacks can Bob or Charlie mount when they already hold perfect
copies of the quantum public keys. However, in a realistic scenario
it is clear that an eavesdropper could attack the quantum channels as
states are being distributed, and so it is important to consider whether
this has any effect on QDS security.
Amiri et. al. [47] provide a QDS scheme which allows for an Eve
to eavesdrop on the quantum channels. In the worst-case scenario it
is assumed that Eve will conspire with a dishonest internal player
(Bob or Charlie in the case of a forging attack), and knowledge which
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Bob/Charlie hold about their own quantum public key measurements
is supplemented by knowledge learned through Eve’s attack.
The key modification which Ref. [47] makes is to have Alice use
different private keys (and so different sequences of quantum coherent
states for her public keys) for each recipient. This means that the
dishonest recipient is forced to eavesdrop on the honest recipient’s
quantum channel if he is to gain any information. This is in contrast to
earlier protocols in which the dishonest recipient held a perfect copy
of the quantum public key, which was identical to that of the honest
recipient.
The protocol relies on sending weak attenuated coherent states with
three different randomly chosen intensities, identically to decoy-state
BB84 [48]. The coherent states are randomly polarized in one of two
non-orthogonal polarization bases, and photon-number resolving de-
tection in one (randomly chosen) polarization basis is performed at
the receiver. The three different intensities are required in order to
circumvent a photon-number splitting attack [49, 50]. Players gain clas-
sical binary strings, which are later compared during the Messaging
stage. The protocol is secure provided that Bob’s (Charlie’s) string is
closer7 to Alice’s string than any possible string which a dishonest
eavesdropper can hold.
Because the security of discrete-variable QKD is advanced, the QDS
protocol proposed in Ref. [47] is secured against coherent eavesdrop-
ping attacks8 via an estimation of the smooth-min entropy [18, 51].
This is the commonly bounded quantity for analysis of quantum
cryptographic protocols [52, 53]. Amiri et. al. note specifically that
the quantum stages of their protocol are identical to the equivalent
QKD protocols, with difference only in the classical postprocessing of
measurement results. This becomes a common factor of many QDS
protocols as they move towards realistic and practical implementation,
even in commercial systems and installed fibers, and is a thread which
we shall pick up again in Ch. 5.
Because the dishonest player is forced to eavesdrop, he in fact
receives a worse copy of the honest player’s public key than in the
previously discussed protocols, and so somewhat counter-intuitively
Ref. [47] requires only an estimated L = 6× 108 over 50 km fiber.
Remarkably, this is shorter than previous protocols, despite relaxing a
security assumption.
An experimental implementation of a protocol which is similar to
Ref. [47] is described in Ref. [54], based on the protocol Ref. [55].
This protocol relies on distribution of decoy-state BB84 (attenuated
coherent states of several different polarizations, as with Ref. [47]).
The crucial difference betweens Refs. [47] and [54, 55] are that the
7 in Hamming distance.
8 We will discuss the hierarchy of eavesdropping attacks in Sec. 3.6.
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latter use a larger set of non-orthogonal polarization bases, while Alice
sends to Bob and Charlie identical public keys.
Yin et. al. [54] sign a 32 bit message over a distance of 102 km,
making their experiment the longest implemented message to-date.
Finally, we note the recent work by An et. al. [56] which boasts
an experiment with GHz clock rate based on Ref. [47], allowing for
coherent forging attacks by Eve and requiring single-photon detectors
at the receiver.
2.2.7 Side-channel attacks
It should be noted that “security” of a protocol is a theoretical state-
ment, and not a physical one. A protocol is secure only with respect to
a model of how it operates in the real world, and whether a so-called
unconditionally secure protocol can be broken in practice depends on
how realistic or practical its underling modelling assumptions are. For
example, although in many QKD protocols Eve is allowed to attack
the quantum channels and eavesdrop on all communication, she is
assumed unable to attack the physical devices which implement the
protocol.
For example, the QDS scheme presented in Ref. [47] relies on distri-
bution and detection of attenuated coherent states in different polar-
ization bases. A realistic Eve could attack the sending device in order
to gain information about the polarization of the prepared state and
so gain enough information to forge without detection even though
the protocol is unconditionally secure against conventional types of
eavesdropping attack.
An example of such a “side-channel” attack is the Trojan Horse
attack presented in Ref. [57]. Here, Eve shines a bright laser pulse into
Alice’s device and measures the few back-reflected photons. These
photons have picked up the same polarization which Alice imparted to
her prepared state, and so Eve is able to infer the chosen polarization
basis choice, giving her an undetected advantage.
To guard against side-channel attacks, honest parties have several op-
tions. One direction is to close known side-channels by additional pro-
tocol steps or additional hardware. Leakage of intensity-modulation
information may be removed by using a passive decoy-state scheme,
as in Ref. [58], which uses a parametric down conversion (PDC) source
to generate photon pairs. The idler is used to estimate channel pa-
rameters, much like decoy intensity modulations were earlier, and
the signal is projected into different non-orthognal polarization states.
Although Zhang et. al. reach channel distances of 200 km, they require
single-photon detectors cryogenically cooled to 2 K, and so it is dif-
ficult to see how this protocol could be implemented in a real-world
scenario.
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Against the Trojan Horse attack Alice and Bob could add additional
filters to their devices to block out light at Eve’s required wavelength.
It was shown however that Eve can bypass this by breaking Alice’s
filters in a way that is undetectable to honest players [59]. Closing side-
channels in this way may open up the protocols to additional attack
methods, which must then be understood, modelled and reacted-to.
This moves quantum cryptography into the same “cat-and-mouse”
development cycles as conventional cryptography.
To break this cycle, and to provide genuinely unconditional security
which is guaranteed against all conceivable side-channel attacks, there
has been a recent push towards device-independent cryptography.
The security of device-independent (DI) protocols makes no trust
assumptions about the devices used and it may even be assumed
that the devices are held by the malevolent party. DI cryptography is
then based entirely on laws of quantum mechanics, specifically on the
violation of a Bell inequality [60–62].
Full DI cryptography, while secure, is difficult to perform and may
offer figures of merit which are too pessimistic for the desired appli-
cation. One may compromise, then, and instead implement measure-
ment device independent (MDI) cryptographic protocols, in which no
trust assumptions are placed on the measurement devices (and they
can even be owned by Eve), while the state-preparation and sending
devices are held by honest parties and are trusted [63].
The first MDI QDS scheme is presented by Puthoor et. al. in Ref. [64],
which requires only a characterization of the states which are dis-
tributed through the quantum channel. Crucially, no assumptions are
placed on the detectors. An experiment by Roberts et. al. implements
either MDI-QDS, MDI-QKD or regular QKD with a switchable setup
[65]. By handing the untrusted measurement device to Charlie, and
allowing Bob and Charlie to additionally share a QKD link, they se-
curely sign a message between Alice and Bob situated 50 km apart.
They also only require two quantum links, between Alice-Charlie and
Bob-Charlie (with Charlie playing the role of Eve), which reduces the
resource cost of distributing signatures across a network. Roberts et.
al. sign a single-bit message in just 74 ms.
2.2.8 Installed fibers
There have been several experiments seeking to move secure QDS
from the laboratory setting to a practical network of deployed fibers.
The first demonstration of QDS over installed fibers [66] allowed for a
single-bit to be signed in approximately one second over 90 km fiber,
relying on a differential phase shift (DPS) quantum state distribution
[67].
In this DPS-QDS protocol, sequences of coherent state pulses are
distributed with complex phase either α or −α, and information is
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encoded in the phase difference between subsequent pulses [68]. Key
to the long distances reached in this protocol is the move to telecom
wavelengths 1550 nm, allowing the use of very low loss fibers.
H.-L. Yin et. al., in a second implementation of MDI-QDS [69], se-
curely sign a message over a deployed fiber network in approximately
40 hours using the protocol from Ref. [64], although they note that
a full parameter optimization was not performed. Regardless, there
has been quick and marked progress from early QDS experiments, as-
suming quantum memories and tricky detection methods which were
unique to QDS, to the recent advanced experiments demonstrating, for
example, unconditionally secure MDI-QDS over installed metropolitan
fiber communication systems.
Both of these schemes, although running over deployed fiber net-
works, require difficult detection methods. Collins et. al. [66] rely on
single-photon detectors, while Yin et. al. [69] is required to perform Bell
measurements. Both of these require dedicated hardware not normally
present in a standard deployed telecommunications network.
2.2.9 Continuous-variables
Despite the many recent advances in single-photon detection, and its
progress towards practical implementation, the protocols presented
above still require a dedicated hardware platform. Deploying such a
platform will be difficult and costly, especially if it requires entirely
new network infrastructure. An alternative approach is to build quan-
tum cryptographic protocols specifically designed for integration with
the classical telecommunications network.
The protocols discussed above, relying on single-photon detec-
tors which give a discrete outcome (click or no click), fall within
the discrete-variables category. These protocols boast a high level of
theoretical development and mature security proofs, owing in part
to the small Hilbert spaces in which their systems live. It should be
no surprise, therefore, that while many protocols for quantum infor-
mation processing are designed first for DV systems, they are often
implemented first on a continuous variable (CV) platform [70].
CV quantum cryptography, relying on distribution of phase-encoded
coherent states and heterodyne detection typically requires complex
security proofs. An important issue is the infinite-dimensional Hilbert
spaces in which the quantum states live. There are several properties of
quantum states which hold for any finite dimension but which break
in the infinite dimensional case [71]. Additionally, numerical methods
which work efficiently at low dimension [72] cannot be implemented
in the infinite-dimensional case without simplifying assumptions.
Despite this, the CV platform has preferable implementation. Op-
tical homodyne and heterodyne detection are mature technologies
routinely used throughout currently deployed telecommunications
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networks, and they can run at GHz (or larger) clock-rates. Further-
more, these detection methods are highly efficient and run at room
temperature. One is therefore motivated to pursue CV cryptography
by the allure of its technological maturity and compatibility with
already deployed architecture.
The first CV QDS protocol was proposed in Ref. [73] by Croal et. al.
This protocol relied on distribution of QPSK coherent states, Fig. 1.3,
and heterodyne detection of their phase. The structure of the protocol
is similar to those discussed previously. Alice, for each future one-bit
message she might send, first creates strings of classical information
corresponding to a phase from the QPSK alphabet. She then creates
sequences of the corresponding phase-modulated coherent states,
and sends them through the quantum channel to recipients Bob and
Charlie.
Bob and Charlie perform heterodyne measurement and receive a
phase measurement outcome. Unlike the schemes discussed earlier im-
plementing an unambiguous state discrimination [43] or unambiguous
state elimination [46], the measurement used here may be interpreted
as an “ambiguous state elimination” (ASE), which is a natural next
step in the progression USD→ USE→ ASE. The heterodyne measure-
ment outcome is used to eliminate one of the possible QPSK states,
similar to Ref. [46]. The USE will always give the correct outcome (i.e.
it will never eliminate the state which Alice has sent) at the expense of
sometimes failing to give any outcome. In contrast the ASE will never
fail to give an outcome, at the expense of sometimes eliminating the
state which Alice did indeed send. So, while in Donaldson’s protocol
[46] the ideal minimum number of errors between honest parties is
zero, for Croal [73] there will always be a minimum threshold of errors
between honest parties, even in the ideal case.
Croal et. al. implement their scheme over a 1.6 km free-space chan-
nel, which makes Ref. [73] both the first demonstration of CV QDS
and the first demonstration of free-space QDS. Surprisingly, the exper-
iment reaches signature lengths L = 7× 104 to sign a one-bit message,
shorter than previous protocols. This is partly due to the employed
measurement scheme, and partly due to the technological maturity
of the CV experiment and hardware. Because of the short signature
length and the experimental clock-rate of 2.2MHz, Ref. [73] addition-
ally boasts the shortest required time to sign a single-bit message, a
fact which is noted in the recent QDS reviews Refs. [66, 74].
Despite these advances in CV QDS, Ref. [73] still makes the as-
sumption that there can be no eavesdropper on the quantum channel.
One of the main results of this Thesis is to relax this assumption, as
performed in our recent work Ref. [75]. We will discuss this further in
Ch. 3.
To summarise, in contrast to DV implementation, the CV quantum
cryptographic platform typically boasts fast sending rates and ready
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implementation with deployed network architecture, at the expense of
being sensitive to channel loss and noise. The distances over which CV
quantum cryptography is secure are limited, and so the conventional
wisdom is that a future quantum cryptography network should use the
fast CV protocols over short distances (metropolitan distances within
cities would be a perfect application of this), while long-distance
quantum communication should be performed using a DV protocol
[76].
2.2.10 Other directions
Before we move on, it is worth spending a moment to acknowledge
some directions of QDS research which are orthogonal to the imprac-
tical→ practical narrative presented above.
Unconditionally secure classical digital signatures
It is important to note that unconditionally secure classical digital
signatures schemes do exist [45, 77, 78]. For example, the protocol P2
proposed by Wallden et. al. [45] offers unconditional security requiring
preshared classical keys. Similarly, the protocol [77] uses hash func-
tions to securely sign a message. Both of these are unconditionally
secure against even a quantum adversary.
Therefore, one may rightly ask why a future quantum-secure cryp-
tographic network should not use one of these classical protocols.
Indeed, there may be applications where one of these protocols is
preferable to any quantum protocol. However, it is worth considering
the full practical requirements of these protocols. For example, proto-
cols [45, 77] each require secret preshared keys between all players.
Unconditional security for these schemes therefore realistically as-
sumes QKD between participants in order to securely share the secret
keys before the classical signatures protocol may be run. We may
therefore denote these “classical” unconditionally secure schemes as
“indirect quantum digital signatures,” since in practice they will require
first the distillation of secret keys (via QKD) and then classical postpro-
cessing. It is not clear a priori whether this will be more or less resource
intensive than the “direct” QDS schemes above, which perform the
signatures task without first distilling secret keys. A promising indica-
tion that direct QDS may be often advantageous was given in Ref. [47],
who noted that since QDS does not require the same costly reconcilia-
tion steps as QKD, there will be channels which cannot sustain QKD
but for which direct QDS is still possible.
Longer channels
We have seen that the CV protocols are expected to be useful over
the short intra-city distances, while DV cryptography will be most
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practical over long distances. New protocols in each of these paradigms
are regularly designed and implemented, boasting faster key rates
over longer distances, and so one is drawn to the following question:
for a given distance, is there a fundamental physical limit to the
distillable key rate? Or, how does the maximum distillable key rate
for any protocol scale with distance? This question was quantitatively
answered by Pirandola et. al. [79] who revealed that the best achievable
key rate R for a given channel transmittance η is
R 6 − log2 (1− η) . (2.2)
This “PLOB”-bound9 is an upper bound on the maximum key rate
attainable for a given channel loss in a QKD setup. Crucially, the PLOB
bound applies to a point-to-point QKD setup, without any quantum
repeater to effectively amplify the quantum signal. For small η, we
have an approximately linear scaling R ≈ O (η).
Can this linear scaling be beaten? A recent proposal [80] effectively
doubles the distance at which a given key rate can be distilled, by
replacing a point-to-point QKD network, in which Alice and Bob share
a direct quantum channel, with a three-node network. Alice and Bob
each share a quantum channel of length L with Charlie, but share no
quantum channel with each other10. Alice and Bob can be situated 2L
apart from each other, but the maximum distance any quantum state
has to travel is L. This new Twin-Field QKD leads to a super-PLOB




of the key rate.
Figure 2.6: Eve’s central node in the simplest TF-QKD setup [81]. Since
the two incoming pulses are interfered Alice and Bob can know
whether their initial state choices agree (A) or disagree (D), thus
enabling them to generate a raw key. Perfect secrecy is then
established by the usual error correction and privacy amplification
routines.
9 So named after the authors of Ref. [79]: S. Pirandola, R. Laurenza, C. Ottaviani and L.
Banchi.
10 Notice the strong similarities with MDI cryptography
2.2 quantum digital signatures 51
In its simplest construction [81], in TF-QKD Alice and Bob each
prepare coherent pulses |α〉 , |β〉, Fig. 2.6, chosen from some predeter-
mined alphabet, and send then to Charlie. The central Charlie can
even be a dishonest eavesdropper, so we will refer to them now as
Eve. For illustration let us assume that Alice and Bob choose from
QPSK, although more general alphabets are normally required [82,
83]. Eve interferes the incoming pulses on her beamsplitter, and per-
forms single-photon detection on the two output ports. She then
announces which detector, A or D clicked. Alice and Bob each pub-
licly announce whether they prepared a state with real (|α〉 , |−α〉)
or imaginary (|iα〉 , |−iα〉) displacement, and keep only the trials for
which they both displaced in the same basis. In the ideal case, if for
example the real basis was chosen then if detector A clicks it means
α = β, whereas if detector D clicks it means that α = −β. using this
information, combined with their own knowledge about what they
sent, Alice and Bob can generate a key with each other. The TF-QKD
is thereby able to double the possible distance between Alice and Bob
for a given key rate, and since the central node is assumed to be under
Eve’s control it is inherently MDI.
Theoretical and experimental development of TF-QKD is ongoing,
owing both to its promise of long composite channel lengths without
the requirement of a quantum repeater, and its inherent measurement
device independence without requiring a tricky bell-state measure-
ment. The key practical challenge of such a system is path length
matching between the Alice↔Eve and Bob↔Eve channels, to ensure
that the pulses correctly interfere on the central beamsplitter. This is
likely to require active stabilisation and monitoring of incoming pulses
[80], the full security implications of which are yet to be determined.
General advances and open questions
Each of the QDS protocols which we described have assumed that
there are only three players: one sender (Alice) and two recipients (Bob
and Charlie). This simplifies the security analysis and allows a focus
on the key aspects of security for each scheme. However in realistic
contexts it may be desirable to allow for more than two recipients. In
this case new attack strategies are possible and so careful attention
must be paid to whether a particular QDS scheme remains secure
against conspiracies of multiple dishonest players. Arrazola et. al. [84]
consider QDS with many recipients.
Similarly, a simplifying assumption which each protocol has made
was to assume that Alice wished only to sign a single-bit message
m ∈ {0, 1}. It is clear that by iterating each protocol longer messages
may be signed, but a naive and identical repetition of the distribution
and messaging steps opens up new attack strategies. The works [85, 86]
propose iteration methods for successful signing of longer messages
which are applicable to any of the above QDS protocols, which require
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still linear scaling of L with |m|. It is not yet clear what the optimal
procedure for signing long messages is, or whether the scaling L ∝
2 |m|, from a naive iteration, can be beaten.
Finally, we note that while some recent advances in QKD, such as
measurement device independence or passive decoy-states, have been
translated into the QDS context, there are many recent developments
which have not yet been leveraged by QDS. For example, there as yet
no QDS equivalent of device-independent scenarios such as fully DI
[60], detector-DI [87] or one-sided DI [88]. There are only preliminary
theoretical developments of a twin-field [80, 82] QDS protocol [89]
which promises to increase the possible channel lengths over which
the scheme remains secure. More exotic developments such as coun-
terfactual communication [90–93] also have yet to be translated to the
QDS task.
Even developments in CV QKD, such as the recent proof of un-
conditional security against coherent attacks for Gaussian-modulated
coherent states [94] have yet to find an analogue in QDS. Indeed,
any fully-Gaussian QDS is missing, and future work should seek
to rectify this. A clear motivation for doing so is that description
of fully-Gaussian QKD relies only on finite-dimensional covariance
matrices size 8 × 8 [95] and so the problems with modelling and
numerics on the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space can be avoided.
Indeed, an assumption about the Gaussianity of the QPSK alphabet
(which is increasingly valid as the states’ amplitude tends towards
zero) was even a necessity for the recent developments in numerical
semi-definite programming (SDP) methods for QPSK-based QKD [96].
Unfortunately, it is not immediately obvious whether any of these
results for fully-Gaussian QKD can be utilised in the existing CV
QDS protocol, since the ASE measurements used in Ref. [73] break
Gaussianity. Fully-Gaussian QDS therefore remains an exciting, but
still open, question.
2.2.11 Summary
Quantum Digital Signatures protocols perform a fundamentally dif-
ferent task to the more familiar QKD protocols. The goals of QDS,
message authentication and transferability, are important tasks which
are routinely performed by computationally secure classical algo-
rithms in our day-to-day information infrastructure. In recent years
the security of QDS has been catching up with QKD, and security
proofs against an eavesdropping attack [47, 55] or for QDS in the MDI
setting [64] have been proposed, and their respective protocols have
been implemented.
Despite this, and despite their immediate practical advantages for
implementation, continuous variables (CV) QDS protocols have been
an under-researched platform for secure digital signatures. A recent
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work [73] has proposed, proved security, and implemented a CV
QDS protocol involving discretely-modulated coherent states and
heterodyne detection. The protocol assumed secure quantum channels,
and until Ref. [75], which constitutes part of this Thesis, there has
been no security proof which allowed for an eavesdropping attack on
the channels.
2.3 how to share a secret
A secret sharing scheme allows for secure splitting and distribution of
classical information among multiple recipients, an unknown subset
of whom may be dishonest. The canonical example of such a scheme
is that of a bank. The head of the bank, Alice, wishes to distribute
keys to the vault between several potentially untrusted deputies. If
the deputies work together and use their keys simultaneously they
are able to access the vault, but any nefarious deputies working alone
should not be able to gain access.
2.3.1 Classical secret sharing
Although many existing classical secret-sharing schemes are already
information-theoretically secure [34, 35], they may encounter prob-
lems when distributing shares of the secret across insecure channels.
This is analogous to the classical unconditionally secure signature
schemes [45, 77] discussed in Sec. 2.2, which implicitly required an
underlying QKD encryption. Thus we may ask whether it is more or
less resource-efficient to first run pairwise QKD between players, or
to run a “direct”-QSS scheme without first distilling pairwise secret
keys. We should expect interesting parallels between QSS and QKD,
since intuitively they are very similar, both effectively performing
encryption of classical messages.
Let us consider some examples. Alice wishes to share a secret, m,
between n players, such that any k 6 n of them can access m. The
general framework for this is called an (n,k)-threshold scheme, where
of the n players any subset of k players can reconstruct the secret.
An information-theoretically secure threshold sharing scheme was
designed by Shamir in Ref. [34]. Shamir’s scheme relies on polynomial
equations over finite fields, and is provably secure even against an
adversary with infinite computing power.
For example, Alice wishes to distribute a secret m between four
players, such that any three of them can access m. Alice generates a




Prime p should be chosen larger than any of the coefficients a,b or
m. Alice then evaluates this polynomial at four different points x, and
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sends the outcomes to each player. These points will be referred to as
“shares”.
The polynomial has three unknown coefficients, a, b and m, and so
any three players can combine their shares to create three equations,
which may be solved for each unknown. Any fewer shares will yield
an underdefined system which cannot be solved. An attempt to guess
the final share will show that any message m can be the secret, and so
such a guessing attempt is useless.
Another threshold secret sharing scheme was built on similar prin-
ciples by Blakley [35]. In this scheme, the message m is defined as
a point in a large k dimensional space. Each share is then a hyper-
plane in a k− 1 dimensional space, which includes the point m. It
therefore requires the intersection of all k hyperplanes to reveal m.
For example, if Alice again wishes to share a secret between four
players, such that three of them are able to access m, then each share
is a two-dimensional plane. The intersection of any two planes is a
one-dimensional line containing m, and the third plane is required to
reduce this line to the point m.
While both of these schemes are information-theoretically secure
once the shares have been distributed (assuming that each share is
securely stored and cannot be stolen), the main issue arises when
considering how the shares can be distributed in the first place. If a
malevolent party can access the shares during distribution then they
can reconstruct the secret. In implementation, Shamir’s and Blakley’s
schemes are therefore only as secure as the underlying encryption
which is used to share the shares.
2.3.2 Quantum secret sharing
We therefore wish to investigate whether the task of secret sharing
can be made secure using quantum resources. It is important to notice
that the translation from classical secret sharing to quantum secret
sharing is not straightforward, and there are at least three directions
which one can pursue:
• quantum-assisted classical secret sharing (qCSS): encrypt a clas-
sical secret sharing protocol [34, 35] using quantum resources.
For example, perform pairwise QKD between Alice and each
recipient, then encrypt the shares of the classical secret sharing
protocol. This is analogous to the classical unconditionally secure
schemes discussed earlier.
• quantum secret sharing (QSS): use quantum states to securely
distribute shares of a classical secret.
• quantum state sharing (QStS): securely distribute shares of a
quantum state.
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Quantum state sharing is an important and exciting research direc-
tion in its own right and helps to establish the close links between
quantum secret sharing, QKD and quantum teleportation [70, 97, 98].
Despite the fact that both QSS and QStS are natural extensions of
classical secret sharing to the quantum realm, and despite the fact that
early work [97] proposes related protocols for each task, it should be
understood that they are distinct quantum tasks with different goals
and hardware requirements. For the rest of this Thesis we will restrict
ourselves to QSS. In what follows we will only refer to the first two
options as “quantum secret sharing”, while the third option we shall
refer to as “quantum state sharing”.
2.3.3 Entanglement-based QSS
All three directions, qCSS, QSS and QStS, are discussed at length in





shared between three players, which can be used to distribute shares of
a classical secret. Collaborating recipients can recover the secret while
a dishonest subset of players cannot. Alternatively, the GHZ resource
state may be used to distribute shares of a quantum state (for QStS),
such that collaborating players may reconstruct the original quantum
state while a dishonest subset of players can gain no information.
For QSS, each player chooses independently and at random to
measure their state in either x or y basis:
|±x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉) ,
|±y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± i |1〉) .
If, for example, all three players measure in the x basis, then Charlie
can infer from his measurement outcome whether Alice and Bob’s
measurements are correlated or anticorrelated. By collaborating, then,
Bob and Charlie can accurately infer Alice’s bit. In fact, whenever
Alice and Bob measure in the same basis, Charlie must measure in x
in order to gain information. Conversely, if Alice and Bob measure in
opposite bases then Charlie must measure in y, otherwise he gains no
information. We see, then, that since each player randomly chooses
which basis to measure, 50% of the resource GHZ states will yield no
information, and are effectively discarded.
Despite its high resource requirement, and despite the fact that
50% of the resource states are wasted, Hillery’s protocol has influ-
enced the direction of all subsequent QSS protocols, and the paper
was instrumental in demonstrating that multipartite entanglement is
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an important resource for quantum communication protocols. Mul-
tipartite entanglement is difficult to create and manipulate, and will
degrade quickly as it is distributed over a quantum channel exposed
to realistic loss or noise. However, just as QKD has an equivalence
between entanglement-based and prepare-and-measure versions [95,
99], it should be expected that the requirement of large multipartite
state in Ref. [97] can likewise be reduced [100–103].
To accomplish this, Karlsson et. al. [100] propose an entanglement-
based QSS scheme which, rather than relying on creation and distri-
bution of the GHZ state, relies on distribution of pairs of entangled
qubits in a Bell state. This configuration allows for correlations be-
tween players to be established identically to Hillery’s scheme, but
with more readily accessible resources. Recipients Bob and Charlie can
determine with certainty which Bell state Alice sent, which allows Al-
ice to establish a key with Bob/Charlie, and which may subsequently
be used to encrypt a message.
This protocol drastically reduces the resource requirements for ex-
perimental QSS, but the resulting protocol is still tricky to implement.
The protocol requires Bell states and superpositions of Bell states,
which will degrade over a realistic channel. The protocol also intro-
duces a fundamental asymmetry into QSS at the quantum level. While
in Hillery’s protocol protocol any of the three players can be chosen
as dealer even after the GHZ state has been distributed, for Ref. [100]
it is established at the time of quantum state distribution that Alice is
dealer.
Both the protocols from Hillery [97] and Karlsson [100] assume
perfect state creation and noiseless and lossless quantum channels.
This is an unrealistic assumption and one which must be relaxed
before entanglement-based QSS can be implemented securely.
Chen et. al. [104] modify the Hillery’s protocol [97] to allow for an
imperfect distribution of entangled state. By proposing a method for
entanglement distillation on a multipartite state, which can be used
before a cryptographic protocol, Chen effectively reduces the extreme
resource requirement of protocols like Ref. [97]. The resource state
used does not even need to violate a Bell inequality.
An important generalization of Hillery’s scheme allows for analysis
of the optimal entangled states required to share a secret between
more than three players. While one option would be to simply replace
the resource state with the N-partite GHZ state
|N−GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(|000 . . . 0〉+ |111 . . . 1〉) (2.5)
another option is to generalize to graph states [98, 105–107], under
which the tasks qCSS, QSS, QStS and entanglement-based QKD may
be united and described within the same framework. One advantage
of using such a state is that it can allow for QSS to be completed
without collaboration from all recipients, which may help practical
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QSS to be robust and prevent against denial-of-service attacks from a
dishonest internal player11.
There have been several attempts to prove security of entanglement-
based QSS. As we have seen, security proofs based on highly-entangled
GHZ states or graph states become insecure once realistic channel
parameters are considered, even though they offer unconditional secu-
rity in the ideal limit. One way to tackle this is to borrow tools from
entanglement-based QKD. Kogias et. al. [108] use similar analysis to
so-called one-sided device-independent (1sDI) QKD [88, 109] in order
to prove QSS security while modelling channel effects on their CV
resource state.
Key to Kogias’ protocol is the assumption that neither the mea-
surement device of Bob, nor of Charlie, should be trusted. Rather,
each player is assumed to possess a black-box which can output one
of two measurement outcomes, corresponding in the honest case to
homodyne measurement in either x or p quadrature. Protocol security
is based on monogamy of entanglement and employs an entropic
uncertainty relation which makes no assumption about the action of
a dishonest player. To our knowledge Ref. [108] marked the first full
security proof of QSS, against all forms of dishonesty and all types of
attack over realistic channels. It was later shown that the resource re-
quired for entanglement-based QSS is two-way steering of the shared
state [110], where the optimal Gaussian resource states for a given
energy were also considered.
The links between QSS and 1sDI QKD considered in Ref. [108] hint
at an interesting direction for exploration: what is the relationship
between QSS and other quantum communication protocols? It was
already shown in Ref. [98] that qCSS, QSS and QStS may be united
under the same framework using graph states, while even in Hillery’s
original work [97] the links between qCSS and QSS were acknowl-
edged. Additionally it can be shown [97] that a QStS protocol may be
readily constructed from a teleportation protocol plus QSS (or qCSS
or QKD) scheme if Alice teleports a quantum state to Bob, but sends
the classical information required for state reconstruction to Charlie.
There are strong links between QSS and quantum conferencing [107,
111] which is a natural multipartite generalization of QKD in which
N players receive identical keys. Indeed, as shown in Refs. [107, 111]
the same resource states and network configurations may be readily
used for both QSS and quantum conferencing. It is an open ques-
tion however whether these additional tasks have the same optimal
requirements [108, 110] on the resource state as QSS.
11 Though we note that even QKD is susceptible to denial-of-service attack where Eve
simply destroys the quantum (or classical) channels between Alice and Bob.
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2.3.4 Sequential QSS
The above protocols which implement QSS using entangled resource
states offer an advanced level of security and neatly demonstrate the
important role of entanglement in quantum communication. However,
it is hard to see how they will be preferable to qCSS which can
offer equivalent levels of security for the same task, but without
the problems associated with generation and distribution of large
entangled states. An entanglement-based scheme may even be fine if
the number of players is small – for example the scheme [100] relies
only on Bell-pairs, but they cannot be easily scaled to many parties.
We note that qCSS scales much more favourably as the number of
required quantum channels is linear in the total number of players.
It should still be explored whether there are any QSS protocols
which outperform qCSS. One promising direction is that of sequen-
tial12 QSS in which the QSS task is fulfilled by sharing of a single
quantum system between multiple players.
In the first sequential QSS protocol [112], Zhang et. al. propose a
system in which Bob prepares a single photon state with his choice
of polarization and sends it to Charlie. Charlie performs a unitary
operation, either the identity, a Hadamard gate or a bit-flip, on the
photon and sends it to Alice who stores the photon in a quantum
memory. This process is repeated many times. Later, Alice will sample
some of her stored photons for errors by asking Bob and Charlie to
declare which state was sent and which operation was performed. She
then performs the claimed operation, and measures the claimed basis,
in order to check for errors.
On the remaining photons Alice performs her unitaries (either the
identity or a bit-flip) to encode her secret. She then sends the photons
back to Charlie. If Bob and Charlie collaborate they can deduce the
correct basis in which to measure Alice’s photon, and so recover her
information.
Sequential protocols have the obvious advantage that large entan-
gled states are not required. Even though Ref. [112] proposes to use a
quantum memory it is ultimately not necessary for the protocol, and
the work by Schmid et. al. demonstrates this in a sequential QSS exper-
iment [113]. Their experiment, in which players perform operations
on heralded single photons, allows for a secret to be shared among
six players in a setup which is much more readily scalable to more
players than the earlier QSS schemes requiring entanglement.
Schmid’s scheme relies on sequential interactions with a qubit state
encoded into the polarization of a heralded single photon. Each player







12 Sometimes referred to as entanglement-free QSS.
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The final player measures in the |0〉 ± |1〉 basis. Collaboration of the
first N− 1 players allows them to infer, with certainty, the Nth player’s
outcome.
This sequential scheme, while secure against an Eve external to
the protocol, is difficult to secure against dishonesty from one of
the internal players [114–116]. For example, Ref. [116] points out
that the order in which recipients declare their information is of
utmost importance, and this is adopted into the sequential protocol
in Ref. [117]. Unfortunately, the protocol remains insecure against a
so-called Trojan Horse attack [114], in which an internal player to the
protocol adds one mode of an entangled state to the single photon as
it is being distributed. This entangled mode will undergo the same
subsequent gates as the signal photon, granting the dishonest player
additional information.
The Trojan Horse attack is guarded against in the recent work from
Grice et. al. [118]. In their protocol for sequential QSS, each player
creates a coherent state which is chosen from a Gaussian modulation.
These states are added to the initial coherent state as it travels, and
the final state is heterodyned by the dealer, Alice. With combined
knowledge of their injected states, the players are able to estimate
Alice’s measurement outcome. This protocol has the advantage of high
tolerable losses, especially when compared to entanglement-based
QSS. Crucially, the scheme is immune to Trojan Horse attacks since
once a coherent state has been added to the total state, it only interacts
with Alice’s measurement apparatus and does not pass through the
equipment of any other player. Additionally a dishonest player cannot
access other players’ devices.
Owing to its simplicity of implementation QSS has been performed
in many experiments [113, 119] including those explicitly using tele-
com fiber networks [120]. This latter work, Ref. [120], demonstrates
QSS in two experiments between three players and four players using
phase encoding of single qubits. Their implementation uses a Sagnac
interferometer, with light travelling in two directions around a loop.
The light is at standard telecom wavelengths 1550 nm and channel
lengths are between 50 and 70 km, rendering secure QSS eminently
practical.
2.3.5 Summary
Quantum Secret Sharing has been an intense field of active research
for the quantum communications community for the last two decades.
Entanglement-based QSS boasts a high level of provable security
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against both internal and external dishonesty. While there have been
some proof-of-principle demonstrations of these QSS schemes [101,
121–123] the style of protocol is still far off routine and practical
implementation.
In contrast, sequential QSS involving sharing of a single quantum
system is much more practical for implementation, and has been
demonstrated in realistic settings with many players [113, 119, 120].
However, these protocols face difficulty against a dishonest player
internal to the protocol, which is precisely the context which secret
sharing should guard against. Moreover, even though these schemes
do not require generation or distribution of entangled states, they still
require a dedicated hardware setup in order to distribute the quantum
state and perform sequential measurements. To our knowledge, the
most plausible protocol in terms of both its security and practicality,
that of Grice et. al. [118], is yet to be implemented.
It is therefore yet unclear whether these quantum secret sharing
protocols will give an advantage over the quantum-mediated qCSS
protocols which we have discussed in Sec. 2.3.1. The underlying quan-
tum encryption algorithm, QKD, boasts advanced security proofs
and intensely researched hardware, and any proposed QSS scheme
must be benchmarked against a QKD-based classical protocol which
performs the same task.
3
Q UA N T U M D I G I TA L S I G N AT U R E S
In this chapter we introduce and investigate a continuous-variable
Quantum Digital Signatures (QDS) protocol, which allows for secure
authentication of classical messages even against a quantum adversary.
We describe the protocol and its similarities and differences to recent
QDS protocols from the literature in Sec. 3.1, and then prove its
security against several different attack strategies in Secs. 3.2-3.6. It is
only recently that QDS protocols in the discrete-variable regime have
been proven secure against an eavesdropping attack on the quantum
channels [47, 55], and the work in this chapter marks the first time that
continuous-variable QDS is proven secure against an eavesdropper.
Finally, in Secs. 3.7-3.9 we analyse the performance of our protocol,
including a postselection technique to improve performance, and
demonstrate that a remarkably small number of quantum states are
required to securely sign a message. Our protocol is implemented in
Chapter 5.
3.1 our qds protocol
In the simplest instance we may consider a signature scheme involving
only three parties: a sender, Alice (A), and recipients Bob (B) and
Charlie (C). Alice wishes to send a classical message m to B and C,
such that B and C can correctly determine whether m was indeed sent
by A. Furthermore the recipients should be able to check whether m
has been altered. The three-party setting is the smallest setting to fully
distinguish a digital signatures protocol from related protocols such
as MACs1. Because more than two (potentially dishonest) players are
present, this allows for new attack strategies which distinguish QDS
from other quantum tasks such as QKD.
3.1.1 QDS setup
Our signature scheme is displayed pictorially in Fig. 3.1. Alice (A)
wishes to send a message m to Bob (B) and Charlie (C) such that
both Bob and Charlie accept it as genuine. To accomplish this she
appends to m a signature σm which should be unique to the message
and uniquely generated by Alice. In this way our digital signatures
scheme is a quantum generalization of Lamport’s protocol [24, 38]. As
we shall see later, any player in our protocol may be dishonest.
1 Message Authentication Codes. See Ref. [24].
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A B C
Figure 3.1: Setup of a 3-party digital signatures scheme. Alice (A) wishes to
securely sign her message m such that Bob (B) and Charlie (C)
both accept it as genuine.
3.1.2 Goals of a signature scheme
A digital signature scheme must fulfill the requirements outlined in
List. 3.1. If requirement 1 (security against forgery) holds then no
dishonest player will be able to impersonate Alice, which fulfills re-
quirement 2 (genuine sender). In order to do so they will be required
to generate σm which at the start of the protocol is known only to her.
The dishonest player’s only hope for successful impersonation is to
take Alice’s place at the start of the protocol and perform a so-called
“man-in-the-middle” attack. We do not investigate this possibility fur-
ther, though we note that without previous authenticated interaction
between players even QKD is insecure for this attack [124].
For our scheme involving three parties, requirements 3 and 4 are
equivalent. A QDS protocol involving N recipients may distinguish
between non-repudiation and transferability by defining a message
m(k) as k-transferable if it may be successfully forwarded up to k times.
An honest participant should be able to determine the transferability
level of m [84], while non-repudiation then refers to Alice’s ability to
cause a message to be non-transferable. In what follows we treat these
requirements as equivalent.
A digital signature scheme which rejects all messages trivially fulfills
requirements 1− 4, and so in order to get a useful digital signature
scheme we must also impose requirement 5.
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1. Security against forgery, Fig. 3.2a. Neither a dishonest recipient
(B or C), nor an external fourth party (Eve, E), should be
able to alter m and have it accepted as genuine by an honest
recipient. The signature scheme should ensure that m is the
message which Alice sent.
2. Genuine sender, Fig. 3.2a. Neither a dishonest recipient (B or
C), nor an external fourth party (Eve, E), should be able to
impersonate A. Any message which falsely claims to have
originated with Alice should be rejected.
3. Security against repudiation, Fig. 3.2b. A dishonest sender A
should not be able to cause disagreement between B, C about
the previous two requirements. After genuinely sending m
she should not later be able to deny it, and if Bob accepts
the message as genuine then so too should Charlie.
4. Message transferability, Fig. 3.2b. If B accepts a message as
genuine, then he should be sure that C will also accept.
5. Robustness, Fig. 3.2c. The message m should be accepted if
all players behave honestly and there is no tampering by an
eavesdropper.
List 3.1: A secure QDS scheme should fulfill each of the above re-
quirements. Requirement 1 implies requirement 2. In our
3-party setting, requirements 3 and 4 are equivalent. We de-
pict each type of attack which a QDS scheme must prevent
in Fig. 3.2.







Figure 3.2: The multipartite setting permits many different methods for
attack on the protocol depicted in Fig. 3.1. Gray boxes depict hon-
est players while red boxes depict dishonest players. (a) Forging
attack with dishonest Bob. Bob will change the message m→ n
with fake signature σn. The attack succeeds if Charlie accepts.
Alternatively, either Charlie or a fourth player, Eve, may attempt
a forging attack against an honest player. (b) Repudiation attack
with dishonest Alice. Alice tries to convince Bob to accept the
message and Charlie to reject it. (c) Honest failure: all players
behave honestly but the protocol fails and both Bob and Charlie
reject m. A protocol which does not fail due to honest failure is
called robust.
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3.1.3 QDS protocol description
We here present a continuous-variable (CV) QDS protocol based on
the quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK) alphabet of coherent states,
Fig. 1.3. For the first time in a continuous-variables QDS protocol, our
protocol takes into account insecure quantum distribution channels
and permits the presence of an eavesdropper. Surprisingly, the same
step of the protocol which ensures security against eavesdropping
also makes the protocol efficient in its use of quantum resources. We




Figure 3.3: Setup of the QDS protocol considered in this chapter. Alice
(A) wishes to securely sign a 1 bit message m. Alice distributes
quantum coherent states |φ(B,C)j 〉 along insecure quantum dis-
tribution channels (solid lines) during the Distribution stage.
Bob and Charlie swap eliminated signature elements via their
securely encrypted classical channel (dotted lines). During the
Messaging stage Alice sends Σ, containing her messagem and her
corresponding signature σm along a classical broadcast channel
(dot-dashed line). Inset: QPSK alphabet.
Our QDS scheme is split into two stages, Distribution and Messag-
ing, which, by analogy with classical digital signatures, may occur
with significant time delay. Quantum states are sent and measured
during Distribution. During Messaging Alice will send her message
and classical signature, and recipients Bob and Charlie will try to
determine its validity.2 Our protocol setup is outlined in Figs. 3.1, 3.3.
2 Note the intrinsic separation between the Distribution (quantum) and Messaging
(classical) stages of the protocol. We will take further advantage of this separation
between quantum and classical steps in Chapter 5
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We will now describe in detail the running of the protocol.
Distribution stage
step 1 . Alice wishes to send a signed 1 bit message m to Bob
and Charlie. For each possible future m, and for each recipient, Alice











which are of length L. The φj are complex phases chosen uniformly
at random from the QPSK alphabet. The strings Φ(B,C)m may be inter-
preted as Alice’s private key. The signature length L ∈N is chosen to
ensure the desired level of security.



























understood to be the coherent state from QPSK with phase corre-
sponding to the relevant element of Alice’s private key.
The states Eq. 3.2 may be interpreted simply as sequences of coher-
ent states, and correspond to Alice’s public key. An important difference
between quantum and classical digital signatures is that here the pub-
lic key may no longer be freely distributed, copied and stored. We also
note that Alice no longer has a single public key for each message (un-
like Lamport’s scheme [38]), and her quantum public key differs both
for each possible m and for each recipient (unlike the recent scheme
Ref. [73]). This is a requirement for security against an eavesdropping
forger, Sec. 3.4.
step 3. Each recipient B,C performs heterodyne detection on their
received coherent states, and receives outcomes (qout,pout) which we
will write as z = qout + ipout ∈ C. Crucially, since measurement is
performed immediately on receipt of the states no quantum memory
is required. The remainder of the protocol is entirely classical.
At the end of the quantum stage of the protocol, recipients Bob and
Charlie now possess classical strings, length L, containing their phase
measurements on Alice’s distributed states. They now form eliminated
signatures, Fig. 3.4. For each z ∈ C, recipients record the phases φ(B,C)j,m
which Alice was least likely to have sent. At position j this may be




∣∣ xj) for each phase φj ∈ QPSK, (3.3)
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Element QPSK elements Heterodyne outcome
e1 |− α〉 , |−iα〉 qout > 0,pout > 0
e2 |−iα〉 , | α〉 qout < 0,pout > 0
e3 | α〉 , | iα〉 qout < 0,pout < 0
e4 | iα〉 , |− α〉 qout > 0,pout < 0
Table 3.1: We denote possible eliminated signature elements as e1, e2, e3, e4,
and display their corresponding states from QPSK and their requi-
site heterodyne measurement outcomes.
and recording the two φj which yield the smallest of these. This record
of φj forms the jth element of their eliminated signatures. We note that
the φj comprising the eliminated signature element will always be
adjacent in phase space, and an example of this elimination procedure
is displayed in Fig. 3.4. We denote Bob and Charlie’s total eliminated
signatures at this stage as X(B,C)m . Each is of length L and they will
later be compared to Alice’s private key in order to test the validity of
the message. We display the possible eliminated signature elements
and their requisite heterodyne outcomes in Tab. 3.1.
Figure 3.4: Bob and Charlie each perform heterodyne measurement on
their received coherent states, and obtain (qout,pout). We define
z = qout + ipout, which is the dark gray circle in (a). From their z,
Bob and Charlie then record the two states from QPSK which are
least likely to have been sent by Alice, (b). We display the possible
eliminated signature elements and their requisite heterodyne
outcomes in Tab. 3.1.
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step 4 symmetrization: Bob and Charlie now swap a random
L/2 elements of their X(B,C)m over their encrypted classical channel.
Signature elements which have been forwarded by a player will no
longer be used by him in the protocol. We denote these resulting
strings as Y(B,C)m . By using an encrypted classical channel the positions
and values of swapped elements are kept secret from Alice, which
will ensure that the information which Bob and Charlie each hold is
symmetric from Alice’s point of view [43, 45].
In other words, at the end of Step 3, having sent the state |φBj,m〉 〈φBj,m|
to Bob, Alice knows that Bob holds the corresponding eliminated sig-
nature element XBj,m, even though she doesn’t know its value. Since
Alice knows which state she sent to Bob, she may gain an advantage
in trying to guess Xj,m. At the end of Step 4 however, Alice does not
know whether it is Bob or Charlie who holds XBj,m. This uncertainty
will prove crucial for preventing successful repudiation.
Bob (Charlie) now possesses an eliminated signature X̃(B)m in two
halves: one half Y(B)m (Y
(C)
m ) containing those elements received directly
from Alice, and one half Z(B)m (Z
(C)
m ) containing elements received
during this Symmetrization step from Charlie (Bob).
The key parameters for the Distribution stage are the signature
length L, which directly measures the quantum resources required
for the protocol, and the alphabet parameter α, related to the average
photon number of the distributed coherent states. Channel parameters
such as loss and thermal noise will be discussed later3.
Messaging stage
Messaging may occur at any time after Distribution.
step 5 . To sign m, Alice sends to Bob the classical information
Σ = (m,σm), consisting of the message m which she would like to





phases, which acts as m’s signature.







elements from Alice’s declaration which correspond to the two halves
of his eliminated signature X̃(B)m . The original σm has length 2L, while
σ̃Bm has length L.
Bob compares relevant elements of σ̃Bm to his X̃Bm, choosing which
half of X̃Bm to compare to based on whether he kept or swapped the
eliminated signature element. Bob makes a decision about whether
to accept m as genuine based on the number of mismatches between
Alice’s signature and his own eliminated signatures. A mismatch is
defined below in Sec. 3.1.4 and in Fig. 3.5.
3 In Appendix C we discuss an extension to the protocol which allows it to run with
an NPSK alphabet of coherent states, where N is an even integer.
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If Bob measures fewer than sBL/2 mismatches on both of his elim-
inated signature halves then he accepts Alice’s message as genuine,
otherwise the protocol aborts. Bob’s threshold mismatch rate sB deter-
mines how many mismatches he can observe before a signature fails
his check. In general, sB is a free parameter of the protocol and will
be discussed further in Secs. 3.1.4, 3.2, 3.7.
step 7 . If Bob has accepted m, then he forwards Σ to Charlie,
who similarly checks for mismatches between Alice’s signature and
his eliminated signature. Charlie accepts the message if there are
fewer than sCL/2 mismatches between σ̃Cm and X̃
(C)
m . If Charlie also
accepts m then the protocol has succeeded, otherwise it aborts. Char-
lie’s threshold mismatch rate is sC and will be discussed further in
Secs. 3.1.4, 3.2, 3.7.
The key parameters for the Messaging stage are sB, sC which may
be freely chosen by Bob and Charlie in order to optimize security. We
observe in Sec. 3.2 that the choice sB 6 sC will ensure security against
Alice’s repudiation attack.
3.1.4 Counting mismatches
The key test of validity which our protocol employs is a check on the
number of mismatches between Bob or Charlie’s eliminated signatures
X̃
(B,C)
m and Alice’s declaration σm. A mismatch occurs if the state
which Alice claims to have sent has been eliminated, Fig. 3.5.












denote the probability of mismatch between an arbitrary eliminated
signature G, and an arbitrary list of phases F. Both F and G should be
of the same length.
3.2 security against repudiation
We now turn to consider the security of the QDS protocol desribed in
Sec. 3.1. In what follows we will prove that our protocol is:
1. Sec. 3.2: secure against a repudiation attack (List 3.1 requirement
3, Fig. 3.2b),
2. Sec. 3.3: robust (List 3.1 requirement 5, Fig. 3.2c),
3. Sec. 3.4 secure against a forgery attack (List 3.1 requirement 1,
Fig. 3.2a)
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Figure 3.5: A mismatch occurs when an honest party eliminates the state
which Alice claims to have sent. (a, d) Alice sends coherent state
|α〉. (b, e) Bob (Charlie) heterodynes and receives (qout,pout). We
define z = qout + ipout. Even when all players are honest there
is some probability of measuring qout < 0, Sec. 3.3.1. (c) The
eliminated signature element consists of |−α〉 , |−iα〉 so there is
no mismatch. (f) The eliminated signature element consists of
|α〉 , |iα〉 and so there is a mismatch.
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Our proof will proceed by demonstrating that an attempted repu-
diation or forgery will induce a large mismatch rate, while a small
mismatch rate is obtained when no attack is attempted. Thus, by ap-
propriate choice of security parameters sB, sC and signature length
L, the probability of a successful attack of any type may be made
arbitrarily small.
We assume that in our 3 party setting at most one of the players
A,B,C may behave dishonestly. For simplicity of notation we give
a dishonest player the power to eavesdrop on the distribution of
quantum states, and so the label “Eve” is not required. An internal
eavesdropper is at least as powerful as an external Eve. If two or more
players are dishonest then we assume that they will collaborate, which
allows them to trivially break the protocol, and so this scenario is not
discussed. We note that a collaboration of multiple dishonest players
must be considered for an n > 3 party QDS protocol, as discussed in
Ref. [84].
To succeed in a repudiation attack, a dishonest Alice aims to con-
vince Bob that message m is genuine, while Charlie that m is fake,
Fig. 3.2b. Security against repudiation is guaranteed by the sym-
metrization procedure (Step 4 of the protocol) which ensures that
Alice does not know which recipient holds the eliminated signature
element corresponding to a particular distributed state. Proof of secu-
rity against repudiation follows along similar lines to Refs. [43, 45, 46,
73, 75].
At the end of Step 3, having sent the state |φBj,m〉 〈φBj,m| to Bob, Alice
knows that Bob holds the corresponding eliminated signature element
XBj,m, and she may be able to guess it with high probability. In any
case, knowing which recipient holds the X(B,C)j,m gives Alice additional
power to repudiate, even if she does not know what the individiual
eliminated signature elements are4.
At the end of Step 4, however, Alice does not know whether it
is Bob or Charlie who holds an element XBj,m. This uncertainty will
prove crucial for preventing her from successfully repudiating. Recall
that Bob (Charlie) possesses an eliminated signature X̃(B)m in two
halves: one half (Y(B)m ) containing those elements received directly
from Alice, and one half (Z(B)m ) containing elements received during
this symmetrization step from Charlie (Bob).





. We also assume that she may freely manipulate
the number of mismatches between her declared signature and the
eliminated signatures X(B,C)m which Bob or Charlie held before sym-
4 Alice could, for example, perform an optimal strategy in order to guess the X(B,C)j,m .
Then she may declare σm using guesses on Bob’s elements to reduce her mismatch
rate with respect to Bob, while declaring the opposite of her guesses on Charlie’s
elements to increase her mismatch rate with respect to Charlie.
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Alice may even choose them to be zero
Alice succeeds in her repudiation attack if Bob accepts both of his
halves as genuine, while Charlie rejects at least one of his halves as
fake. Let EA,EB denote the events that Bob accepts on the first or
second half of his eliminated signature, respectively, and let EC,ED
denote the events that Charlie rejects on the first or second half of
his eliminated signature, respectively. Then a successful repudiation
attack occurs when
(EA and EB) and (EC or ED)





























The Φ̃ denotes the rearranged form of Alice’s declared phases Φ in
order to compare corresponding elements, symbol Y denotes that
an element was received directly from Alice and symbol Z denotes
that it was received during symmetrization. Function M measures the
mismatch probability between two strings, and is defined above in
Sec. 3.1.4.
Thus, the probability εrepudiation of a successful repudiation attack is
given by
εrepudiation = P [(EA ∩ EB)∩ (EC ∪ ED)] . (3.8)
To proceed, we require the following two probability inequalities for
arbitrary events x,y:
P (x∩ y) 6 min {P (x) , P (y)} , (3.9)
P (x∪ y) 6 P (x) + P (y) . (3.10)
We may now use the probability inequality Eq. 3.9 and observe that
εrepudation 6 min {P (EA ∩ EB) , P (EC ∪ ED)} .
Again using Eqs. 3.9, 3.10, we arrive at
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εrepudiation 6 min {min {P (EA) , P (EB)} , P (EC) + P (ED)} , (3.11)
which provides an upper bound for the probability of successful
repudiation attack in terms of the individual probabilities for distinct
events. We now wish to demonstrate that the probability for each
event may be made arbitrarily small by suitable choice of L, and thus
εrepudiation may also be made arbitrarily small.
We rely on Hoeffding’s inequalities Eqs. 1.75, 1.76 which we use
to bound each probability appearing in Eq. 3.11. Let F be a string of
declared phases, and G be an eliminated signature. Strings F and G
each have length n. We define a string E such that
Ej =
1 if a mismatch occurs between Fj and Gj
0 otherwise
which measures whether a mismatch has occurred between the jth
elements of F and G, Fig. 3.5, Sec. 3.1.4.
The mismatch rate M (F,G) is equivalent to the observed (empirical)















We wish to bound the probability that there are fewer than s observed
mismatches,













By applying Hoeffding inequality Eq. 1.75,

















− s > 0. This Eq. 3.13 gives an upper bound for
the probability that there are fewer than s mismatches observed when

























> 0. This Eq. 3.14
gives an upper bound for the probability that there are more than s






Using Eqs. 3.13, 3.14 we may now bound the probabilities for events
of Eq. 3.7:
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P (EA) 6 exp
(
− [pB − sB]
2 L
)
provided that pB > sB,
P (EB) 6 exp
(
− [pC − sB]
2 L
)
provided that pC > sB,
P (EC) 6 exp
(
− [sC − pC]
2 L
)
provided that pC < sC,
P (ED) 6 exp
(
− [sC − pB]
2 L
)
provided that pB < sC, (3.15)
where in the first two inequalities we have applied Eq. 3.13 and in the
second two inequalities we have applied Eq. 3.14.
Alice has the power to choose any 0 6 pB,pC 6 1. Let us consider
some cases.
case 1 : Assume that pB > sB. Then, by the first inequality of
Eq. 3.15, the probability Eq. 3.11 must decay exponentially and so we
are secure against repudiation. An analogous argument holds for the
choice pC > sB using the second inequality of Eq. 3.15.
case 2 : Assume that pB < sB and pC < sB. It follows that if we
choose sB 6 sC, then we force pB < sC and pC < sC, and so Eq. 3.11
decays exponentially via the third and fourth inequalities of Eq. 3.15.
Intuitively, we have demonstrated that even though Alice has full
control over pB,pC she cannot engineer a situation in which Bob
measures fewer than sB mismatches while Charlie measures more
than sC. This relies on the choice sB 6 sC to ensure that εrepudiation
decays exponentially in L.
Let us substitute Eq. 3.15 into Eq. 3.11 and simplify. Clearly, in-
creasing pB or pC will cause both of the exponentials in the first term
to decrease. Because of the inner minimum, we will only care about



















In the case pB,pC 6 sC we may increase the second term of Eq. 3.11:
exp
(






























Since the minimum over two distinct Gaussians is maximized when

















as our useful bound for the probability that Alice succeeds in her repu-
diation attack. Since Eq. 3.19 is exponentially decaying, the probability
that she succeeds may be made arbitrarily small by choice of L. Our
protocol can therefore be secured against a repudiation attack by a
sufficiently large choice of L, provided that we choose sB 6 sC.
3.3 robustness
The QDS protocol must be robust (List 3.1 requirement 5, Fig. 3.2c)
and allow the message m to be accepted provided that all parties
behave honestly and there is no attack present. This is a requirement
for useful QDS, since a protocol which aborts for every message will
certainly abort in the presence of an attack and thus is trivially secure.
In this Section we will find an upper bound to the probability that the
protocol fails even when everyone behaves honestly.
The protocol fails in the absence of attack if either Bob or Charlie
rejects a message which Alice did in fact send, i.e. if Bob or Charlie
detect too many mismatches on Alice’s declaration σm. Since in Sec. 3.2
we derived that sB 6 sC, it will always be more likely that Bob rejects
than Charlie. We will seek to bound the probability that Bob measures
more than sBL/2 mismatches on either of his signature halves. This
will also provide an upper bound for the probability that Charlie
rejects with no attack.
We define an honest mismatch to have occured if there is a mis-
match between Alice’s declaration and either of Bob’s (or Charlie’s)
eliminated signature halves in an honest scenario. Let perr be the
probability of honest mismatch. Because of the non-orthogonality of
coherent states even in an ideal setting we have perr > 0. This is in
contrast to protocols such as Refs. [44, 46] which could attain an ideal
perr = 0. We model perr in the next Section 3.3.1, and there demonstrate
that it is nonzero.
Using probability inequality Eq. 3.10, the probability that Bob rejects
either of his halves is given by
εBob rejects 6 2P (EA) (3.20)
where EA is the event that Bob measures more than sBL/2 mismatches
on either of his halves. We have implicitly assumed that perr is identical
for states originally sent to Bob and those originally sent to Charlie,
but this is easy to relax if desired.
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Using Hoeffding inequality Eq. 3.14 in an identical manner to the
derivation of Eq. 3.15, Sec. 3.2, we see that









provided that sB − perr > 0. Equation 3.21 is our useful bound for the
probability that the protocol fails the robustness requirement. Since
it is exponentially decaying, the probability that this happens can be
made arbitrarily small, and so our protocol is robust.
3.3.1 Modelling perr
The probability perr corresponds to the probability that a heterodyne
measurement outcome (qout,pout) has qout < 0 when Alice distributed
the coherent state |α〉, Fig. 3.6. In the absence of thermal noise the
channel simply acts as a beamsplitter with vacuum at the unused




when the channel has transmission T (see Appendices A, B). A het-
erodyne measurement on the output state yields (qout,pout) which we








where ket vector |z〉 denotes the coherent state centred on z (c.f. Ap-
pendix A). Then,



















where x = Re (z) = qout,y = Im (z) = pout and αx = Re (α).











which models the probability of honest mismatch over a lossy channel
with transmission T . Probability perr is motivated in Fig. 3.6 which
elucidates the above discussion, and explains why perr 6= 0. An equiv-
alent analysis when the channel contains thermal noise is discussed in
Appendix A.
3.4 security against forgery 77
Figure 3.6: Histogram of possible heterodyne outcomes. A coherent state
|α〉 with α > 0 has nonzero probability to give the measurement
outcome qout < 0. In other words, perr > 0 always, and perr → 0
only as α → ∞. The blue region corresponds to measurement
outcomes which will not give a mismatch, while the pink region
corresponds to measurement outcomes which will yield a mis-
match. This histogram is equivalent to the Hussimi Q function
[1] of the received coherent state, and is thus also Gaussian.
3.4 security against forgery
We now turn to consider security against forgery, List. 3.1 requirement
1, Fig. 3.2a. In a forging attack, a dishonest player (or a fourth party,
Eve) will declare some fake message m′ with the aim that it should
be accepted by honest players as being genuine and having origi-
nated with Alice. We will not consider the possibility that a dishonest
player is impersonating Alice from the beginning of the protocol (see
Sec. 3.1.2 for brief discussion). The fake message m′ will have an
appended signature τm′ consisting of declared coherent state phases.
Message m′ will be accepted if τm′ has sufficiently few mismatches
with respect to an honest player’s eliminated signature.
Since Bob and Charlie already know L/2 of each other’s eliminated
signature elements – those which were forwarded during the sym-
metrization step of the protocol – a dishonest player who is internal
to the signature scheme will always have an advantage over an ex-
ternal Eve. Additionally, since sB < sC, Charlie is more likely than
Bob to accept a forged message m′ and fake signature τm′ , and so
the most dangerous forger will be a dishonest Bob. We thus proceed
with the mantra “Bob is Eve,” and take Bob as our dishonest forging
party. Since this is a worst-case scenario, our following analysis will
implicitly also guard against the possiblity that Charlie or Eve are the
forger.
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Security against a forging attack arises because the sequence of
states which Alice sends to Bob is different from the sequence which
she sends to Charlie. This is in stark contrast to the recent work
Ref. [73] and earlier works Refs. [39, 43, 44, 46]. Since Bob already
knows the L/2 elements ZCm which Charlie received from Bob during
Symmetrization, Step 4, Bob is able to cause arbitrarily few mismatches
on that half of Charlie’s signature. Bob’s goal then is to declare a string











which will be accepted by Charlie.
Bob’s only strategy to gain information about the YCm′ is to eavesdrop
on the distribution of states from Alice to Charlie during Steps 2 and
3 of the protocol, and Bob’s eavesdropping strategies will be fully
considered in Sec. 3.6 below.
Defining pe as the probability that Bob will induce a mismatch on
an individual given signature element, the probability εforgery that Bob










provided that pe − sC > 0. Equation 3.27 is derived using Eq. 3.13
similarly to Eqs. 3.19, 3.21 in Secs. 3.2, 3.3 by calculating the probability
that Charlie accepts a message with more than pe mismatches.
Charlie’s threshold sC may be freely chosen, and by combining it
with conditions required for derivation of Eqs. 3.19, 3.21 we deduce
the requirement
perr 6 sB 6 sC 6 pe, (3.28)
where threshold parameters sB, sC may be freely chosen to optimize
security.
Equation 3.28 encodes the intuitive condition that the QDS protocol
is secure provided that pe > perr; or, in other words, that a dishonest
forger will cause more mismatches than an honest player. The protocol
security analysis thus relies on finding channel parameters, signature
lengths and QPSK amplitudes for which a forger is guaranteed to
make more errors than the honest error rate perr, and thus for which
a forging attack will be detectable. In Sec. 3.5 we demonstrate how
pe relates to the quantum system held by Bob at the end of the
protocol’s Distribution stage, while in Sec. 3.6 we analyse several types
of eavesdropping attack which Bob may attempt, and we perform
explicit calculations of pe under different channel conditions.
3.5 bounding pe
To complete the security analysis of our protocol we must find a lower
bound for pe, the rate at which a forging Bob will induce a mismatch
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with respect to Charlie’s signature. Our protocol may be secured by
choice of L provided that pe > perr and an honest Charlie outperforms
dishonest Bob. The key contribution of this section will be a lower
bound for pe which may be calculated once Bob’s quantum system at
the end of the Distribution stage of the protocol is known.
Bob will declare a string Φ̃CY,m′ , length L/2, aimed to cause suffi-
ciently few mismatches with respect to Charlie. For convenience we
will abbreviate Bob’s declared string as Φ̃Bob. Our analysis differs from
QKD analysis in that Bob’s mismatch probability is not equivalent to
the probability that he misidentifies an element of Chalie’s eliminated
signature. Because Charlie eliminates two states from QPSK, Fig. 3.4,
there are two remaining states from the QPSK alphabet which Bob can
declare without introducing a mismatch. Each of the remining states
is shared with another possible eliminated signature element, and
so it is entirely possible for Bob to misidentify Charlie’s eliminated
signature and yet still not introduce a mismatch.
This forces us to work directly in terms of mismatch probability pe,
which we do via our error variable E, Eq. 3.2, the jth element of which
is 1 if Bob induces a mismatch there, and 0 if there is no mismatch.
We will continue to work in terms of the QPSK alphabet, though in
Appendix C we demonstrate how the proof may be generalized to an
NPSK alphabet.
To proceed, recall that YCm′ is the half of Charlie’s eliminated sig-
nature based on states he received directly from Alice. This is the











2 in the QPSK alphabet. The y
j
1,2
denote the states which Charlie has eliminated. Note that yj1,2 must be
adjacent to each other in phase-space, that is, if yj1 = α then y
j
2 must






which is the result of an unspecified but optimal POVM and classical
strategy.
A mismatch occurs when φj = y
j
1 or φj = y
j
2. Bob’s average mis-















, which is defined in Eq. 1.78.








∣∣∣ φj) , (3.29)
which is related to the uncertainty about whether a mismatch has oc-
curred under Bob’s declaration φj. Using the chain rule for conditional








∣∣∣ φj) = H(Ej ∣∣∣ yj1,yj2,φj)+ H(yj1,yj2 ∣∣∣ φj) . (3.30)
80 quantum digital signatures









∣∣∣ yj1,yj2,φj) = 0.
Using chain rule Eq. 1.91 once again on the left hand side of Eq. 3.30,


























∣∣∣ Ej,φj)+ h (pe) , (3.31)
where the inequality follows because conditioning cannot increase
entropy.











































Now, because there are two eliminated signature elements consistent
with a given Ej = 0 and φj, and since we are free to permute and
relabel yj1 ↔ y
j













∣∣∣ Ej = 0,φj) 6 log2 4 = 2. (3.34)
Additionally, since Charlie eliminates precisely half of the alphabet to








∣∣∣ Ej = 0,φj) = H(yj1,yj2 ∣∣∣ Ej = 1,φj) , (3.35)








∣∣∣ φj) 6 2+ h (pe) . (3.36)
Let us expand the left hand side of Eq. 3.36 using the definition of








∣∣∣ φj) = H(yj1,yj2)− I(yj1,yj2 : φj) . (3.37)
5 And eight choices a priori.
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There are four possible eliminated signature elements, therefore eight
possible choices for yj1,y
j













= log2 8 = 3. (3.38)
We lower bound Eq. 3.37 by using the fact that the Holevo information








∣∣∣ φj) = 3− χ(yj1,yj2 : φj) . (3.39)














which is one of the key results for this chapter, and a key result of
Ref. [75].
In order to use the bound Eq. 3.40 we must calculate forging Bob’s










also gives us a lower bound for pe. Equation 3.40 therefore
fully quantifies the best mismatch probability which Bob can attain
from an optimal measurement on his quantum system, combined with
an optimal classical strategy. We may solve this equation for a lower
bound on pe one Bob’s Holevo information χ is quantified. We do
this under several important classes of eavesdropping attack in the
following Section, 3.6.
3.6 attack analysis
We will consider several different models of dishonest Bob’s eavesdrop-
ping attack. Different models will affect both the parameter regimes
over which our protocol can be made secure, and the cost of resources
required for that security. We will demonstrate how Bob’s Holevo
information may be calculated in each model, which may then be used
to calculate pe, Eq. 3.40.
As in the QKD literature [125], we define the following three types
of quantum attack:
• individual: Fig. 3.7a;
• collective: Fig. 3.7b;
• coherent: Fig. 3.7c.
In an individual attack, Fig. 3.7a, Bob interacts separately with each
signal state distributed from Alice to Charlie, and performs separate
measurements on each state. For a collective attack, Fig. 3.7b, Bob
again interacts with each signal state separately, but is permitted to
perform a global measurement on his entire quantum system. This
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may include either introducing or exploiting classical correlations
between signal states. Finally, in a coherent attack, Fig. 3.7c, Bob
interacts with all signal states globally and (assumed) simultaneously,
and he is permitted to perform a global measurement on his entire
system. This attack affords him the full power of quantum mechanics,
and Bob can even introduce and exploit quantum correlations between
signal states.
Before we proceed, it is pertinent to discuss the general strategy
adopted in this Thesis to bound the power which an eavesdropper has
to attack the protocol. Intuitively, Eve’s power must be related to her
ability to correctly distinguish between possible states which she pos-
sesses at the end of the Distribution stage. As we have seen, her overall
mismatch probability is not equivalent to her state-discrimination prob-
ability, but the two are intimately related. Questions about optimal
discrimination between non-orthogonal quantum states have a long
history [126], and one should expect that advances in answering these
questions will pay dividends in quantum security analysis.
In Section 1.4 we encountered one type of discrimination strategy, an
unambiguous measurement, which can probabilistically, but accurately,
differentiate between two non-orthogonal states. Such strategies never
give an error, but will sometimes fail to give any information. The QDS
scheme [43] is built on honest players performing such a measurement.
Could Eve benefit from using an unambiguous measurement, gen-
eralised to the states which she receives after the Distribution stage?
When the measurement yields a result, she will perfectly know her
held state, and thus can introduce no mismatch on that signature
element. However, on the elements which she gains no result she will
still be forced to guess which state to declare, which will have high
probability to introduce a mismatch. In principle, Eve could sabotage
the state distribution whenever she gains no information from her
unambiguous measurement, though this intuitively will raise the perr
mismatch rate as the honest players still heterodyne on the vacuum.
There are other concrete measurement strategies which Eve could try
to perform. The most natural class to consider are so-called minimum-
error measurements [127, 128], which are chosen precisely to reduce
Eve’s error probability6. For symmetric sets of states7, the POVMs
describing the required minimum-error measurements can be con-
structed and take a well-known form, that of a “square-root measure-
ment” [127, 128, 130]. When considering sequences of quantum states,
the best global measurement is not always a sequence of optimal indi-
vidual measurements [129], and finding the optimal global POVMs
6 Their generalisation, the minimum-cost measurements [129] were considered in the QDS
protocol in Ref. [73].
7 Let Û be a unitary operator such that ÛN = 1, and define |ψi〉 = Ûi |ψ0〉 for a
state |ψ0〉. Then the set of N states {|ψ0〉 , |ψ1〉 , . . . , |ψN−1〉} generated from |ψ0〉
by repeated actions of Û is known as a symmetric set [129]. The NPSK alphabets
considered in this Thesis are a common example of a symmetric set.







Figure 3.7: Taxonomy of different eavesdropping attack strategies [125].
Black arrows denote quantum signal states distributed from Alice
to Charlie. Red items belong to Bob. (a) Individual attack. Bob
inserts separate probes (red boxes) into state distribution and
performs measurement on each system individually. (b) Collective
attack. Bob inserts separate probes into state distribution and
stores his states until the end of signal distribution. He may
then perform a measurement on his entire system. (c) Coherent
attack. Bob interacts with all signals at the same time and he
can perform a measurement on a single, global, probe. Attack
(a) cannot introduce correlations between signals. Attack (b) may
introduce classical correlations, and attack (c) may introduce any
correlations between signals.
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is difficult. To proceed, one requires a more general approach. Most
quantum cryptographic proofs focus instead on information-theoretic
quantities bounding the information available to Eve, or bounding her
error probability, without reference to a specific measurement strategy.
This is the the method we have adopted in this Chapter, whereby the
Holevo information implicitly assumes that it has been optimized over
all POVMs which Eve could perform [16]. This allows us to apply the
analysis to a greater class of states8, and hints at future generalisations
in terms of the smooth min-entropy [18].
Thus, in this section we will focus on individual and collective
forging attacks, for which we calculate the eavesdropper’s Holevo
information. Full security against coherent quantum attacks in the CV
QKD literature has only been proven for the simpler case of coherent
states modulated with a Gaussian distribution [95, 131–135], and a full
security proof remains elusive for a discrete modulation. There has
been some recent success in applying convex optimization methods to
the problem [96], but these proofs often rely on an assumption about
the Gaussianity of the discretely modulated alphabet [136] which is
only strictly valid in the limit α→ 0. In keeping with recent trends in
the QKD literature for discretely modulated coherent states without
the assumption of Gaussianity [137], we will focus on bounding the at-
tack strength of individual attacks, and then assume the i.i.d. criterion
[94, 95] in order to reach security against collective attacks.
In particular, we will study both a beamsplitter attack and an entan-
gling cloner attack for our protocol [99, 138]. In both of these attacks,
Bob will replace the quantum distribution channel with a beamsplitter
intended to mimic the effect of the channel on Charlie’s measurement.
Since Bob chooses his beamsplitter, he can do so without alerting Alice
and Charlie to his presence, and so all channel loss must be attributed
to Bob. Bob will either leave the second beamplitter input port empty,
or he will mimic channel thermal noise by injecting there a thermal
state Eq. 1.40, or one arm of his entangled two-mode squeezed vac-
uum state Eq. 1.51. This so-called “entangling cloner” attack allows
Bob to gain additional information which is stored in the correlations
between his two modes. This is known to be a dishonest player’s
optimal attack strategy in asymptotic QKD with Gaussian-modulated
coherent states [95, 131], while the optimal attack strategy against
discrete-modulated QKD remains an open question. However, we con-
jecture that entangling cloner should be optimal in the Gaussian limit
α→ 0, and close to optimal for the small amplitudes α considered in
this thesis. Certainly, performing an entangling-cloner attack on each
signal state as it passes will be physically demanding for Bob.
8 Although the QPSK alphabet is a symmetric set, the more realistic variations on
QPSK considered in Chapter 5 are not.




Figure 3.8: Attack BS0. Bob replaces the channel with a lossless channel, plus
a beamsplitter. By inputting vacuum |0〉〈0| into the beamsplitter,
Bob mimics channel loss while imposing zero excess noise.
In its canonical form, the beamsplitter attack, Fig. 3.8, allows Bob to
replace a lossy channel, transmission T , with a corresponding lossless
channel and beamsplitter. Bob inputs vacuum |0〉 into the unused
input port. Bob receives his quantum system ρB from the reflected
output port, and from ρB he will attempt to gain information about
Charlie’s measurement outcomes. Crucially, to honest players Alice
and Charlie this attack is indistinguishable from simply having a lossy
transmission channel, and so in analysis all channel loss must be
attributed to the action of the dishonest Bob. This attack cannot model
any channel thermal noise, which should therefore be ignored in the
analysis. A realistic channel will, however, impose noise onto Charlie’s
measurement outcomes, and later we describe some modificaions to
the beamsplitter attack to include this.
BS0: ξ = 0
Attack BS0 is depicted in Fig. 3.8. This attack is the canonical beam-
splitter attack, in which Bob will replace the channel with a lossless
channel plus a beamsplitter. Crucially, the beamsplitter is chosen so
that it mimics the channel exactly, and honest players should be unable
to tell whether an attack has taken place. In a run of the protocol,
therefore, all channel loss is attributed to dishonest Bob.
Consider a single input coherent state |αk〉〈αk|, with the αk chosen
uniformly at random from the QPSK alphabet (k = 0, 1, 2, 3). Bob’s
attack effectively inputs the vacuum state |0〉〈0| into the second input
port of the beamsplitter. We will calculate the Holevo information χ,
Eq. 1.87, of Bob’s state conditioned on Charlie receiving a particular
eliminated signature element after his heterodyne measurement.
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Using beamsplitter relation Eq. 1.55 (c.f. Appendix B), we see that a
beamsplitter with transmission T enacts the following transformation
on the input state:

















When the αk is chosen uniformly at random, we must mix over the




















Charlie heterodynes on his mode and receives outcomes (qout,C,pout,C).
We write zC = qout,C + ipout,C, and so Bob now holds












Here P (zC | αk, T) =
∣∣∣〈zC|√Tαk〉∣∣∣2 corresponds to the probability





Tαk|, while P (zC) =
∑
αk
P (zC|αk, T) corresponds to the
total unconditional probability that he measures zC.
Recall that the eliminated signature element held by Charlie is
determined entirely by his heterodyne outcome zC, Fig. 3.9. Since
Holevo information χ is defined in terms of Charlie’s eliminated
signature element rather than heterodyne measurement outcome, and
since many outcomes zC will return the same eliminated signature
element, we must now mix ρB | zC over entire quadrants in phase-
space.
Let us use the notation for eliminated signature elements from
Tab. 3.1, and consider the first eliminated signature element e1. We
mix ρB | zC over all outcomes zC which are consistent with e1, i.e.
qout > 0 and pout > 0:





d2zC P (zC) ρB | zC , (3.44)
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Figure 3.9: Multiple heterodyne outcomes give rise to the same eliminated
signature element. (a) A particular eliminated signature element.
(b) All possible heterodyne outcomes consistent with (a).




d2zC P (zC) . (3.45)
The conditional state ρB | e1 is the quantum state held by Bob when
Charlie has received eliminated signature element e1. Bob’s states
conditioned on eliminated signature elements e2, e3, e4 are calculated
likewise by varying the limits of integration.









In this chapter we are working in the ideal case where each eliminated
signature element is equally likely, and where the entropies of each











P (ek) ρB | ek (3.48)





using the definiition of Holevo information, Eq. 1.87,
χ = Sapriori − Saposteriori. (3.49)
We calculate and plot χ under attack BS0 in Fig. 3.12.
9 Clearly the normalization factor N as defined in Eq. 3.45 is equal to 1/4 for each
e1, e2, e3, e4. We explicitly show the general form for Eq. 3.45 here for completeness,
though, as it will become important in Sec. 3.8 when we discuss postselection on
measurement outcomes, and in Ch. 5 when assumptions about uniform sending
probabilities are relaxed.
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BS1: ξ > 0
Figure 3.10: Attack BS1. The beamsplitter mimics channel loss, while mixing
with thermal state ρthermal introduces excess noise into Charlie’s
outcome.
Next, let us consider a modification to attack BS0 which will allow
us to model lossy channels which also induce excess noise in Charlie’s
measurement outcomes. In the first modification, denoted BS1 and
displayed in Fig. 3.10, Bob inputs a thermal state ρthermal, Eq. 1.40,
into the second input port of the beamsplitter. This will induce excess
noise ξ > 0 in Charlie’s measurement outcomes consistent with the
thermal channel noise, where we define the excess noise in Charlie’s
q quadrature, when coherent state |αk〉 was sent, as




and similarly for p quadrature. In other words, the excess noise in the
q quadrature is defined as the quadrature variance above the vacuum
variance, and similarly for p. The total excess noise ξ is then taken to
be
ξ = max {ξq, ξp} , (3.51)
and should be attributed to the action of dishonest Bob. We will
calculate Bob’s Holevo information under this attack.
We wish to mix a coherent state ραk = |αk〉〈αk| and a thermal state
ρthermal on a beamsplitter with transmission T . In the Fock basis our
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where α∗k denotes the complex conjugate of αk. The input state into
the beamsplitter is
ρinput = ραk ⊗ ρthermal. (3.53)
Enacting beamsplitter relation Eq. 1.57 on ρinput, and heterodyning
on Charlie’s mode, we arrive at Bob’s conditional output state ρB | zC .
The state is displayed in full in Eq. B.9, Appendix. B.3.
Now, to reach the a posteriori state under this attack we will integrate
this ρB | zC over all zC ∈ C consistent with a particular eliminated
signature element. Mathematically, this corresponds to simply integrat-
ing scalar terms involving zC in Eq. B.9, noting that the integration
operation commutes with the rest of the state. Writing z = zC for







where k, l = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
The integration is best performed in polar coordinates since the
radial and angular integrals separate. We find
IBS1 =














if k 6= l
(3.55)
with Γ the gamma function [139]. Indeed, the radial component of the
integrand of Eq. 3.54 is a standard integral for Γ . The final a posteriori
state is now accessible by substituting Eq. 3.55 into Eq. B.9.
The a priori state is calculated likewise, but the limits of integration




zkz∗l = πΓ (k+ 1) = πk! (3.56)
since the polar integral forces k = l. The Holevo information may now
be calculated in the same way as Sec. 3.6.1 by the difference of a priori
and a posteriori entropies, and we compare Holevo information under
different attacks in Fig. 3.12.
3.6.2 Entangling-cloner attack
The entangling cloner attack [99, 138], depicted in Fig. 3.11, is ideally
suited to consistently incorporate the presence of excess noise ξ, and
we shall see that it is a much more powerful attack than any of the
beamsplitter attacks considered above. The entangling cloner attack,
which we shall denote EC, may be viewed as a natural extension of
attack BS1.
Instead of inputting a thermal state into the beamsplitter’s fourth
port, Bob will input one arm of his entangled two-mode squeezed




Figure 3.11: EC attack. Locally, one mode of the TMSV looks like ρthermal
and so allows channel excess noise to be emulated. Bob can
exploit correlations in noise between his two mode output state
ρB′1,B2
to gain additional information.
vacuum (TMSV) state, Eq. 1.51. The mode which Bob inputs into
the channel is locally indistinguishable from ρthermal, and so honest
players are unable to distinguish between BS1, BS2 and EC.







(tanh ζ)n+m |n,n〉〈m,m| . (3.57)


















⊗ |n2〉〈m2| , (3.58)
where we have explicitly separated in square brackets the two modes
which will interfere on the beamsplitter.
The beamsplitter mixes |n1,n2〉〈m1,m2| via Eq. 1.55, and gives an
entangled three-mode state at the output. Charlie heterodynes on his
mode and receives outcome zC, and we arrive at Bob’s conditional
two-mode output state ρB | zC , which we display fully in Eq. B.13,
Appendix. B.4. Once again the state is readily integrated in zC, either
over the entire complex plane or a single quadrant, and we may simply
substitute Eqs. 3.55, 3.56 into Eq. B.13 to reach the a posteriori and a
priori states, respectively.
The a priori state is automatically normalized by virtue of the inte-
gration over C, while the a posteriori state is normalized by multiplying
by N (e1 | ξ), defined as
N (e1 | ξ) =
∫
qout>0,pout>0
d2c P (zC | ξ) . (3.59)
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where we have included excess noise ξ in our probability, as in Ap-
pendix. A. The performance of this attack is analysed in Fig. 3.12.
3.6.3 Comparison of attacks
We compare attacks BS0, BS1 and EC in Fig. 3.12 as amplitude α and
channel transmission T are varied. We observe that for all α, T and for
all channel thermal photon numbers n̄ the EC attack performs best,
while attack BS1 performs worse than even attack BS0 where no excess
noise is considered. Under EC, Bob is permitted to exploit correlations
between his two modes, and the n̄ restricts the level of entanglement
between his modes. Larger n̄ means greater entanglement, and so
we should expect that as n̄ increases Bob gains more information.
However, under BS1 Bob is not permitted to use these correlations,
and so his outcomes and Charlie’s outcomes are both noisy. The added
noise reduces Bob’s information without providing him the advantage
of EC.
The thermal photon number n̄ is related to the inverse temperature








while n̄ is related to the squeezing parameter ζ of the input TMSV






Since under attack BS1 Bob performs worse than BS0, we are led
to consider an attack which can be considered mid-way between the
power of BS0 and EC. We modify the attack by imposing that the
channel excess noise should only affect honest players. That is, the
presence of ξ causes perr to increase, but Holevo information and
therefore pe should both be unaffected. We call this attack BS2. While
strictly this attack is physically inconsistent, and therefore impossible
for Bob to perform, it is more pessimistic for honest players than
either BS0 or BS1 and so the security bounds it gives are also safe
bounds on both of those attacks. Indeed, since an analytic expression
for Bob’s states under attack BS0 is readily attainable without resort
to the numerical methods required for BS1 (Appendix B), in some
circumstances it may even be computationally preferable to assume
attack BS2. The Holevo information is given by using Eqs. 3.44 and
3.48 in the usual way, while perr is given in Appendix A.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.12: Comparison of Holevo information χ under attacks BS0 (black),
BS1 (orange) and EC (red). BS0 has no excess noise in the channel
which corresponds to channel thermal photon number n̄ = 0.
BS1 and EC both include excess noise, with n̄ = 0.01 (solid
red/orange lines) and n̄ = 0.02 (dashed red/orange lines). (a)
Increasing amplitude α of the QPSK alphabet leads to larger
Holevo information for dishonest Bob. Honest players should
therefore choose small α. (b) At T = 0 and T = 1 Bob gains no
information about Charlie’s outcomes. In both (a) and (b), we
see that EC attack gives Bob much more information than BS0,
while BS1 performs worse.
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3.7 signature length L
We have proven protocol security against both repudiation (Sec. 3.2)
and forgery (Sec. 3.4). and we have shown that our QDS protocol is
robust (Sec. 3.3). Additionally, we have demonstrated how a forging
Bob’s probability pe to introduce a mismatch into his signature is
related to the Holevo information χ of his quantum system (Sec. 3.5)
and have explicitly analysed several attacks which he may perform
which mimic different channel conditions (Sec. 3.6). We are now in a
position to calculate the total probability that our QDS protocol fails to
meet the security requirements outlined in List. 3.1. We shall see that
the total failure probability decays exponentially, and so our protocol
is secure.
Let us define εfail as the total probability that our protocol fails, either
by allowing a repudiation or forging attack, or by aborting when all
players behaved honestly. To gain a figure of merit we assume that the
protocol is equally likely to fail in any of these ways, and so we set
εfail = εhonest abort = εrepudiation = εforgery, (3.62)
though we note that alternative combinations may be easily considered.
Let us eliminate the free parameters sB, sC by equating the arguments


























as our choices of security thresholds. Notice that since perr 6 pe,
Eq. 3.64 automatically fulfils the requirement that sB 6 sC. The overall










This probability εfail decays exponentially in L, and so provided that
perr and pe are known, and pe − perr > 0, any security level εfail > 0
may be reached by varying signature length L. In keeping with the
recent works Refs. [44, 46, 47, 73] in this Thesis we will take εfail =
0.01%. Equation 3.65 may then be solved for the signature length. We
take L as the main figure of merit10 for a QDS protocol, and analyse
the performance of our protocol in Sec. 3.9.
10 Analogously to the key rate in QKD.
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3.8 postselection
In the context of QKD it has been known for some time that a postse-
lection of measurement outcomes, in which measurement outcomes
unfavourable to honest players are discarded, will improve the key
rates in the presence of excess noise. Postselection is even a require-
ment to distill a key below T 6 1/2 in the direct reconciliation regime
[140]. We are thus motivated to apply postselection to our QDS pro-
tocol in order to allow a message to be securely signed over a larger
range of channel parameters, and we shall see that it can reduce the
necessary L. The results of this section will be especially useful in
Ch. 5 where – as for direct reconciliation QKD – we shall see that
postselection is a necessity for some QDS protocols.
For now, we will apply postselection to the protocol outlined in
this chapter. To apply the postselection technique, recipients Bob and
Charlie will simply disregard unfavourable measurement outcomes,
i.e. outcomes for which a dishonest player is deemed to have too much
knowledge, or for which the probability of honest mismatch is too
high.
We define a region RPS ∈ C, Fig. 3.13. Honest recipients will only
accept measurement outcomes (qout,pout) with c := qout + ipout ∈
C \ RPS. We may then vary RPS in order to increase the range of
channel parameters for which the QDS protocol is secure, and to
minimize signature length L.
Figure 3.13: The postselection region RPS, gray, is parametrized by ∆r,∆θ
in polar coordinates. Participants will only accept measurement
outcomes c ∈ C \ RPS.
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Our chosen RPS is parametrized by two variables ∆r,∆θ in polar
coordinates, Fig. 3.13. This is the same postselection region which
was considered in the recent work Ref. [141], but if desired more
general regions may be readily considered. We make no claims as to
the optimality of our choice of the shape RPS, though once the form
of RPS is set we may optimize over ∆r and ∆θ to improve protocol
security.
The crucial quantity which controls the security of our QDS protocol
is gsec := pe − perr, which describes how much more likely a dishonest
player is to induce a mismatch than an honest player. We saw in
Sec. 3.7 that our QDS protocol is secure provided that gsec > 0, and
that the signature length L required to sign to a given level of security
εfail is directly controlled by gsec. We therefore must consider how
postselection affects gsec.
Let us begin with the effect of postselection on perr = perr (∆r,∆θ).
Recall that when Alice sends state |α〉 through a lossy but noiseless
channel, transmission T , Charlie receives c ∈ C with probability







Thus the probability of eliminating the state |α〉 when no postselection





















When the postselection technique is used we must change the limits





















where we effectively have the same integrals as Eq. 3.67 restricted by
RPS. The normalization probability N is the probability that Charlie
will accept his measurement outcome, which is calculated by extend-




d2c P (c | α, T , ξ) . (3.69)
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The calculation of perr (∆r,∆θ) follows identically to Eq. 3.68 when
excess noise ξ is included, simply using the requisite formula (Ap-
pendix A) and performing the integrations as Eq. 3.68.
Since a dishonest player’s declaration will depend on an honest
player’s heterodyne outcome, the probability pe must also vary with
RPS. We will calculate the effect of RPS on Holevo information χ, from
which the probability pe is calculated via Eq. 3.40 as normal.
Assume that Bob has performed any one of the attacks examined in
Sec. 3.6, and let Bob’s state after Charlie’s heterodyne measurement be
denoted ρj
B | c
. Again, since Charlie’s eliminated signature element is
entirely determined by the quadrant in which c lies, the state ρj
B | ek
is calculated by mixing ρj
B | c
over an entire quadrant of phase-space,
as in Eqs. 3.44, 3.55, Tab. 3.1. We must therefore update these integrals


















dθ ρB | reiθ , (3.70)
and similarly for e2, e3, e4. The N is identical to that required for
Eq. 3.68, and Bob’s a priori state is found by mixing Eq. 3.70 over all
quadrants. Probability pe (∆r,∆θ) may now be calculated via Eq. 3.40.
To actually perform the integration, we separate out terms involving











where we have used c = reiθ. To perform the integration, it is helpful
to perform the angular integral first, which readily integrates to a
sum of exponentials when k 6= l, or to π/2− 2∆θ when k = l. The






which is the definition of an upper incomplete Gamma function [142],






[2+ k+ l] ,∆2r
)
,∀k, l > 0 (3.73)
which may be easily calculated.
We have now included the effects of RPS on gsec, and so the per-
formance of the protocol under postselection may be analysed. In
Fig. 3.14 we plot gsec varying RPS for attacks BS0, BS1, and EC, and
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for different coherent state amplitude α’s at T = 0.5. We observe that
when considering gsec, it is advantageous to choose a large postselec-
tion region as this always allows gsec to increase. However we also
observe that the effectiveness of postselection depends on our coherent
state amplitude. For example, at α = 0.2 we see smaller increase in
gsec as RPS is increased, and there is almost no effect of postselection
as ∆θ is varied under EC attack.
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.14: The efficacy of postselection depends strongly both on attack
type and parameters α, T . Solid: ∆θ = 0. Dashed: ∆θ = 0.3.
Green: BS0. Orange: BS1. Red: EC. (a) α = 0.5, T = 0.5 and (b)
α = 0.2, T = 0.5. In both graphs attacks BS1 and EC have excess
noise ξ = 0.1%.
Let us turn now to examine our main figure of merit, the num-
ber of quantum states L used in the protocol. Directly incorporating
gsec (∆r,∆θ) into Eq. 3.65 will give an erroneous level of security, for
the following reason. Our calculations in this section, culminating in
gsec (∆r,∆θ), correctly bound the number of states required to sign a
message to security level εfail. However, this is not equivalent to the
number of states which Alice has actually sent.
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For example under attack EC with α = 0.5, T = 0.5, ξ = 0.1%,
choosing ∆r = 4.0 and ∆θ = 0.4 gives gsec = 0.1225. Substituting
this into Eq. 3.65 and solving for L gives L = 10560. But in order to
have that many states accepted at Charlie, Alice will actually need
to have sent 7× 1010 coherent states in total, since Charlie will reject





It follows that L, as implicitly defined by Eq. 3.65, is actually a poor
figure of merit to measure the resource-use of our protocol when
postselection is used.
Instead, we will work in terms of L̃, which we define as the total
number of states sent by Alice. This may be written as a rescaling of L
given by
L 7→ L̃ := L
N
, (3.74)
with the normalization factor N interpreted sthe average probability
that Charlie accepts a given state sent by Alice, Eq. 3.69.
We plot N in Fig. 3.15, and figure of merit L̃ in Fig. 3.16. We observe
that even though large ∆θ causes gsec to increase, Fig. 3.14, it also
causes an increase in L̃, owing to the quick decay of N with ∆θ,
Fig. 3.15. We also may deduce from the graphs Fig. 3.16 that there is
an optimum ∆r which minimizes L̃ and gives the best performance of
our protocol.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.15: Normalization factor N Eq. 3.69 varies dramatically with posts-
election region RPS. (a) α = 0.5, T = 0.5. (b) α = 3.0, T = 1.0
Since the figures of merit L̃ (with postselection) and L (without
postselection) measure the same thing – how many states must Alice
send in order to sign a 1 bit message – they may be directly compared.
For the remainder of this Thesis, then, we will not distinguish between
L̃ and L. It should be understood that when postselection is used we
are using the rescaled L̃, while when postselection is not use we are
using L. Furthermore, since ∆θ > 0 causes L̃ to increase we will take
the optimal ∆θ = 0 always from now on, and only allow ∆r to vary. It
will be made clear in what follows whether the postselection technique




Figure 3.16: The key figure of merit, L̃, depends strongly on postselection
region RPS. Solid: ∆θ = 0. Dashed: ∆θ = 0.3. Green: BS0. Orange:
BS1. Red: EC. (a) α = 0.5, T = 0.5 and (b) α = 0.2, T = 0.5. In
both graphs attacks BS1 and EC have ξ = 0.1%. In all cases it is
optimal to choose ∆θ = 0
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3.9 protocol performance
Let us apply the analysis performed in the previous few sections
and calculate our main figure of merit, the signature length L, under
several different attacks. We plot the signature length L required to
sign a 1 bit message under attacks BS0 (black) and EC (red) in Fig. 3.17,
for several different α. An entangling cloner attack with ξ = 0.1% has
vastly increased signature length for α = 0.2 (dotted), while for larger
α = 0.5, 0.8, entangling-cloner causes the signature length to increase
by more modest amounts when compared to BS0. Note that in Fig. 3.17
the transmissions T at which the lines stop should be interpreted as
being close to the smallest T attainable before L begins to diverge,
and signing a message becomes impractical (in the case of BS0) or
impossible (in the case of EC).
Figure 3.17: Signature lengths L varying with channel transmission T for
attacks BS0 (black) and EC (red). Solid: α = 0.5. Dashed: α = 0.8.
Dotted: α = 0.2. Entangling cloner attack has excess noise ξ =
0.1% at all T. A non-optimal choice of α can lead to much larger
signature lengths. No postselection is used.
Even when attack BS0 is used and ξ = 0%, a sub-optimal choice of
coherent state amplitude α can drastically worsen the performance of
the protocol. To investigate optimal amplitudes, we plot the security
parameter gsec varying with α under attack BS0 in Fig. 3.18. We
observe that the optimal α decreases with increasing loss (smaller T ).
Intuitively, at T = 1.0 Eve gains no information and so one should pick
α 1 so as to minimize the mismatch rate between honest players.
We also compare our current protocol to a recent CV QDS protocol
[73] which did not allow for the presence of an eavesdropper on
the quantum channels. The security parameter under Ref. [73] is
displayed as red, dot-dashed lines in Fig. 3.18 at T = 0.47 (top) and
T = 0.19 (bottom). We see that for larger T , and almost all α at
smaller T , our current protocol outperforms Ref. [73], despite our
relaxing the requirement of secure quantum channels. This surprising
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improvement in performance comes directly from the fact that in
the current protocol, Alice distributes different signatures to each
recipient, whereas in Ref. [73] she distributed identical signatures.
Figure 3.18: Security parameter gsec under attack BS0 as it varies with α for
T = 0.61, 0.47, 0.19, 0.11, 0.01 (solid, black, top to bottom). The
optimal α which should be chosen to maximize gsec (minimize
L) decreases as T decreases. Horizontal gridlines denote O (L)
starting from L ∼ 105 at gsec = 0.038 (top), with L increasing by a
factor of 10 at subsequent lower gridlines. Red, dot-dashed: gsec
calculated via the protocol described in Ref. [73] for T = 0.19
and T = 0.47.
We optimize over α and postselection region ∆r in Fig. 3.19. The
figure thus represents the smallest attainable L for our protocol under
attacks BS0 (solid, blue), BS2 (dashed, orange) and EC (solid, red).
Attack BS1 gives smaller L than even BS0, and so we do not show
it. Even at the T ∼ 0.4 corresponding to a fiber length ∼ 20 km, the









Figure 3.19: Signature lengths under protocols BS0 (blue, solid), BS2 (orange,
dashed) and EC (red, solid). At each point L is optimized over α
and postselection parameter ∆r. EC attack with ξ = 0.1%.
102 quantum digital signatures
Finally, in Appendix C we extend the protocol discussed in this
chapter to allow for larger alphabet sizes. These alphabets, which
we denote as NPSK alphabets, consist of N coherent states equally
distributed around the origin of phase space. The case N = 4 is
equivalent to the QPSK alphabet which we have used until now. For
NPSK alphabets with N = 2, N = 4, N = 6, N = 8 we plot their
signature lengths optimized over α in Fig. 3.20, and the required
optimal α’s are displayed in the inset.
Surprisingly, although for larger alphabets the optimal α is de-
creased, the minimal L is slightly increased. As has been found else-
where [143], the biggest leap in behaviour should occur between 2→ 4,
and indeed this is what we see11. As N increases, with α 1 we tend
closer towards a Gaussian mixture of coherent states (c.f. Fig. 1.4b).
We may therefore reasonably expect the attack strategies BS0 and EC
to become increasingly optimal in this Gaussian limit, which explains
the slight increase in L for larger alphabets.
Figure 3.20: Signature length L under attack BS0. At each T , length L has
been optimized over amplitude |α| of the alphabet. We have
considered NPSK alphabets with N = 2, 4, 6, 8. Dot-dashed:
N = 2. Black, solid: N = 4. Dashed: N = 6. Gray, solid: N = 8.
Inset: the corresponding optimal αopt.
3.10 outlook
Quantum digital signatures, which use quantum resources to allow for
secure authentication of a classical message, have only recently been
proven secure against a quantum eavesdropper on the channels [47, 55,
64]. In this Chapter, we have progressed continuous-variables QDS by
providing security against an eavesdropper performing one of several
beamsplitter attacks, or an entangling-cloner attack, on the quantum
channels. Surprisingly, short signature signature lengths are sufficient
11 Noting that for the case N = 2 we no longer need to think about an eliminated
signature and we may simply consider optimal guessing probabilities.
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to perform secure QDS over metropolitan distances, and we require
even shorter signatures than a comparable scheme in Ref. [73] which
assumed secure quantum channels. Our security proof has enabled
us also to take into account the fact that for each eliminated signature
element there are multiple “correct” declarations which a dishonest
player can make.
Our security proof has relied on several assumptions which reflect
the state-of-the-art of CV quantum cryptography with our chosen
alphabet of discrete-modulated coherent states, but which future work
should strive to relax. First, the eavesdropping attacks permitted by
a dishonest player in this chapter do not give them the full power of
quantum mechanics, and there are additional attacks which could be
performed which may prove additionally effective. For example, a dis-
honest player could begin to induce and exploit quantum correlations
between subsequent distributed states. There may also be additional
attacks on individual signature elements which are more powerful
than the ones considered here. The non-Gaussianity of our alphabet
is restrictive, and the entangling-cloner attack is only expected to be
optimal as a limiting case that the QPSK alphabet becomes Gaussian,
i.e. α→ 0 [144, 145]. One possible route towards a fuller security anal-
ysis could be an extension of results known for QKD with two-state
[146] and three-state [147] alphabets to our four-state alphabet, noting
recent progress in Ref. [137]. We expect that such an extension, if even
possible, will be challenging.
One may begin to further consider the finite-size effects [18] which
are intrinsic to any QDS scheme, noting the operational links between
the guessing probabilities pe considered in this Chapter, and the
smooth min-entropy [51]. Calculations of the smooth min-entropy
have been used to good effect for DV QDS in Refs. [47, 64], where we
note that a full calculation also allows for security against coherent
attacks. Advances in calculating optimal lower bounds for the smooth
min-entropy under a discrete-modulated coherent state alphabet will
have immediate and direct application to CV QDS, and may be readily
incorporated into our security proof. Recent work [148] has allowed for
direct calculations of smooth min-entropy for an alphabet of Gaussian-
modulated coherent states via the covariance matrix formalism, and
recent QKD work [96] has successfully handled the QPSK alphabet
in the asymptotic regime only by assuming that it is Gaussian, i.e.
α 1, allowing the mixture of states to be completely described by
a covariance matrix. In our case, however, choosing α such that this
criterion is met and any bounds are tight enough to be useful, also
gives very large perr rendering our protocol insecure.
The work by Lin et. al. [141] has removed the Gaussian assump-
tion by applying new reformulations of the Devetak-Winter key rate
bounds and the related semi-definite programming optimizations [72,
149], but they are still forced to make the assumption to truncate
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their Hilbert space sizes in order to make the problem numerically
tractable. While this does provide a high level of security, it further
demonstrates that the ideal methods to provide general coherent QKD
security for the QPSK alphabet–even in the asymptotic case–are by no
means settled. Further work is needed.
A fully Gaussian CV QDS protocol is conceivable, in which Alice
distributes coherent states chosen from a Gaussian probability distri-
bution. It is likely that the resulting analysis could proceed almost
entirely in the covariance matrix formalism [13, 14], for which good
bounds for smooth min-entropy are known [148]. One should take
care in the analysis to correctly define perr however, as there is now
no natural partitioning of phase-space. One may therefore also need
to optimize over the best choice of phase-space partition with which
to define an eliminated signature, and it will be interesting to ob-
serve how this partitioning is affected by channel parameters T , ξ, the
variance of the underlying Gaussian probability distribution, and the
choice of postselection region RPS.
The security of our QDS protocol and the short L required to sign
a message, stemming both from our security proof and the practical
advantages of the CV platform, make CV QDS an attractive scheme
for secure communications in a quantum future. We further explore
this protocol in Chapter 5 where we investigate its practical experi-
mental implementation alongside related cryptographic protocols. We
demonstrate, there, that the short signature lengths obtained for this
protocol result in small times required to sign a message in a practical
implementation. Thus, to our knowledge, this QDS protocol is the
fastest protocol over comparable distances.
A brief discussion of the numerical methods which are used for this
current Chapter may be found in Appendix B, where we also display
the full quantum states used for attacks BS0, BS1 and EC.
4
Q UA N T U M S E C R E T S H A R I N G
In this chapter we introduce and investigate a continuous-variable
Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) protocol, which allows for secure
distribution of a classical secret among multiple potentially dishonest
recipients. Crucially, recipients are forced to collaborate in order to
reconstruct the secret, and a dishonest player should not be able to
access the secret by themselves.
We describe the protocol and its similarities and differences to recent
QSS protocols from the literature in Sec. 4.1, and then prove its security
against several different attack strategies in Secs. 4.2, 4.3. In Sec. 4.4
we analyse the performance of our protocol. Although the QSS task
has been around for many years, many of the existing protocols are
not suitable for implementation, despite their high level of security.
We present the implementation of our protocol in Chapter 5.
4.1 our qss protocol
Our Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) scheme allows for Alice to dis-
tribute a classical secret between two recipients, Bob and Charlie. To
keep with convention we call Alice the “dealer”. Either Bob or Charlie
is dishonest, and Alice does not know which one. Bob and Charlie
should be able to exactly reconstruct the secret when they work to-
gether, while the dishonest player should not be able to access the
secret by themselves, or even if they work with an external Eve.
4.1.1 QSS setup
All QSS protocols follow essentially the same structure, Fig. 4.1:
1. Alice (A) uses quantum resources to distribute shares of classical
key KA among recipients Bob (B) and Charlie (C). These shares
are labelled KB,KC and are such that KA = KB ⊕KC.
2. Alice encrypts her secret ΥA = KA ⊕ σA and makes the en-
crypted secret ΥA publicly known.
The ⊕ operation corresponds to bitwise addition (XOR) of binary
strings. Provided that KA,KB,KC and σA are the same length, the
above secret sharing operation is provably unconditionally secure1
provided that key shares KB,KC are securely distributed [24].
1 Much like the One Time Pad [24].
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Figure 4.1: All quantum secret sharing schemes follow the same structure:
Alice encrypts her classical secret σA with secret key KA, and
broadcasts the resulting ΥA. Shares of KA are distributed among
recipients Bob and Charlie such that KB ⊕KC = KA. Gray boxes
denote honest players, while red denotes dishonest players. The
half-red/half-gray boxes denote uncertainty about the honesty of
a player.
This form of protocol is similar to QKD-based encryption, and it
is for this reason that renowned cryptographer Gustavus Simmons
wrote that
“Secret sharing is simply a special form of key distribution”
as his abstract to Ref. [150].
QSS protocols, then, only differ in the method used to generate and
share the KB,KC forming the encryption key. One potentially attractive
option would be for Alice to perform individual QKD protocols,
first with Bob and then with Charlie, and then XOR the resulting
secure keys together. Since QKD is provably secure against a quantum
adversary, neither Bob nor Charlie can gain sufficient information
about the other player’s key, and the resulting QSS scheme is thus also
secure. Alternatively, once the secure keys are shared between Alice-
Bob and Alice-Charlie, they could implement one of several classical
unconditionally secure schemes which are discussed in Sec. 2.3.
Other options for distribution of a secret using quantum resources
are discussed in Sec. 2.3 and fall into one of two categories. The first
category [97, 98, 100, 107, 108, 151] relies on large entangled states
shared between all N players, while the second category [112, 113, 117,
118], involves distribution of a single (typically one-mode) quantum
state between all N players, who each perform their choice of measure-
ment on the state. In both forms, if N− 1 players communicate and
share their choice of measurement and their measurement outcomes,
they have sufficient information to infer the measurement outcome of
the Nth player. In this way, a key KA is distributed between players.
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4.1.2 QSS protocol description
We here propose a QSS protocol which will perform the task of quan-
tum secret sharing without requiring the distribution of highly entan-
gled states between players [108] and without requiring a dedicated
hardware or network setup [118]. Instead, we rely on distribution of
QPSK alphabet and heterodyne detection. Our QSS protocol guards
against eavesdropping by choosing a QPSK alphabet with small coher-
ent state amplitude α. This ensures that Eve cannot accurately guess
Alice’s heterodyne outcomes. The protocol also guards against the
internal dishonesty of Bob or Charlie by ensuring that the key KA,
which Alice will use to encrypt her secret, is a function of both Bob
and Charlie’s information.
In our protocol, Bob and Charlie are chosen as the senders of the
quantum states. This has advantage in that we may fully trust Alice’s
heterodyne detection2 and its characterisation. A dishonest internal
player will be forced to collaborate with Eve to attack the honest
player’s quantum channel, but by our choice of alphabet, this will
not succeed. Since Alice will decide on the eventual shared key our
protocol is analogous to a reverse-reconciliation (RR) QKD system,
and so we may similarly expect the performance benefits of RR QKD
at high loss. Indeed, we may interpret the entire QSS protocol as
effectively a QKD protocol between Alice (dealer) and several recipient
players.
Our QSS protocol runs in three stages, a Distribution stage, an
Encryption stage and, finally, a Decryption stage. Distribution and
Encryption stages are displayed in Fig. 4.2. The Distribution stage,
Fig. 4.2a, involves distribution and measurement of quantum coherent
states chosen from QPSK alphabet. At the end of Distribution, Alice
will hold classical information which is correlated with both Bob and
Charlie. In the Encryption stage, Fig. 4.2b, Alice will combine her
classical information and use it to encode her sensitive classical secret.
The encoded secret is then distributed to Bob and Charlie, who decode
it during Decryption.
Distribution stage, Fig. 4.2a
step 1 Alice wishes to share a classical secret, σA. Bob forms a clas-
sical random variable XB = {φB}, where the φB are one of four com-
plex phases independently chosen from the QPSK alphabet. Phases
φB are assumed to be chosen uniformly at random, but we relax this
assumption in Chapter 5. Charlie likewise forms classical random
variable XC = {φC}.
2 Note that permitting Bob or Charlie to perform the heterodyne detection implicitly
places trust in their heterodyning beamsplitter [88].





Figure 4.2: Distribution and Encryption stages of our QSS protocol. Alice
(A) wishes to securely share her secret σA amongst potentially
dishonest recipients Bob (B) and Charlie (C). (a) Distribution
stage. B and C send coherent states chosen from QPSK alphabet
to Alice, who heterodynes and obtains outcomes AB,AC. Eve
eavesdrops on the quantum channels in order to gain information
about Alice’s outcomes AB,AC. (b) Encryption stage. Alice forms
variable XA using her chosen function F with her heterodyne
measurement outcomes as input variables. She converts XA to a
binary X̃A and encrypts the secret with it to reach ΥA = σA⊕ X̃A.
The encrypted secret is then broadcast. Dishonest players are
shown in red and honest players in gray. A combination of red
and gray denotes uncertainty about the honesty of a player.
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denotes a coherent state with phase φ(B,C). These
sequences of states are sent to Alice through quantum channels. Alice
performs heterodyne detection on each of her received states and
records her outcomes. We denote the strings of Alice’s measurement
outcomes as AB,AC, where AB corresponds to measurement out-
comes on states sent by Bob, and AC corresponds to those on states
sent by Charlie. Alice keeps the AB and AC separate and secret, and
Bob and Charlie should retain their information XB,XC.
Encryption stage, Fig. 4.2b
step 3 Alice creates a new string of complex variables,
XA = F (AB,AC) , (4.2)
from her measurement outcomes. The function F is freely chosen by
Alice to optimize security. In this Thesis we will pick a simple form
for F which allows us to make concrete predictions about protocol
security, although in general F may be as pathological as Alice desires.
step 4 Alice now holds random variable XA of complex variables,
which depends on both Bob and Charlie’s choices XB,XC. Alice maps
her string of complex variables onto a binary random variable XA 7→
X̃A [152], and uses X̃A to encode σA via an XOR operation. For
notational ease we shall write this combined step in terms of an
encryption function Enc:
ΥA = Enc (σA,XA) , (4.3)
which should be known to all players at the start of the protocol. Alice
distributes ΥA to Bob and Charlie, who are unable to access σA since
they do not yet know XA.
Decryption stage
step 5 Later, when Alice desires to allow Bob and Charlie access
to σA, she broadcasts her choice of function F, along with enough
classical information to perform a reconciliation procedure between
XA and F (XB,XC). This stage is similar to CV QKD and so we refer the
reader to Refs. [95, 152]. Bob and Charlie contribute their information
XB,XC to form F (XB,XC) and reconcile it to XA and thus to X̃A. They
are now able to access Alice’s original secret σA.
Critical to the protocol is the fact that Alice forms a secret key based
on a degree of freedom which is shared between Bob and Charlie.
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This forces collaboration. If either one of Bob or Charlie is dishonest,
they are forced to work with an honest player and so our scheme
has succeeded. In this way, our protocol is a natural extension of the
protocol from Kogias et. al. [108], while having much simpler physical
requirements (e.g. no entanglement is required).
4.2 security against eve
The QSS protocol presented above must be secure against both the
actions of an external eavesdropper and those of a dishonest Bob or
Charlie who may be collaborating with Eve. We will first consider
security against Eve in order to illustrate key steps from the security
analysis. For this section we assume that Bob and Charlie are honest,






Figure 4.3: Alice distributes her secret σA to Bob and Charlie who are
assumed honest. Dishonest Eve will try to attack the protocol
and gain information about σA. Gray: honest. Red: dishonest. See
Fig. 4.1 for further information.
The starting point for our security analysis is the following Devetak-
Winter bound [153] for the asymptotic key rate under collective attack,
Fig. 3.7b:
κEve > I (XA : XB,XC) − χ (XA : E) . (4.4)
This equation describes the key rate in terms of the difference between
the mutual information, I, shared between Alice and a Bob-Charlie
collaboration, and the Holevo information χ between Eve’s quantum
system E and Alice. The XA = F (AB,AC) is Alice’s variable based on
her heterodyne measurement outcomes.
We would like to calculate the lower bound for key rate given by
Eq. 4.4 and so we will consider each term, and demonstrate how they
may be calculated in our protocol.
4.2 security against eve 111
4.2.1 Mutual information
Using Eq. 1.81, the mutual information I may be written as
I (XA : XB,XC) = H (XB,XC) − H (XB,XC | XA) , (4.5)
where the first term on the right hand side is the joint Shannon entropy
of XB and XC, and the second term is the conditional Shannon entropy
of XB,XC given XA, Sec. 1.5.3. Intuitively, this second term encodes
the uncertainty one has about which XB,XC were chosen, once Alice
has formed XA. The first term encodes the a priori entropy about Bob
and Charlie’s choice of sent coherent states, and is purely a function
of their sending probabilities.




−P (φB,φC) log P (φB,φC) , (4.6)
where φB,φC are individual instances of variables XB,XC. We take
φB,φC as phase elements of the QPSK alphabet, but it is easy to
generalize to larger NPSK alphabets if desired. Since φB,φC are taken
to be independently and randomly chosen, each with probability3 1/4,
we see that the joint probability




and so H (XB,XC) = 4.
Expanding the conditional entropy in terms of particular outcomes
for XA, via Eq. 1.80, we reach
H (XB,XC | XA) =
∫
a∈C
d2a P (XA = a)H (XB,XC | XA = a) . (4.8)
Each term in Eq. 4.8 can be calculated once function F is known. The
conditional entropy H (XB,XC | XA = a) expands as
H (XB,XC | XA = a) = −
∑
φB,φC
P (XB = φB,XC = φC | XA = a)×
log P (XB = b,XC = c | XA = a)
(4.9)
and so all that remains to calculate are the probabilities
P (XA = a) and (4.10)
P (XB = φB,XC = φC | XA = a) (4.11)
once F is known.
3 We relax this in Ch. 5.
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Function F
We have no requirement that the function F should be injective. This








, i.e. the entropy
of Eve’s quantum state conditioned on Alice’s heterodyne outcomes
AB,AC is not equal to the entropy of Eve’s quantum state conditioned
on Alice’s variable XA. So, we must carefully consider the action of F
early on in our analysis.
To be concrete, in what follows we assume that F is linear,
F (x,y) := gx+ hy with g,h ∈ R \ {0} , (4.12)
which will enable us to make some predictions about the performance
of the protocol. Although we make no claims about the optimality of
this choice of F, Alice is free to optimize the key rate over g,h.
Expanding classical probabilities
Applying Bayes’ formula Eq. 1.74 to probability Eq. 4.11 we see that
P (XB = φB,XC = φC | XA = a) = P (XA = a | XB = φB,XC = φC)
× P
(XB = φB,XC = φC)
P (XA = a)
.
(4.13)
Now, we can access P (XA = a | XB = φB,XC = φC). We take
XA = F (AB,AC) = gAB + hAC, (4.14)





Since our F is not injective we must average over all of the possible
ways to reach a given XA. Therefore, once XA,g and h are fixed, the
choice of AB,AC reduces to a one-variable problem. So









∣∣∣∣ XB = φB,XC = φC) ,
(4.16)
which may be calculated once we know how the channel acts on input
states4.
4 Note that an analogous expression would be reached by rearranging Eq. 4.14 as
AB = (XA − hAC) /g, but it will make no difference to the resulting quantities which
we derive from Eq. 4.16
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Assuming that the two channels, one from Charlie→Alice and one
from Bob→Alice, are independent5 from each other allows us to write
P (AB,AC | Xb = φB,XC = φC) = P (AB | XB = φB)×P (AC | XC = φC)
(4.17)
for the probabilities that Alice’s heterodyne measurement outcomes
are AB,AC, given that coherent states with phases φB,φC are sent.
Let us assume for now that each channel is noiseless but lossy.
The probability that Alice measures a particular heterodyne outcome
a = qout + ipout when a coherent state of complex amplitude β is sent
through a lossy channel, transmission T , is







which we have used previously in Ch. 3. The required changes to
include thermal noise of the channel can be readily made, c.f. Ap-
pendix. A.
The integral in Eq. 4.16 may now be calculated analytically to reach







































Here φB,φC are Bob and Charlie’s coherent state amplitudes, XA is
Alice’s final variable after applying F (Eq. 4.12) to her heterodyne
outcomes, TB, TC are the transmissions of the Bob→Alice channel and
Charlie→Alice channel, respectively, and a superscript R (I) denotes
the real (imaginary) part of the corresponding quantity. The probability




P (XA | XB = φB,XC = φC) . (4.20)
Finally, the mutual information Eq. 4.5 may be calculated. We perform
the integration over XA in Eq. 4.8 numerically and display the mutual
information I in Fig. 4.6.
4.2.2 Holevo information
We will now detail how the Holevo information term, χ in Eq. 4.4,
may be calculated. In doing so we will point to areas where future
work might strengthen the security analysis to consider wider classes
of attack. This should illuminate the contexts to which our security
5 We shall see later what this means for their combined action on an input quantum
state
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proof may be applied. For illustrative convenience, in this section we
consider a dishonest Eve performing attack BS0, as detailed above in
Sec. 3.6.1, though the analysis follows readily for the other attacks
described in Sec. 3.6.
Bob and Charlie prepare a state from the QPSK alphabet, and
each state is chosen randomly and with equal probability. Before the
channel, Bob and Charlie hold the joint state













where β,γ are the amplitudes of Bob’s and Charlie’s coherent state
alphabets.
We assume that the channel acts separately on each mode, and that
modes ρB, ρC undergo independent evolution. In other words, we
assume that the channel has the following structure:
Φ [ρ] = ΦB [ρ]⊗ΦC [ρ] (4.23)
whereΦB,C denote the lossy channels described by attack BS0, Sec. 3.6.1,
and the subscript B,C denotes which mode of ρbefore each channel acts
on. The total channel Φ preserves the tensor-product structure of the
input state.
Physically Φ corresponds to the case where Eve performs separate





Figure 4.4: We model the channelΦ as two independent beamsplitter attacks
of type BS0, Sec. 3.6.1. This preserves the tensor-product structure
of ρbefore.
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The total state after the channel becomes
ρafter = ρAB,EB ⊗ ρAC,EC , (4.24)













and similarly for ρAC,EC . Now, Alice heterodynes and measures AB
from ρAB,EB and AC from ρAC,EC . Eve’s total state conditioned on
these outcomes becomes












and similarly for ρEC |AC . The probability PB (AB | βk, TB) is calcu-
lated analogously to Eq. 4.18, and similarly for AC.
To proceed, we take XA = gAB +hAC as usual, with g,h fixed, and
write AC = (XA − gAB) /h. Therefore the state ρE |AB,AC , Eq. 4.26,
becomes


















Once again, since Alice’s function F is in general not injective, we
must mix over outcomes AB,AC in order to find Eve’s state ρE | XA :
ρE | XA =
∫
AB∈C
d2AB P (AB) ρE | XA,AB . (4.29)




d2XA P (XA) ρE | XA . (4.30)
We may identity Eq. 4.29 as Eve’s a prosteriori state and Eq. 4.30 as
Eve’s a priori state and so Eve’s Holevo information is given by the
usual formula Eq. 1.87:
χ = S (ρE) −
∫
XA∈C
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We note that we can no longer simplify the second term in Eq. 4.31,
like we did in Sec. 3.6, for example, since in general the entropy of
each state depends on XA. We perform the integration in Eq. 4.31
numerically, and display the output Holevo information in Fig. 4.7.
4.3 security against a dishonest player
Of course, if Alice only had to guard against an external Eve, and
both Bob and Charlie could be assumed honest, then the QSS task
becomes much easier. She could, for example, simply send the same
information to each recipient. Or send her secret just to the recipient
she is interested in, with no need to “split” it or share it. The task of
secret sharing, however, assumes dishonest recipients. In this section
we will adapt the analysis of Sec. 4.2 to this case. Our method will
be to take the final key rate as the minimum of key rates under
dishonest Bob and dishonest Charlie, which therefore secures against
both possibilities [108, 118].
4.3.1 Dishonest Bob
Let us translate the analysis from Sec. 4.2 to the case where either Bob
or Charlie is dishonest, but Alice does not know which one, Fig. 4.1.
Including a dishonest recipient in the above security proof requires us
to re-calculate several quantities. For concreteness we will first assume
that Bob is dishonest and Charlie is honest, Fig. 4.5, and we will allow
Bob to collaborate with Eve. Later we will discuss how to account for





Figure 4.5: A dishonest Bob gains an advantage since he knows which
coherent state he chose to send to Alice. He may additionally
choose to collaborate with Eve in order to gain information about
Alice’s measurement on Charlie’s state. c.f. Fig. 4.1.
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The main effect of permitting dishonesty from Bob is that he knows
precisely which coherent states he sent to Alice. This reduces his
uncertainty about Alice’s variable XA. Bob might also wait and see
which coherent state was sent by Charlie before choosing his own,
in order to preference a certain outcome XA, but the advantage that
this might give may be reduced by assuming that F, g and h are
not disclosed by Alice at the start of the protocol. We will discuss
this further in Sec. 4.5. We will additionally assume that Bob sends
states only from the QPSK alphabet, though in principle this could be
relaxed in future work.
Since Bob knows which coherent state he sent, we must re-calculate
several expressions from Sec. 4.2. The main change is that we no
longer mix over Bob’s alphabet. The quantities which this influences
are P (XA = a) and H (XB,XC | XA = a), which now become
P (XA = a) =
∑
c
P (XA | Xb = b,XC = c) , (4.32)
and
H (XB,XC | XA = a) = −
∑
c
P (XB = b,XC = c | XA = a)×
log P (XB = b,XC = c | XA = a) .
(4.33)
The mutual information may now be calculated as in the previous
section.
The Holevo information is also calculated analogously to the pre-
vious section, the key change being that Eve’s state conditioned on
XA,AB, Eq. 4.28, is now given by















and the a posteriori and a priori states calculated by integrating Eq. 4.34
identically to Eqs. 4.29, 4.30.
Since we no longer mix over Bob’s coherent state βk, the mutual
information I and Holevo information χ have themselves become
functions of βk. In this chapter we assume that each state in the QPSK
alphabet is equally likely and has equal magnitude and so both I and
χ will be identical for each of Bob’s alphabet states. We will relax this
in Chapter 5.
The final key rate is now
κEve, Bob = I (XA : XB,XC) − χ (XA : EB) (4.35)
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with mutual information and Holevo information terms calculated as
described above. In using Eq. 4.35 we are treating Bob as a dishonest
eavesdropper who collaborates with Eve. This key rate formula thus
provides security against general collective eavesdropping strategies,
provided the mutual information and Holevo information terms can
be bounded. In this Chapter we will allow the same range of attacks
as in Ch. 3. We discuss additional attack strategies unique to our QSS
protocol in Sec. 4.5.
4.3.2 Dishonest Bob or Dishonest Charlie
If Alice is certain that Bob is the dishonest player then she has no
need for a secret sharing scheme. Equivalently, she can set g = 0 in
her function F. If she is correct about Bob’s dishonestly, then she has
successfully prevented him from gaining any information about her
secret. However, if Alice turns out to be wrong and it is Charlie who is
the dishonest player then she has accidentally given Charlie the secret!
It is precisely this uncertainty about which player is dishonest which
makes a QSS scheme necessary.
In order to take into account this uncertainty over which player is
dishonest, Fig. 4.1, we proceed as in the recent QSS works Refs. [108,
118] and calculate the minimum over all possible dishonest configura-
tions. That is, we take
κ > min
{
κEve, Bob, κEve, Charlie
}
(4.36)
where κEve, Charlie is calculated analogously to Eq. 4.35. This expression
makes explicit the close links between QSS and QKD, as explored
further in Refs. [108, 118]. The work by Grice [118] generalizes this
expression to N players, and directly comments that their setup can
perform both QSS and 2-party QKD with key rate calculated analo-
gously.
4.4 protocol performance
We plot the mutual information (Eq. 4.5) in Fig. 4.6, taking honest
recipients in (a) and dishonest recipients in (b). Coherent state ampli-
tude α and channel transmission T are varied. We here take Bob and
Charlie’s states as having equal amplitudes and channel transmissions,
but in principle they can vary independently from one another. Unless
T = 0, the mutual information between Alice and Bob-Charlie always
increases with α as the states at Alice become increasingly distinguish-
able. The mutual information with honest recipients is bounded by 4,
while in the case of dishonest recipients it is bounded by 2.
The Holevo information χ under identical conditions to Fig. 4.6 is
plotted in Fig. 4.7. We see that there is a clear maximum of χ at T = 0.5,
which is when dishonest parties have maximum fidelity to Alice’s
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.6: Mutual information Eq. 4.5 as it varies with coherent state am-
plitude α and channel transmission T . (a) Honest recipients. (b)
Orange: dishonest recipients. Blue, clear: honest recipients, same
surface as (a). In both figures we have taken linear F, with param-
eters g = h = 0.5.
received state. Our QSS protocol leverages the power of cryptographic
protocols constructed in the reverse-reconciliation regime. As T < 0.5,
even though Eve receives a greater share of the sent state than Alice6,
the overlap between Eve’s and Alice’s states begins to decrease as T
decreases, meaning χ also decreases.
Curiously, Fig. 4.7b demonstrates a reduction in the Holevo infor-
mation when Bob or Charlie is dishonest. Since Holevo information
is directly related to the efficacy of an attack, this might suggest that
dishonesty gives no advantage, and even makes things worse. We
note however that the mutual information is also reduced in this case,
and a consideration of the key rate in Fig. 4.8 demonstrates that such
dishonesty of Bob or Charlie does indeed yield a marked reduction in
the key rate κ.
(a)
(b)
Figure 4.7: Holevo information Eq. 4.31 as it varies with coherent state
amplitude α and channel transmission T . (a) Honest recipients.
(b) Orange: dishonest recipients. Blue, clear: honest recipients,
same surface as (a). In both figures we have taken linear F, with
parameters g = h = 0.5.
6 This would be fatal for direct-reconciliation cryptography.
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The key rate κ is plotted in Fig. 4.8. Comparing Fig. 4.8(a) and (b),
we see that in all cases the presence of dishonesty in Bob or Charlie
causes a reduction in the obtained key rate. Each figure takes Bob
and Charlie to have the same coherent state amplitude α and channel
transmission T . At the loss levels considered here, α = 0.8 yields larger
κ, but for larger losses (not shown) α = 0.5 performs better. Indeed,
the best α reduces as the loss level increases. We found a similar result
for our QDS protocol, Fig. 3.18.
We see that a symmetric choice g = h = 0.5 is clearly optimal when
both Bob and Charlie are honest (green and blue lines in (a) outper-
form red and orange), while the best choice of g,h in (b) depends on
which player is assumed dishonest. For example, assuming that Bob
is dishonest gives much larger κ for g = 0.2, h = 0.8 (orange in (b))
than for g = h = 0.5 (blue in (b)). By lowering g we are effectively
reducing the amount of information which Bob has access to, and his
knowledge of which state was sent matters less and less. Conversely,
the choice g = 0.2, h = 0.8 causes a large reduction in κ when Charlie
is dishonest. Since the final key rate κ is a minimum over these two
key rates, Eq. 4.36, we see that when either party can be dishonest
the optimal choice should be the symmetric choice g = h. It would
however be interesting to see how optimal parameter choices vary
with the number of players and potential adversarial collaborations.
Allowing for Bob and Charlie to experience different loss levels,
or use different input alphabet amplitudes, we plot the resultant key
rates in Fig. 4.9. In (a) we let g = 0.2, h = 0.8 (blue, green) and
g = 0.3, h = 0.7 (orange, red) and vary the channel loss of Bob,
while Charlie’s is fixed at −1.5 dB. Bob is assumed dishonest. We
see that the loss variation in the player who contributes little to the
key, in this case Bob as g < h, leads to only small changes in the
resultant κ. However, when Charlie’s loss varies and Bob’s remains
constant, for equivalent parameters, we see (b) large variations in κ.
Black lines denote g = h = 0.5 with only Bob’s loss (a) or Charlie’s
loss (b) varying. Gray, dashed lines denote g = h = 0.5 when Bob and
Charlie’s losses vary equally. We see from this Figure 4.9 that when
g 6= h, the channel parameters of the player who contributes most to
the key (Bob if g < h or Charlie if h < g) make the most significant
impact. Interestingly, for the symmetric case g = h, which we have
already noted is the optimal choice, it is the largest amount of loss
which controls κ. Little is to be gained by having one high quality
channel if the other one is poor.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.8: QSS key rates varying with dB loss. Bob and Charlie experience
the same loss, and begin with the same input alphabet amplitude.
(a) Honest Bob and Charlie. (b) Dishonest Bob and Charlie. (a)
and (b) - blue: α = 0.5, g = h = 0.5; green: α = 0.8, g = h = 0.5;
orange: α = 0.5; g = 0.2, h = 0.8 Bob dishonest; red: α = 0.5;
g = 0.2, h = 0.8 Charlie dishonest.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.9: QSS key rates varying dB loss asymmetrically. (a) Bob’s loss
varies, while Charlie’s remains at −1.5 dB. (b) Charlie’s loss varies,
while Bob’s remains at T = 0.7. (a)-(b): We have taken g = 0.2,h =
0.8 (blue, green); g = 0.3,h = 0.7 (orange, red). Blue and orange
lines: both Bob and Charlie are honest. Green and red lines: Bob
is dishonest. Varying the loss of the dishonest player (a) results
in negligible variation of κ, while varying loss of honest player
(b) results in large variation. Black: g = h = 0.5 varying loss of
honest player. Gray, dashed: g = h = 0.5 varying loss of honest
and dishonest player equally.
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4.5 outlook
We have introduced and demonstrated a fully continuous-variables
protocol which performs the QSS task. Our protocol relies only on
distribution of QPSK coherent states and phase measurement via
heterodyne detection. Our protocol is proven secure against collective
attacks for which the Holevo information χ may be bounded, and
we have explicitly demonstrated how this may be estimated under
beamsplitter attacks (Sec. 3.6). In principle our analysis may readily
include entangling cloner attacks, as we did in Ch. 3 for the QDS
protocol, but as we shall see later in Ch. 5 the QSS protocol is not
very robust to channel excess noise. This might have been expected, as
QKD protocols with similar resources [137, 146] allow only very small
amounts of noise in the reverse-reconciliation configuration before a
secure key cannot be formed.
We will revisit this QSS protocol in Chapter 5, where we shall inves-
tigate its experimental implementation alongside other cryptographic
schemes with identical hardware requirements, and we shall see in
particular that this QSS protocol requires fewer quantum resources
than pairwise-QKD followed by a classical unconditionally secure
secret sharing scheme, Sec. 5.6.3.
The classical post-processing of the above protocol is inherently
very similar to Ref. [108], in which a secret key is generated between
Alice and a shared Bob-Charlie degree of freedom via incompatible
homodyne measurements on a tripartite entangled state. We have sev-
eral reasons to expect that our protocol will be secure against a more
restricted set of attacks, but over a wider range of channel parameters.
Firstly unlike Ref. [108] which relies in generation and distribution
of large multipartite entangled states, our scheme has more modest
quantum requirements which are easier to generate and manipulate,
and which are much more robust to channel loss and channel noise
than a large entangled state. Quantum cryptography (QKD, QDS)
using continuous-variables typically operates over metropolitan dis-
tances of tens of kilometers, and so we might reasonably expect similar
performance of our QSS protocol. Performance of our protocol over a
realistic fiber channel is analysed in Chapter 5. Secondly, the protocol
from Ref. [108] takes a form analogous to direct-reconciliation (DR)
QKD, while ours is analogous to reverse-reconciliation (RR) QKD. RR
QKD is known [95, 99, 138] to be much more resilient to loss and noise
than DR QKD without modifications [140].
Ref. [108] has potentially dishonest players Bob and Charlie per-
forming homodyne measurements on incompatible observables (i.e.
switching between q and p quadratures). No assumptions are made
about the measurement devices used and they are each treated as a
“black-box”. Security there comes inherently because of a Heisenberg-
type relation between incompatible observables, and the security proof
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relies on an Entropic Uncertainty Relation which has had success in
many parts of quantum cryptography [135, 154]. However, since we
desire to use heterodyne detection we are forced to adopt a different
approach and explicitly model the states’ evolution and measurement
during the protocol. We note that this matches the current state-of-the-
art of QPSK-based QKD [137], but should be improved in future work.
One approach might be to use an Entropic Uncertainty Relation de-
signed with heterodyne detection in mind [155, 156], but a preliminary
analysis has been pessimistic.
We have assumed that a dishonest Bob or Charlie still sends a state
from the QPSK alphabet. It is yet unclear whether they could gain
an advantage by sending something exotic and potentially highly
entangled, perhaps in order to force Alice to reach a certain key XA.
This should be explored and potentially included in future work. One
solution might be for Alice to wait until after Distribution to declare
her choice of F and its parameters, which in the worst-case scenario
should lead to a final security bound based on assumptions about
the power of existing quantum memory devices. This approach was
used in recent proofs for security of quantum oblivious transfer [124,
154]. We anticipate also that applying methods from quantum bit
commitment [124] might prove fruitful here, since bit commitment
also allows for possible dishonest distribution of the quantum state
from an untrusted player. Finally, we note that our assumption that
the channel between Alice and Bob-Charlie takes a tensor-product
structure, Eq. 4.23, Fig. 4.4, should be relaxed.
Finally, we note that the QSS protocol presented in this section, in
which both Bob and Charlie send coherent states to a central Alice,
is intrinsically similar in its setup to twin-field QKD systems which
have recently been proposed in order to overcome the rate-loss bound
for repeaterless QKD [79, 80], see Sec. 2.2.10. In the TF-QKD protocol
discussed in Ref. [81], for example, Alice and Bob independently
and randomly pick states from the QPSK alphabet and send them
to Eve through their separate quantum channels. Eve receives the
states, interferes them on a balanced beamsplitter, and then performs
a single-photon detection on each of her two output ports Fig. 2.6. By
Eve’s declaration of which of her detectors clicked, Alice and Bob are
able to distill a key. Since Eve is given full control over the central
node, TF-QKD is also inherently MDI.
All of this raises the possibility of a future TF-QSS protocol. The
close similarities between the systems are remarkable, and should be
explored in detail in future work. In the first instance we will replace
Alice’s two heterodyne detectors with an interference measurement
and single-photon detection, which gives her information about the
relative phase of Bob and Charlie’s distributed states. This will open
up several security concerns which should be addressed, since the
trust assumptions for the QSS presented here differ significantly from
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TF-QKD. As with all QKD protocols, TF-QKD assumes that Alice and
Bob, the senders of the quantum states, are honest. Eve, the receiver
of the states, is dishonest. Our QSS however has an honest reciever,
Alice, and at most one potentially dishonest sender, Bob and Charlie.
We must carefully consider the advantage which a dishonest sender
gains in TF-QSS. A initial naïve approach to the TF-QSS seems entirely
plausible, since the interference at Alice’s beamsplitter forces Bob
and Charlie to cooperate to predict which of Alice’s detectors clicked,
though we must be careful to fully explore the potential for trojan
horse attack [114, 115].
Despite these theoretical security and design challenges, this mod-
ified TF-QSS protocol will have the same hardware requirements as
the TF-QKD proposed in Ref. [81], and similar hardware requirements
to those proposed elsewhere [80, 82, 83], thereby opening up the pos-
sibility for the same physical system to perform multiple quantum
cryptographic protocols. This is a theme which we will discuss at




A G I L E Q UA N T U M C RY P T O G R A P H Y
In this chapter we introduce and investigate a framework within
which quantum communications protocols may be combined and
implemented. In particular, we examine two “quantum agile” systems
(Sec. 5.3, 5.4) which are capable of performing several cryptographic
tasks with security against a quantum adversary. Crucially the tasks
differ only at the level of classical postprocessing, and so the choice of
protocol to implement is reduced to just a firmware upgrade. The agile
framework allows us to unite the QDS protocol (Ch. 3) and the QSS
protocol (Ch. 4), which we have examined already in this Thesis, in a
common hardware platform. We additionally introduce a new QDS
protocol, and integrate an existing QKD protocol from the literature
into our system.
These protocols are then investigated in an experiment (Sec. 5.5)
which is inherently compatible with installed telecommunications
hardware. We show that a quantum distribution stage may run while
remaining completely ignorant to the secure task being accomplished.
In our experiment, coherent states are distributed and measured with
a clock rate of 1 GHz, and so we find that our QDS protocol is the
fastest known protocol over comparable distances, Sec. 5.6.3.
5.1 introduction
We have observed over the past two chapters, and in our overview
of quantum cryptography in Chapter 2, that several quantum crypto-
graphic protocols are intimately related. We have seen close connec-
tions between QKD and QSS, and noted that QSS may be interpreted
simply as QKD performed between one player (dealer) and several
players (recipients of the secret). We have also remarked that the secret
sharing task may be performed pseudo-classically, by first encrypting
channels using QKD and then using an unconditionally secure clas-
sical secret sharing protocol, of which there are many [24, 34, 35]. It
was noted in Refs. [97, 104, 107, 111] that QSS is related to quantum
conferencing, and often the same hardware setup may be used to per-
form both tasks. And in Ref. [118] it was explicitly demonstrated that
a sequential round-robin QSS protocol can also be used to perform
QKD between any two players.
Moving to the QDS literature, ever since discovery of practical QDS
requiring neither quantum memory, entanglement, nor an optical
multiport it has been accepted that there are close links between QDS
and QKD. Reference [45] explicitly builds a QDS protocol to use QKD
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hardware, while Ref. [65] realises a setup which can, with minimal
hardware modification, perform either QDS or QKD with additional
MDI1 capabilities. References [54, 56, 65, 66, 69] remark that QDS
differs from QKD only in the classical postprocessing, and Ref. [157]
designs a quantum secret sharing scheme using the same principles as
differential-phase-shift based QKD [158]. Indeed, many QDS papers
even build their security proofs on techniques designed first for QKD
[108, 109, 118, 157, 159].
It should be clear, then, that the field of quantum cryptography is
far broader and more interesting than just QKD [124]. As the field
moves closer towards practical implementation of diverse quantum
cryptographic protocols, one must consider not only the unconditional
security of the underlying protocol but also its ease of implementa-
tion. As protocols are designed with minimal and often overlapping
hardware requirements we may ask the following questions:
Q1: given a particular hardware setup, which quantum protocols can I
perform?
Or, desiring a large-scale quantum cryptographic network:
Q2: given a deployed network architecture, which quantum protocols can I
perform with minimal disruption?
Both of these questions will have deep impacts on the success of
a future large-scale quantum network.
We have already even seen several quantum routes to perform the
same task. For example, by utilizing prior QKD between all players it is
possible to perform digital signatures [45, 77] or secret sharing [24, 34,
35] using unconditionally secure classical algorithms, and indeed this
may sometimes be preferable to protocols requiring large entangled
states [39, 97]. Alternatively, in a distributed quantum computing setup
which can easily generate and distribute entanglement, protocols such
as Refs. [108, 122] may be advantageous if they take advantage of
already accessible hardware, for example as an additional security
layer for a distributed quantum computation. The comparison between
the many different routes to the same task is rarely straightforward
and is often more involved than a simple comparison of key rates.
In addition to considering the performance of unconditionally se-
cure protocols, the questions Q1 and Q2 push us to consider practical
quantum cryptographic protocols which may perform well but not yet
offer full unconditional security against an infinitely powerful eaves-
dropper. This may particularly be the case as new side-channel at-
tacks are designed and discovered in existing quantum cryptographic
protocols. Indeed, throughout the history of classical cryptography,
1 Measurement Device Independent, Ch. 2.
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development of new cryptosystems have often occurred in response
to the breaking of a system which was previously believed secure.
Perhaps cynically, one could even view cryptographic history has a
“cat-and-mouse” race between cryptographers and cryptanalysists.
The replacement of a newly-insecure cryptosystem is difficult, ex-
pensive and time-consuming. In response to this problem in conven-
tional (classical) cryptography there has recently been a push towards
so-called crypographic aglity (crypto-agility) [29, 160] with a key moti-
vator being the threat of quantum computers.
5.1.1 (Quantum) crypto-agility
One of the main ideas of crypto-agility is the existence of a middleware
which interacts both with the software application layer (user) and the
underlying cypto-core (algorithm). This is accomplished in Ref. [160],
for example, by ensuring that written code is kept as abstract as
possible without hard-coding the secure protocols which are used.
This allows for flexible switching between underlying algorithms, and
keeps the top-level code agnostic as to which secure algorithms are
being used. When the security of the underlying algorithm is weak-
ened it becomes easy to simply replace the algorithm with a new or
modified one, without changes to the rest of the architecture. Failures
to allow a system to respond to new cryptographic threats like this can
be at best embarrassing, and at worst costly or life-threatening [161,
162]. The key idea of classical crypto-agility is depicted in Fig. 5.1a.
The framework of crypto-agility seems ideal to help us answer Q1
and Q2. It is natural to separate the application layer (the task to
be performed) from the underlying algorithm (which we may call
a “quantum crypto-core”). One might even envisage a future library
of quantum security software, in which one can select between the
appropriate underlying algorithm based on the desired task and the
available network hardware. We are then motivated to explore the
quantum analogue of classical crypto-agility as a step towards efficient
and flexible quantum communications networks.
There are two potential ways to translate the idea of classical crypto-
agility into the quantum realm. We depict them both in Figs. 5.1b, 5.1c.
The first we refer to as “QKD-assisted crypto agility,” which may
be seen as a generalization of the unconditionally secure classical
secret sharing protocols, Sec. 2.3.1, and signatures protocols [45, 77]
which implicitly require QKD first in order to remain secure. In this
approach, a QKD system delivers fresh secure random keys which
may be used for many different protocols. This is the stance taken
by the ETSI QKD ISG 004 [164] and 014 [165] standardization efforts,
which specify interface design between a QKD system (hardware)
and the key management system (software). We expect that this QKD-
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Figure 5.1: An agile cryptographic system involves a middleware which
interacts between the user and the underlying crypto-core. The
crypto-core (algorithm) may be readily replaced without affect-
ing the rest of the software architecture. (a) Currently imple-
mented classical crypto-agility. (b) QKD-assisted crypto-agility, in
which several classical protocols may be run over secure channels
first encrypted via a QKD link. (c) Full quantum crypto-agility
which can choose interchangably between many different quan-
tum protocols. A so-called Quantum Network Inferface Card
(NIC) is used to send and receive quantum states. Classical al-
gorithms and quantum algorithms can be replaced as necessary.
The classical protocols displayed are: Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES), One-time Pad (OTP), Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA),
Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and post-quantum cryptog-
raphy (PQC). 10G NIC: classical Network Interface Card. Picture
credit: Stefan Richter in Ref. [163]
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assisted crypto agility will form an important cornerstone for future
quantum networks.
However, as was shown in Ref. [47] in the context of QDS, it is
not always optimal to perform QKD and then a classical protocol.
There may be channels over which QKD is not possible, or hardware
setups over which the costly reconciliation procedures are difficult.
The second viewpoint of quantum crypto-agility may thus be referred
to as a “fully quantum crypto agility,” Fig. 5.1c. Rather than building
upon an underlying fixed QKD system, such a setup should have
the capability to perform multiple quantum communication protocols.
This should use the so-called quantum network interface card in Fig. 5.1.
This viewpoint explicitly recognises the fact that multiple quantum
cryptographic protocols differ only in classical postprocessing while
sharing a quantum stage and so a full QKD protocol may not be
required. In a deployed system the ability to perform new quantum
cryptographic protocols may then be reduced to a mere upgrade of
classical firmware to control the postprocessing.
In Fig. 5.2 we present an example of an agile quantum communi-
cations stack which expresses the viewpoint of Fig. 5.1c. The stack
provides clear separation between the user (software layer) and the
physical hardware layer, and may be interpreted as analogous to recent
work on compilers for quantum computers [166–168].
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select crypto primitives for request
Layer Purpose & Examples
request crypto task(s) to perform
create execution plan based on 
available hardware capabilities
select protocol to realize primitive
&
e.g. 1) @A: "send n coherent states 
           from A to users B, C"
       2) @B, C: "perform n homodyne 
           measurements of X, P"













e.g. 1) @A: "apply modulation voltage U"
       2) @B, C: "read detector output"
       3) ... 
e.g. "encrypt via AES using a QKD key"


























e.g. "encrypt & sign a message for B, C"    
01010
10111
Figure 5.2: Agile quantum communications stack following the viewpoint of
Fig. 5.1c. The user app layer allows a user to select a task they wish
to perform, (e.g. message encryption, message authentication,
secret sharing). The agile middleware provides a separation be-
tween the user (software) and underlying quantum crypto-system
(hardware). The primitive layer selects the desired cryptographic
primitive (e.g. QKD, QDS, QSS, RSA), and instructs the protocol
& hardware abstraction layer to run the protocol via a library of
known functions (e.g. “send coherent state,” “perform heterodyne
detection”). These commands are interpreted by the hardware layer
and sent to the physical hardware setup. The agile system should
be flexible and allow for switching between different tasks, differ-
ent protocols and different hardware setups. Picture credit: Stefan
Richter in Ref. [163]
5.2 cv agile quantum systems 133
5.2 cv agile quantum systems
To illustrate the above discussion, in this section we will introduce
and analyse two quantum systems which are capable to implement
multiple protocols over the same hardware setups. Within an agile
system, the protocols differ only at the level of classical postprocessing.
Our hardware setup is explicitly designed with question Q2 in mind.
The systems therefore are fully continuous-variable, and rely on distri-
bution of phase-modulated QPSK coherent states and their heterodyne
phase detection [169]. This renders each system highly compatible
with deployed telecommunications infrastructure, and paves the way
to an integration between our agile systems into deployed communi-
cation links which can run with up to 100 GHz sending rate [170, 171].
In Sec. 5.5 we describe and analyse an experimental implementation
of the agile systems discussed here.
We will consider the following tasks:
QDS - quantum digital signatures: allows for secure authentication
of a classical message. It has been explicitly demonstrated that because
of its small overhead, QDS may run over channels for which QKD is
insecure [47].
QSS - quantum secret sharing: allows for secure distribution of a
classical secret among a conspiracy of potentially dishonest recipients.
QKD - quantum key distribution: allows for secure key distribu-
tion of identical randomly-generated bits between players. These keys
may then be used for encryption via one-time pad [7, 24].
The tasks QDS and QSS are discussed in Chapters 3, 4 above, while
the reader is referred to Refs. [95, 172] for reviews of QKD. The tasks
QDS and QSS are inherently multipartite, while QKD is inherently
bipartite2. In what follows we will use quantum networks with three
players to allow for multipartite tasks, while also allowing for bipartite
QKD to be performed.
We therefore propose two separate agile quantum systems, one
which may perform tasks QDS and QSS, and the other which may
perform tasks QDS and QKD. We display these two systems in Fig. 5.3.
The crucial aspect is the separation between the abstract user layer
defining the roles performed in the protocols, and the hardware layer.
For example, the task QDS can be performed in either of the two
systems, and Alice can either choose to be the sender of the quantum
states or their receiver, depending on available hardware. We denote
our two systems as QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK and QDS-f-QKD-f-CV-
QPSK. The labels indicate which tasks are supported; the underlying
quantum states which they use (QPSK alphabet), and in which direc-
tion the quantum states are exchanged (“f” - forward, Alice sends
quantum states to Bob and Charlie; or “b” - backward, Bob and Charlie
2 Though note the existence of its multipartite generalization - quantum conferencing
[111, 173]
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Figure 5.3: Our two agile quantum systems. Depending on the setup con-
figuration and the chosen task, the hardware modules (Tx, Rx)
perform either as Alice or as Bob/Charlie. Tx: hardware sender
module. Rx: hardware receiver modules. Hardware specifications
are discussed in Sec. 5.5. Picture credit: Stefan Richter in Ref. [163]
send quantum states to Alice). The forward- or backward- distinction
can be seen as related to3 direct- or reverse-reconcilition in QKD [95],
in which quantum and classical information flow either in the same
direction or in opposite directions.
5.3 agile system qds-b-qss-b-cv-qpsk
The first agile system we consider runs in the b-configuration, Fig. 5.3,
in which Bob and Charlie are the senders of quantum states while
Alice is their receiver. We immediately see that the QSS protocol
proposed and analysed in Chapter 4 may be inherited into this agile
system, c.f. Fig. 4.2. For consistency with notation we will now refer
to this QSS protocol as QSS-b, and we will analyse it further, below.
We also propose a second cryptographic protocol which fits into the
system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK, which performs the QDS task. We
refer to the second protocol as QDS-b, and will analyse it below in
Sec. 5.3.1. Unlike the QDS protocol analysed in Chapter 3, for QDS-b it
is Bob and Charlie who are the senders of quantum states, while Alice
is the recipient. Our first agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK is thus
able to perform both QSS and QDS tasks using identical quantum
resources.
3 but not equivalent to




Figure 5.4: Setup of protocol QDS-b, c.f. Fig. 3.3. Alice (A) wishes to se-
curely sign a 1 bit message m. Bob (B) and Charlie (C) distribute
quantum coherent states |φ(B,C)j 〉 to Alice along insecure quan-
tum distribution channels (solid lines) during the Distribution
stage. B and C swap elements of their classical signatures ele-
ments via a securely encrypted classical channel (dotted lines).
During the Messaging stage A sends Σ, containing her message m
and her corresponding eliminated signature σm along a classical
broadcast channel (dot-dashed line). Inset: QPSK alphabet.
Recall that a QDS scheme must fulfill the requirements from List 3.1
and provide security against a dishonest forger, security against repu-
diation, and should be robust and succeed when all parties behave
honestly, Fig. 3.2. We will first outline how protocol QDS-b runs, and
then prove that it fulfills each of these requirements.
The protocol QDS-b runs as follows:
Distribution stage
step 1. For each future message m ∈ {0, 1} which Alice wishes to











of length L, where the φj are complex phases chosen from the QPSK
alphabet. The φj are assumed to be chosen uniformly at random.
step 2. Bob and Charlie form sequences of quantum coherent states
corresponding to elements of Φ(B,C)m and distribute them through the
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step 3 . Alice performs heterodyne detection on each received state
and receives phase outcomes which we denote xB,C = qout + ipout,
with the subscript denoting which player sent the coherent state. Since
measurement is performed immediately on receipt of the state, Alice
does not require quantum memory and the remainder of the protocol
is entirely classical. Bob and Charlie will each send different sequences
of coherent states, which allows security against forgery.
At the end of the quantum stage of the protocol, Alice possesses
two classical strings, each of length L, which contain her complex
phase measurements. She now forms eliminated signatures AmB,C by
writing down which two states from the QPSK alphabet are least-
compatible with Alice’s measurement. The eliminated signatures are
formed identically to Fig. 3.5.
step 4. symmetrization: Bob and Charlie swap a random half of
their Φ(B,C)m in order to guard against a dishonest Alice. Bob (Charlie)




which consists of two halves of
length L/2, one of which was generated by Bob (Charlie), and one
of which was received during the swapping. We denote the first half
by Y(B)m and the second half by Z
(B)
m in analogy with Chapter 3, and
similarly for Charlie. Contrary to Chapter 3, strings Y(B)m and Z
(B)
m
contain phase information, while AmB,C are eliminated signatures. This
swapping step will ensure security against repudiation.
Messaging stage
Messaging may occur any time after distribution.
step 5. Alice sends the classical information Σ = (m,σm) to Bob.















elements from Alice’s declaration which correspond to the two halves
of his signature. Bob compares σ̃m to his two halves and counts the





















otherwise the protocol aborts.
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step 7. If Bob has accepted m then he forwards Σ to Charlie, who
similarly checks for mismatches between Alice’s eliminated signature




















otherwise it aborts. If both Bob and Charlie accept m then the protocol
has succeeded.
It is worth noting some key similarities and differences between
QDS-b and the protocol described in Ch. 3. While both protocols rely
on QPSK alphabet, heterodyne detection, and the construction and
comparison of eliminated signatures, the security analysis required for
the two protocols differs. Crucially, while in Ch. 3 the jth element of
a dishonest forger’s declaration is a single phase chosen from QPSK,
for QDS-b Bob must effectively declare two phases from QPSK in the
form of an eliminated signature element. Additionally, while QDS
in Ch. 3 shares similarities with reverse-reconciliation QKD, since
a forging Bob had to guess Charlie’s measurement outcomes, here
QDS-b shares similarities with direct-reconciliation QKD: a forging
Bob will have to guess Charlie’s sent state. We will later see how this
affects performance of the protocol.
5.3.2 QDS-b security
Let us consider the security of QDS-b and check how it fulfils the
requirements for a QDS protocol.
Security against repudiation
Recall that during a repudiation attack Alice will try to force Bob
and Charlie to disagree about whether her message is genuine. Proof
of security against repudiation follows identical lines to Sec. 3.2. We
assume that Alice is free to manipulate her declared AmB,C and she has
full control over the mismatch rates pB (pC) with respect to states she
originally received from Bob and Charlie. Alice may even choose pB
or pC to be zero. Security against repudiation arises from the Sym-
metrizaton step of the protocol. After Bob and Charlie have swapped
classical information, they each possess two half-signatures, length
L/2, consisting either of information which they held originally or
which they received during swapping. Alice succeeds in her repudia-
tion attack if Bob accepts both of his halves as genuine while Charlie
rejects at least one of his halves as fake. Therefore the probability of
successful repudiation is given by
εrepudiation = P [(EA ∩ EB)∩ (EC ∪ ED)] , (5.4)
where the events EA,EB,EC,ED are defined as










































Applying probability inequalities Eq. 3.9, 3.10 and Hoeffding’s in-





















Finally we arrive at









identically to Ch. 3. We have seen that repudiation is only affected by
the relative mismatch rates between players’ signatures and not by
who actually possesses the signatures. This is perhaps unsurprising,
since in both QDS protocols it is assumed that Alice has complete
control over mismatch rates with respect to states held by players
before swapping.
Robustness
The robustness of the protocol depends only on parameters sB and
perr. Using Hoeffding inequality Eq. 3.14 identically to Sec. 3.3 we may
derive









provided that perr 6 sB. The probability perr of honest mismatch may
be modelled as in Sec. 3.3.1, and does not change here.
5.3.3 Security against forgery
Since Bob already knows half of Charlie’s signature elements (those
which Bob himself forwarded) and since sB 6 sC, the most dangerous
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forger is a dishonest Bob. He is therefore assumed to be the eaves-
dropper on Charlie’s distribution of quantum states, and tries to gain
information about the L/2 signature elements which Charlie generated
himself.
Using Hoeffding’s inequalities Eq. 3.13 as in Sec. 3.4 we see that a
forging attack succeeds with probability









provided that pe > sC.
5.3.4 Bounding pe
All that remains is to bound pe. This will expose several of the differ-
ences between QDS-b and QDS from Chapter 3.
Consider the jth signature element. Charlie holds some cj denoting
which state from the QPSK alphabet he sent. During Messaging, Bob







chosen to minimize pe and should be the outcome of some optimal
strategy on his system, denoted B. The b1j ,b
2
j correspond to adjacent
elements of the QPSK alphabet, with a mismatch occurring if b1j = cj
or b2j = cj.
We define an error variable E such that
Ej =
1 if a mismatch occurs between Fj and Gj
0 otherwise
which measures whether a mismatch has occurred between Fj and Gj
(c.f. Eq. 3.2). The F is Charlie’s list of phases, while G is the declared













is the binary entropy, since
∣∣Ej∣∣ = 2.





∣∣∣ cj). Via the






∣∣ cj) = H (b1j ,b2j ∣∣ cj)
where we have used the fact that once b1j ,b
2
j and cj are known, Ej


















∣∣ Ej, cj)+ h (pe)
since conditioning can never increase entropy. Therefore, by expanding
the variable Ej,

























∣∣ cj) 6 1+ h (pe) . (5.11)
Finally, we expand the conditional entropy in terms of the joint entropy














where we have used the fact that a priori there are four choices for
the pair b1j ,b
2
j , and where χ is the Holevo information. Combining












Surprisingly this equation has similar form to Eq. 3.40, but with a
Holevo information calculated differently, as shown below.
Once pe and perr are bounded for the protocol, the probability εfail
that the protocol fails can be found. For concreteness, we assign equal
probability to the failure of the protocol either by allowing a forging
or repudiation attack, or by aborting when all players are honest, that
is
εfail = εhonest abort = εrepudiation = εforgery,
and by choosing sB = perr+(pe + perr) /4; sC = perr = 3 (pe − perr) /4,
in order to satisfy the second two equalities, we arrive at









when perr < sB < sC < pe.
Calculating Holevo information












when states |αk〉 from the QPSK alphabet are sent through lossy
channel with transmission T. Bob’s a posteriori state is simply ρkB =





1− Tαk|, from which his Holevo information is calcu-
lated as








with S the von Neumann entropy. Under attack BS0 state ρkB is pure
and so χ = S (ρB). Other attacks may be readily considered using
the techniques from Appendix B. Bob’s mismatch rate pe may now
be calculated and we obtain figure of merit signature length L via
Eq. 5.14.
5.3.5 QDS-b postselection
Let us apply the postselection technique described in Sec. 3.8 to proto-
col QDS-b. We shall see that while previously postselection was mainly
used to improve efficiency of the protocol over parameters in which it
was already secure, here it is absolutely necessary in order to sign a
message for even short distances. We define the region RPS (∆r,∆θ),
as in Fig. 3.13, and allow honest recipients to only accept x ∈ C \ RPS.
The crucial quantity to consider is gsec := pe − perr, measuring the
advantage which an honest player has over a dishonest one. The proto-
col is secure provided that gsec > 0, Eq. 5.14. For protocol QDS-b, the
probability pe does not depend on Alice’s heterodyne measurement,
since a dishonest player attacks the sender of the quantum states.
Therefore, pe is unaffected by postselection.
Probability perr on the other hand is strongly affected by our choice
of RPS. Given the probability P
(
reiθ
∣∣ α, T) to obtain complex out-
come reiθ when state |α〉 is sent through a noiseless channel with










∣∣ α, T) . (5.17)
Incorporating the postselection technique here corresponds to chang-
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where normalization factor N is calculated in the usual way. Since L̃
(with postselection) is directly comparable to L (without postselection)
as a figure of merit, in the remainder of this chapter we will not
distinguish between the two. However, it must always be understood
that if postselection has been used then we are implicitly dealing with
L̃.
5.3.6 QDS-b performance
We plot signature length as it varies with T under protocol QDS-b in
Fig. 5.5. At each T we have optimized over coherent state amplitude α
and postselection parameter4 ∆r, and the resulting signature lengths
are displayed as the solid lines in Fig. 5.5. Black: BS0 attack, Red: EC
attack with constant n̄ = 0.02. Non-solid lines are specific choices of α
which are close to optimal only at specific T . We see that choosing an
α which is not optimal for a given channel transmission can drastically
affect the signature length, and for some transmissions can even result
in an increase similar to allowing a different class of attack. Since in a
practical realization of the protocol, ∆r may feasibly be chosen after
the distribution of quantum states, we have optimized over ∆r at each
point in the figure.
Figure 5.5: QDS-b signature lengths. Black: BS0 attack. Red: EC attack with
constant n̄ = 0.02. Green, dashed: BS0 attack with α = 0.5. Or-
ange, dotted: BS0 attack with α = 0.7, Blue, dot-dashed: EC attack
with constant n̄ = 0.02, α = 0.5. All lines have optimal ∆r chosen
at each point. Solid lines: optimal choice of α and ∆r at each
point.
4 As in Ch. 3, choosing ∆θ > 0 worsened performance.
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To summarise, our first agile system, QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK, is
capable of performing the secure tasks QDS and QSS. We have incor-
porated the QSS protocol discussed in Ch. 4 and labelled it QSS-b,
for consistency of notation. The new protocol QDS-b may be viewed
as a direct-reconciliation analogue of the QDS protocol discussed in
Ch. 3. We will implement each protocol and discuss performance in
Sec. 5.6.3.
5.4 agile system qds-f-qkd-f-cv-qpsk
In addition to the first agile system described above, which is capable
of performing both QDS and QSS tasks, we here introduce and demon-
strate a second agile system, QDS-f-QKD-f-CV-QPSK, which runs in
the f-configuration, Fig. 5.3. Here, Alice is the sender of quantum
states, while Bob and Charlie are the recipients. This system is capable
of performing both QDS and QKD tasks.
The QKD protocol contained in QDS-f-QKD-f-CV-QPSK already
exists in the literature [137, 143] and has been an active direction
of research for many years. Its inclusion here illustrates that pre-
existing protocols may be interpreted through an agile lens. We denote
the QKD protocol QKD-f. The QDS protocol in f-configuration was
analysed above in Chapter 3, and here we rename it as QDS-f.
Let us briefly consider each protocol in turn.
5.4.1 Protocol QDS-f
We bring the QDS protocol considered in Chapter 3 into the system
QDS-f-QKD-f-CV-QPSK. The protocol QDS-f requires no modification
to run over hardware in the f-configuration and so the reader is
referred to Ch. 3 for details, security proof, and performance analysis.
Our earlier security analysis assumed ideal behaviour. In Sec. 5.6.1 we
relax some of these assumptions and make the protocol analysis more
realistic to experimental implementation.
5.4.2 Protocol QKD-f
QKD using heterodyne detection of a discrete-modulated alphabet of
coherent states has long been proposed and analysed, owing to its
ease of implementation and high compatibility with installed telecom-
munications infrastructure [96, 137, 141, 143, 146, 147]. Despite its
practical ease of use, theoretical work has lagged behind other CV
QKD protocols, which rely on a Gaussian modulation of coherent
states. Unlike DV systems, CV systems live in an infinite dimensional
Hilbert space and so many of the computational methods available
for QKD with single-photons are not immediately transferable [52],
and unlike Gaussian-modulated CV systems, coherent states with a
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discrete-modulation cannot be reduced to calculations on the finite-
sized covariance matrix.
Attempts to prove security of discete-modulated CV QKD protocols
have made simplifying assumptions in either of these directions. For
example, in Refs. [96, 143] it is assumed that since the amplitude α of
coherent states in the chosen QPSK alphabet is small, the a priori states
in the protocol are approximately Gaussian. This allows covariance-
matrix based methods to be used for the analysis. This assumption is
only strictly true in the limit α→ 0, and it is as yet unproven whether
an attack could exploit higher order statistical moments of the a priori
state which are not captured by the covariance matrix.
Another direction has been to truncate the size of the Hilbert space
[96, 137, 141]. This is perhaps a reasonable approach, since for many of
the infinite-dimensional states used in the QKD protocols one can find
a nearby state which lives in a large but finite-dimensional Hilbert
space. This becomes increasingly true for small α.
A QKD protocol relying on a QPSK alphabet and heterodyne de-
tection is analysed in Ref. [137], and it is their analysis which we
lean on in this section. Alice distributes coherent state |α〉 from her
QPSK alphabet through the quantum channel to Bob5. Assuming, for
now, attack BS0, Bob recieves |
√
1− Tα〉 and performs heterodyne
measurement, obtaining outcome x with probability












We denote Alice’s variable containing information of which coherent
state she chose by XA, and Bob’s variable containing his measurement
outcome by XB. Alice and Bob then perform a reverse-reconciliation
procedure [95, 99, 138] to form a secret key.
The starting point for the analysis is the Devetak-Winter key rate
formula [153]
κ > I (XA : XB) − χ (XB : E) , (5.21)
where E denotes Eve’s quantum system. Let us calculate each term.
Mutual information I
The mutual information I is calculated in a similar fashion to the
protocol QSS-b discussed in Chapter 4. Using Eq. 1.81 we expand I as
I (XA : XB) = H (XA) − H (XA | XB) . (5.22)
The Shannon entropy of Alice’s variable is equal to
∑
XA=a
−P (a) log P (a)
and is equal to 2 in the ideal case.
We may expand the conditional entropy in Eq. 5.22 as
H (XA | XB) =
∫
b∈C
d2b P (XB = b)H (XA | XB = b) , (5.23)
5 Alice could also perform QKD with Charlie, and the discussion follows identically.
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where the integration is performed over all possible outcomes b which
Bob can obtain. The mutual information I may then be calculated by
expanding H (XA | XB = b) and then using Bayes’s formula.
Holevo information χ
We will derive the Holevo information χ which Eve has about Bob’s
variable XB under attack BS0. Her Holevo information under other
attacks may be calculated likewise, using steps from Sec. 3.6.
When a coherent state αk is chosen uniformly at random, the two-













and so after Bob’s heterodye measurement, outcome b ∈ C, Eve’s
conditional state is











where P (b) =
∑
αk
P (b | αk, T) denotes the total probability that Bob









and we note that each state ρE | b has in general a different entropy,
so Eq. 5.26 cannot be simplified further.




d2b P (b) ρE | b
 , (5.27)
from which the Holevo information χ may be calculated. Attacks BS1,
BS2 and EC may be implemented following an identical analysis to
this section. The performance of protocol QKD-f is discussed at length
in Ref. [137] and so we refer the reader there.
5.5 experimental implementation
An experiment which investigates the above two agile systems was per-
formed at the Max Plank Institute for the Science of Light in Erlangen
(MPL) [163], Fig. 5.6. Specifically, optical sender and receiver mod-
ules were used to implement the four protocols which are described
above. A sender module (Tx) generates and distributes phase-encoded
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coherent states chosen from the QPSK alphabet, while a receiver mod-
ule (Rx) performs heterodyne detection of the received states’ phase.
Depending on the required configuration, the modules Tx, Rx are
variously interpreted as playing roles of Alice or Bob/Charlie, Fig. 5.3.















Figure 5.6: The sender (Tx) and receiver (Rx) modules which are used to
implement each of the four cryptographic protocols considered
in this Chapter. During distribution and measurement of the
quantum states, hardware modules are ignorant about the roles
which they are playing, and so identical experimental stages may
be interpreted for different cryptographic tasks, Fig. 5.3. ECDL:
external-cavity diode laser; iso: isolator; VOA: variable optical
attenuator; IQM: I/Q modulator; pol.c: polarization controller;
AWG: arbitrary waveform generator; LO: local oscillator; 90°h: 90°
hybrid; OSC: oscilloscope. Picture credit: Stefan Richter in Ref. [163]
Sender module (Tx):
The sender module is depicted in Fig. 5.6. An external cavity diode
laser (PurePhotonics PPCL-300) with a linewidth of 15 kHz is tuned to
standard telecom wavelength 1550 nm and acts as the optical carrier.
The carrier beam impinges on a 50 : 50 beamsplitter which allows for
a shared local oscillator (LO) between modules from one output port.
From the other output port coherent state pulses, chosen randomly
from QPSK alphabet {|+α0〉 , |iα0〉 , |−α0〉 , |−iα0〉}, are prepared by us-
ing an integrated I/Q modulator (Fujitsu DP-QPSK 40 Gbps LiNbO3)
which is driven at a rate of 1 GHz by an arbitrary waveform generator
(AWG; Keysight M8195A). Finally, a variable optical attenuator (VOA)
attenuates the coherent states to a final amplitude of either α or α′,
with α 6 α′ 6 α0. Coherent states with ampltude α′ will be used as
phase reference states, while the signal states used for the quantum
communication protocols have amplitude α. The coherent states are
then sent through the quantum channel to receiver module Rx.
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Receiver module (Rx):
Module Rx interferes the received states with the shared local os-
cillator using the integrated Kylia COH24-X 90°s. The two modules
use a shared local oscillator which provides a frame of reference
against which heterodyne phase measurement is performed using two
balanced optical receivers (Discovery DSC-R412) with analog 3 dB
bandwidth of 20 GHz. In principle the Tx and Rx modules do not
need to share a local oscillator and bright phase-reference pulses6
could instead be used [175].
Outputs from the optical receivers are digitized using a digital
sampling oscilloscope (Tektronix DPO77002SX) with a sampling rate
of 25 GS/s. Proprietary digital signal processing (DSP) algorithms,
designed by MPL, are applied to the quadrature time traces. The
DSP includes a high-pass filter which eliminates low-frequency noise
contributions to the signal. Finally, a phase-recovery step is performed
using phase-reference states which originally had amplitude α′.
The Tx and Rx modules were connected by either a 2 km or 20 km
SMF-28 optical fiber link which contributes to a total loss of 0.65 dB
or 4.75 dB, respectively. This implements the realistic metropolitan
distances over which the CV platform is expected to be effective. Ex-
periments were performed for several different signal state modulation
amplitudes α. For each run of the experiment a total of 1.92× 106
states were sent in frames of 64 which consisted of four bright refer-
ence pulses (α′) followed by 60 signal pulses (α). After the DSP step
there remained information on 1.54× 106 states. An example of some
raw output data is displayed in Fig. 5.7. The top of the figure displays
raw time trace data, while the bottom displays data after the DSP.
6 Though note that this may open up additional security issues [174].
148 agile quantum cryptography
Figure 5.7: Top: raw data trace. Bottom: data after DSP. Red: heterodyne out-
comes on bright phase-reference states, amplitude α′ which are
sent at the start of each frame, and allow the phases of the remain-
ing states to be reconstructed. Green: heterodyne measurement
outcomes on signal states amplitude α < α′. The cryptographic
tasks are performed with signal (green) data points only. Picture
credit: Stefan Richter in Ref. [163]
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5.6 data analysis
In this section we will analyse the data which was obtained in the
experiment detailed in the previous section. Our starting point is the
signal data points7 which we received from MPL. In Sec. 5.6.1 we
will examine how the cryptographic protocols detailed above may
be altered to more closely match the realistic data which includes
experimental imperfections. In Sec. 5.6.2 we will closely examine
the data which we have received from MPL and which forms the
basis for our demonstration of two quantum agile systems. We will
demonstrate how it may be used to estimate protocol performance
and figures of merit8, and then discuss how the experiment provides
an agile interpretation.
5.6.1 Protocol modifications
Throughout this Thesis it has been assumed that an ideal QPSK alpha-
bet has been distributed, with states chosen uniformly and at random.
This has allowed us to make several simplifying assumptions. For
example in protocol QDS-f, these assumptions allowed us to simplify











Similarly, in QSS-b we repeatedly used the fact that each QPSK state
was equally likely, in order to write Eq. 4.7, for example, as




Realistically the states are not sent with identical sending probabili-
ties, nor are they sent with identical amplitudes. The actual sending
amplitudes for each experimental run are displayed in Tab. 5.1. Non-
uniform sending probabilities may also be directly measured from
a disclosed subset of data. These imperfections must be taken into
account in our bounds for key rate and signature length, which we
now do.
QDS-b
In QDS-b the key parameter to calculate is gsec = pe − perr, which
is related to the signature length figure of merit via Eq. 5.14. Bob’s
mismatch probability pe is made more realistic by changing several
steps in the derivation of Holevo information χ.
7 Green in Fig. 5.7
8 Of which the ideal figures of merit obtained in previous chapters are an upper bound.
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For example, under attack BS0 we update Bob’s a priori state, c.f.





∣∣∣√1− Tαk〉〈√1− Tαk∣∣∣ (5.30)
where the amplitudes αk and sending probabilities P (αk) are directly
derived from the received data. Bob’s a posteriori states
ρkB =
∣∣∣√1− Tαk〉〈√1− Tαk∣∣∣ (5.31)







now also depend on the measured data. For attacks BS1 and EC,
they must be calculated without the simplifications afforded by ideal
sending probabilities and equal |αk|’s. For attack BS0 Bob’s a posteriori
entropy vanishes identically because his state is assumed pure.
The honest mismatch probability perr may be measured directly
from the data by observing the probability that a state is eliminated.
We demonstrate this in Sec. 5.6.3.
QSS-b
We will demonstrate the necessary alterations which should be made
to mutual information I and Holevo information χ in protocol QSS-b.
mutual information i , eq . 4 .5 The joint Shannon entropy of
Bob and Charlie’s variables is given by
H (XB,XC) = −
∑
XB=b,XC=c
P (b, c) log P (b, c) (5.33)
where XB,XC denote the states from QPSK which Bob and Charlie
sent, and P (b, c) their sending probabilities. We have observed that
P (b, c) = P (b)× P (c) (5.34)
and when variations in the sending probabilities are considered this is
no longer equal to 1/16.
Secondly, the probability P (XA = a | XB = b,XC = c), Eq. 4.11, should
be updated to match the actual amplitudes of the sent coherent states.





P (βk) |βk〉〈βk|B and ρC =
3∑
k′=0
P (γk′) |γk′〉〈γk′ |C (5.35)
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and therefore Eq. 4.28 becomes















from which Holevo information χ is calculated.
QDS-f
Protocol QDS-f requires us to recalculate gsec = pe − perr with these
experimental imperfections. Probability perr may be estimated directly
from data and is equivalent to the analysis performed above for QDS-
b.
Probability pe requires us to reconsider certain steps in the calcu-
lation of Holevo information χ. We consider attack BS0, and other
attacks follow similarly. After the channel, the state held by Charlie











and so Bob’s conditional state becomes, c.f. Eq. 3.43










where P (c | αk, T) is Charlie’s probability to measure c and P (c) =∑
αk
P (c | αk, T) which is now no longer symmetric.
Each of Bob’s states conditioned on an eliminated signature element
ek now have different entropies and different probabilities P (ek) and















Finally, we consider how the protocol QKD-f may be updated to allow
for non-uniform QPSK alphabets.
mutual information i , eq . 5 .22 The Shannon entropy H (XA)
of Alice’s variable is easily modified with the new probability distri-
bution P (XA), and is given by
H (XA) = −
∑
XA=a
P (a) log P (a) (5.40)
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which is easily calculated using the measured P (a). The conditional
entropy H (XA | XB) is readily calculated following the discussion9
beneath Eq. 5.23.
holevo information χ Eve’s conditional state after Bob’s het-
erodyne measurement becomes, c.f. Eq. 5.25,










with P (b) =
∑
αk
P (b | αk, T) also changing and becoming asymmet-
ric.
Eve’s a posteriori and a priori entropies are calculated identically to
Eqs. 5.26, 5.27 using Eq. 5.41 as a starting point.
5.6.2 Received data
From our experimental collaborators at MPL we received four datasets
output from the experiment detailed in Sec. 5.5. Figure 5.7 displays
raw data before and after the action of the experimental collaborators’
proprietary digital signal processing (DSP) algorithm. The data we
have received is of the form of bottom figure of Fig. 5.7, and we
received only the signal data (green circles) once the phase-reference
data (red circles) were removed. Each of the received datasets consisted
of 1.54×106 elements of pairs of measured phase outcomes (xout,pout),
along with information about which element from the QPSK alphabet
Alice sent. The received datasets have parameters detailed in Tab. 5.1.
We calculate the parameters entering Tab. 5.1 directly from the
received data sets. The amplitude α sent by Alice is calculated by a
rescaling of phase measurement data, as follows. For data when a
particular |α〉 was sent, we calculate the means x̄out, p̄out of measured
output data. The mean coherent state amplitude which was received





From Tx to Rx, the distributed state has undergone two primary
sources of loss: trusted loss and untrusted loss. Untrusted loss must
be attributed to Eve, and is a combination of propagation losses in
the fiber, and coupling losses into and out of the fiber. We write this
as a single number which corresponds to the loss of the channel
(or channel transmission T ), and is −0.65 dB for the 2 km channel
and −4.75 dB for the 20 km channel. These values were given to us
by our experimental collaborators and were measured using their
proprietary methods. The trusted loss occurs in the detector Rx and
9 See also the discussion for alterations to protocol QSS-f, which is analogous.
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an eavesdropper is assumed to not have access to this. The quoted
value is ≈ 50% loss due to Rx.







This scaling procedure was done for each run and each distributed
QPSK state, and the re-scaled values are displayed in Tab. 5.1.
The excess noises corresponding to measurements in each quadra-
ture ξx, ξp are calculated separately, and the value of excess noise
which we use to estimate the power of the eavesdropper is ξ =
max {ξx, ξp}. Maximizing ξ in this way gives the eavesdropper ad-
ditional power, since it assumes that they have used a state with a
higher degree of entanglement. We might reasonably expect that af-
fording Eve this power should loosen the bounds which we calculate
in this chapter, and tighter bounds with an analysis which includes
this asymmetry in noise profiles are left for future work.
The variance in measurement outcome in each x and p for each
distributed state was measured, and the final excess noise is given by
ξx = Var (x) −
1
2
− Var (x)trusted , (5.44)
and similarly for p. The contribution Var (x)trusted represents system
detector noise which is assumed to be outside of Eve’s control, and
which was fully characterised by our experimental collaborators. The
final excess noise values are then averaged over each distributed QPSK
state, and then maximized over x,p. These final values ξ are displayed
in Tab. 5.1. The excess noise values were quoted to us by experimental
collaborators.
To illustrate our received data, we plot the first 100, 000 elements of
raw data for run 1 in Fig. 5.8. In (a) we display data corresponding
to the input state |α〉 with α = 0.615, and in (b) we display data
corresponding to the entire QPSK alphabet, which is highly non-
orthogonal.
In Fig. 5.9 we demonstrate for protocols QDS-f and QDS-b how
perr may be calculated on a particular dataset. Having isolated the
elements for which a particular alphabet state was sent, the data is
partitioned into groups which will induce a mismatch or not. In this
case, |α〉 was sent and so data with xreceived > 0 will not induce a
mismatch, while data with xreceived < 0 will. The mismatch probability
perr is then calculated as
perr =
Number of data points which cause a mismatch
Total number of data points
, (5.45)
where the numerator is calculated including all four of the distributed
QPSK states, with their respective mismatch criteria.
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Experiment QPSK amplitudes [
√
snu ] Excess noise [%]
Run Fiber [km] α iα −α −iα ᾱ max {ξx, ξp}
1 2 0.615 0.676 0.620 0.620 0.64 2.7
2 20 0.624 0.754 0.629 0.717 0.67 1.9
3 20 0.493 0.626 0.499 0.606 0.55 2.1
4 20 0.578 0.716 0.579 0.688 0.64 1.7
Table 5.1: Parameters of received datasets. Each of the four experimental
runs had slightly asymmetric amplitudes for each of the QPSK
alphabet states α, iα, −α, −iα. The mean amplitude for each run is
ᾱ. Each of the states was sent with probability close to 1/4. Excess
noise differs between x and p quadratures, and for our analysis
the largest of these was chosen, i.e. ξ = max {ξx, ξp}. The loss level
corresponding to the 2 km channel is −0.65 dB, and the loss level
corresponding to 20 km channel is −4.75 dB. This includes the
channel and additional losses due to coupling inefficiencies, but
does not include trusted detector loss of 50%.
(a)
Figure 5.8: Datasets received from experimental collaborators, corresponding
to xout and pout phase measurement outcomes when (a) state |α〉
was sent, run 1 and (b) states |α〉, |iα〉, |−α〉, |−iα〉were sent, run 1.
We plot only the first 100, 000 points, for illustrative convenience.
(b) At the amplitudes chosen, our QPSK alphabet is overlapping
and highly non-orthogonal.
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Figure 5.9: Illustration of received data points, coloured by whether they
induce a mismatch in protocols QDS-f and QDS-b. State |α〉 was
sent, and data is taken from run 1. Blue: data points will not cause
|α〉 to be eliminated, and so do not cause a mismatch. Red: data
points will cause |α〉 to be eliminated, and so a mismatch occurs.
For convenience we display only the first 100, 000 data points.
In protocols QDS-f and QDS-b we also discussed the possibility to
postselect on measurement outcomes, by ignoring datapoints which
fall within RPS. As was discussed in their respective sections, we take
RPS (∆r) and display examples of postselected data sets in Fig. 5.10.
Data corresponding to distributed |α〉 are displayed in Fig. 5.10a,
while data for all elements of QPSK are displayed in Fig. 5.10b. For
illustrative convenience we display only the first 100, 000 elements. We
may calculate perr in an identical way to that discussed above, simply
starting from the postselected data in order to reduce perr and increase
the advantage gained by an honest player.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.10: Postselection technique with region RPS (∆r = 1.0) applied to
the datasets from Fig. 5.8.
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QDS -b QDS - f QSS -b QKD - f
Run L [bits−1] t [ms] L [bits−1] t [ms] 2κ κ
1 5.70×106 5.7 4.79×104 0.048 0.3726 0.3479
2 - - 2.26×109 2260 0.1058 0.1024
3 - - 1.37×108 137 0.0858 0.0840
4 - - 2.08×108 208 0.1004 0.0976
Table 5.2: Protocol figures of merit for the experimental runs. QDS signature
lengths (L) and signing times (t) required to sign a 1-bit message for
security level of ε = 0.01%. The QSS and QKD key rates correspond
to the maximum estimated number of bits of secure key which
may be generated per use of the quantum channel. In QSS-b, one
channel use corresponds to distribution of two quantum states,
one from Bob and one from Charlie, and so we display 2κ for fair
comparison with QKD.
5.6.3 Protocol performance
The experiment detailed in Sec. 5.5 was performed and we have
received four datasets from our experimental collaborators. The key
parameters for these datasets are described in Tab. 5.1 and form the
basis for an analysis of performance of each of our cryptosystems.
First agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK
In the first agile system, QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK, the sender module
Tx is understood to play the role of either Bob or Charlie, while Rx
plays the role of Alice. Signature lengths under QDS-b are calculated
using the data parameters from Tab. 5.1 with the postselection region10
RPS optimized. In the ideal case, honest mismatch probability perr is
calculated using Eq. 3.25 under the model described there (or includ-
ing excess noise, Appendix A). We additionally include a detector
efficiency of 50% which a dishonest player cannot exploit.
For QDS-b we allow dishonest Bob to perform the entangling cloner
attack, and we estimate pe using the models in Sec. 3.6, 5.3 once α and
the worst-case excess noise ξ have been estimated from data. These
ideal signature lengths for QDS-b are displayed in Fig. 5.11. The point
at which run 1 (red) intersects the vertical gridline (2 km fiber length)
corresponds to a point at which we have data. Other points in Fig. 5.11
are calculated by varying T in our model.
10 RPS = R (∆r)
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We see that over metropolitan distances of up to several kilometers,
which are favourable to the CV platform, the protocol QDS-b obtains




. Even at these short distances how-
ever the excess noise ξ has strong impact on the required signature
lengths.
Figure 5.11: Signature lengths required to sign a single bit in protocol QDS-
b, under entangling-cloner attack. The signature lengths at a
distance of 2 km remain modest both in the ideal (above) and
experimental (Tab. 5.2) realizations. Solid (red), dashed (blue),
dot-dashed (orange) and dotted (green) lines correspond to
performance deduced by parameters from experimental runs 1,
2, 3 and 4, respectively. The vertical grid line depicts the loss
level over experimental channel A (0.65 dB loss).
We have so far not taken into account in the estimates of pe and
perr the actual amplitudes and sending probabilities which Tx sent.
These may be included using the changes outlined in Sec. 5.6.1. We
may make our result more accurate still by measuring perr directly
from the output of Rx. The perr calculated in this way automatically
takes into account all sources of trusted detector loss and noise which
will increase perr. For example, for experimental run 1 over the 2 km
channel (Channel A), a signature length of 5.7× 106 is required to
sign a single bit, Tab. 5.2, which is an increase in signature length
over Fig. 5.11. However, even at 20 km protocol QDS-b could still be
made secure by choosing a postselection region with ∆r≫ 1, but for
loss levels larger than ∼ 2 dB the required signature length becomes
impractically large.
For our secret sharing protocol QSS-b, Fig. 5.12, the Holevo infor-
mation is calculated by estimating channel transmission T and excess
noise ξ from the data and assuming that the dishonest players per-
form beamsplitter attack BS2 (Sec. 3.6). Results in Fig. 5.12 use the
ideal analysis identically to Ch. 4. We may calculate more realistic
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maximum key rates by using the modifications from Sec. 5.6.1 with
experimental parameters in Tab. 5.1, to include non-uniform coherent
state amplitudes and sending probabilities. We display these key rates
in Tab. 5.2.
Notably, we see that twice the key rate, 2κ is greater than the
comparable key rate κ for QKD-f (remembering that one channel use
is defined differently between QKD and QSS). In other words, QSS-b
outperforms pairwise QKD by consuming fewer quantum resources
to obtain an equivalent key rate. We have observed therefore that a
“direct” QSS can outperform the classical unconditionally secure secret
sharing mediated by QKD. This is thus another case where our agile
framework is preferable to the QKD-assisted crypto-agility.
Figure 5.12: Maximum attainable key rates for protocol QSS-b. Dishonest
Eve performs attack BS2, and either Bob or Charlie are also
dishonest. The key rate is robust to variations in α, and remains
large even for our 20 km channel. Solid (red), dashed (blue),
dot-dashed (orange) and dotted (green) lines correspond to the
ideal performance deduced by parameters from experimental
runs 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Vertical grid lines depict loss
levels over experimental channels A and B, corresponding to
fiber lengths 2 km (0.65 dB loss) and 20 km (4.75 dB loss)
We have investigated performance of the first agile system QDS-
b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK which is capable of performing quantum digital
signatures (QDS) and quantum secret sharing (QSS) tasks. Specifically,
we have analysed the same experimental datasets under the two
different protocols, demonstrating that they only differ at the level of
classical postprocessing. Of particular note is that our QSS protocol
outperforms qCSS while requiring identical resources in terms of
hardware (for QPSK-based QKD) and quantum channels, while being
secure against equivalent attacks.
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Second agile system QDS-f-QKD-f-CV-QPSK
For the second agile system, QDS-f-QKD-f-CV-QPSK, Tx plays the
role of Alice while Rx plays either Bob or Charlie. The performance
under protocol QDS-f is displayed in Fig. 5.13 under attack BS2. The
excess noise and detector efficiency from the experiment are included,
and pe and perr are calculated using analogous methods to QDS-b,
above. We see than in the ideal analysis of Fig 5.13 (using ideal models











Figure 5.13: Signature lengths required to sign a single bit in protocol QDS-
b, under attack BS2. The signature lengths at 20 km (Channel
B) remain feasible under both ideal (above) and experimental
(Tab. 5.2) realizations. At 2 km (Channel A) the protocol requires
small signature lengths and is thus the fastest QDS protocol
over comparable distances, Fig. 5.14. Solid (red), dashed (blue),
dot-dashed (orange) and dotted (green) lines correspond to
experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Vertical grid lines depict
loss levels over implemented channels A and B, corresponding
to fiber lengths 2 km (0.65 dB loss) and 20 km (4.75 dB loss),
respectively.
For small channel loss the required L is roughly invariant over a
broad range of α, ξ, which suggests that QDS-f is robust to experi-
mental differences. Thus, it is easier to implement on an agile system
alongside further alternative cryptographic protocols which may re-
quire a more restrictive choice of α. For large channel loss however,
the choice of α becomes increasingly important, but using for example
the mean α = 0.55 and ξ = 2.1% from experimental run 3, QDS-f is





. On our system this would allow a one-bit
message to be signed in approximately one second.
A more realistic signature length may be calculated by using the perr
directly from Rx output, which includes all noise sources and detector
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inefficiencies, and by using the models from Sec. 5.6.1 to take into
account realistic coherent state amplitudes and sending probabilities.
This results in larger signature lengths which are displayed in Tab. 5.2.
Crucially, they remain highly feasible over the metropolitan distances
where continuous-variable cryptography is expected to be effective.
Of particular note is the L = 47, 887 required to securely sign a 1 bit
message over 2 km fiber, which to our knowledge makes QDS f the
fastest ever demonstration of a QDS protocol, requiring just 0.047 ms

















Figure 5.14: Time required to sign a one-bit message, and the correspond-
ing channel lengths, for several recent QDS protocols. At the
short distnaces (∼ 2 km) favoured by the continuous-variable
platform, our QDS-f and QDS-b protocols allow for signing
times of less than 0.05 ms and 6 ms, respectively, improving on
previous results in CV (a) and discrete-variable (DV) (b) systems.
At 20 km, QDS-f has a signing time comparable to recent DV
QDS systems (c)-(e). Protocols depicted: red triangles - QDS-b
and QDS-f from this chapter and Ref. [163]. (a) Free-space CV
QDS [73]. (b) Unambiguous-state-elimination-based QDS [46]. (c)
Differential-phase-shift-based QDS [66]. (d) GHz BB84 QDS [56].
(e) Early QDS-QKD “agile” system with measurement-device-
independent capabilities [65].
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The calculated maximum secure key rates under protocol QKD-f are
plotted in Fig. 5.15 under attack BS2. The performance of this protocol
agrees with Ref. [137] over comparable parameter regimes (when we
analyse under the BS0 and EC attacks considered in that Paper), while
the QPSK amplitudes employed in our experiment are much closer to
optimal. Calculated maximum key rates, deduced from experimental
parameters with models Sec. 5.6.1, are displayed in Tab. 5.2.
Figure 5.15: Calculated maximum attainable key rates for protocol QKD-f.
The predicted key rates agree with Ref. [137] over equivalent
parameters, while the key rates displayed here are close to op-
timal. Vertical grid lines denote loss levels over experimental
channels A and B, corresponding to fiber lengths 2 km (0.65 dB
loss) and 20 km (4.75 dB loss), respectively. Solid (red), dashed
(blue), dot-dashed (orange) and dotted (green) lines correspond
to experimental runs 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
Our second agile system QDS-f-QKD-f-CV-QPSK is able to perform
QDS and QKD tasks which differ only in classical postprocessing. Our
key figure of merit for this system is the smallest time, 0.047 ms, to
sign a 1 bit message over 2 km. This time is much smaller than for
comparable protocols, and is due in part to the technological maturity
and speed of our CV experiment, and in part to the fact that for QDS-f
Alice uses different sequences of coherent states for each recipient
(c.f. Ch. 3). Our inclusion of protocol QKD-f which exists already in
the literature, and which has been extensively analysed [96, 137, 141,
143], demonstrates that existing protocols may be united in an agile
platform.
5.7 outlook
We have observed efficient performance of each of our cryptographic
protocols, QDS-b, QSS-b, QDS-f and QKD-f, when key rates and
signature lengths are estimated from the experimental data. Crucially,
the experiment detailed in Sec. 5.5 is performed without reference
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to any particular protocol and so the experimental hardware layer
of Fig. 5.2 is agnostic to the application for which it is being used.
Therefore, each system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK, QDS-f-QKD-f-CV-
QPSK may accurately be denoted “agile”.
The clear separation of hardware layers from the software layer
which selects the desired task is beneficial for practical implemen-
tation, and we believe that an agile middleware which enforces the
separation will function analogously to the quantum compilers re-
cently investigated in the context of quantum computing [166–168].
Future quantum cryptographic protocols should be designed and op-
timized towards agility, and it should be possible to group additional
existing cryptosystems into further agile systems for implementation.
The QDS protocols which we have investigated outperform their
nearest competitors and allow for messages to be securely signed
in (to our knowledge) the fastest observed times: less than 6 ms for
QDS-b and less than 0.05 ms for QDS-f. The trade-off of requiring
short distances is not a huge one, since it has long been accepted [76]
that continuous-variables cryptography boasting very high key rates
and sending rates should be used for intra-city communication over
distances the order of kilometers, while discrete-variables cryptogra-
phy should be preferred for long-distance quantum communication.
Moreover, our QSS-b protocol is shown to require fewer quantum
resources than an equivalent task accomplished via classical uncon-
ditionally secure secret sharing performed over pairwise encrypted
QKD channels.
For our demonstrations, we have used experimental hardware which
is almost entirely commercially available and is inherently compatible
with existing classical communications infrastructure. In the future,
this may render it possible to allow for quantum communications
protocols to be performed over installed fibers with existing receivers,
e.g. a home router, requiring merely an upgrade to their firmware.
Our experiment was performed with a sending rate of 1 GHz, but
with similar hardware it is even possible to reach tens or hundreds
of GHz [170, 171], which would both improve the performance of
our protocols, and make a practical eavesdropping attack increasingly
difficult to perform.
It is important to note that while the security techniques used here
mirror the state-of-the-art techniques available for analysing e.g. QKD
[137] over similar setups, the requirement for QPSK states and hetero-
dyne detection has proven restrictive to the amount of noise allowable
on the channel under different attacks [146, 147]. Under EC attacks,
protocols QDS-f, QSS-b and QKD-f remain insecure over the chan-
nels investigated, precisely because of the high level of excess noise
ξ which in a full treatment must be attributed to the eavesdropper.
These protocols were therefore analysed in a “trusted-noise” model,
BS2, in which excess noise adversely affects honest players, but cannot
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be exploited by an eavesdropper. We believe that because of the high
sending rates used in this experiment, and because of the the unknown
(but assumed non-Gaussian) measurement which Eve performs in
attack BS2, that the protocols still retain a high practical level of secu-
rity, albeit technically not unconditional to all possible attacks. Future
work should therefore endeavour to improve the security attainable
for quantum cryptosystems relying on QPSK alphabet, and to improve
the level of security proof for alphabets of coherent states modulated
with a non-Gaussian distribution.

Part II
P H O G : G E N E R AT I O N O F S U B - P O I S S O N I A N
L I G H T

6
P H O G : P H O T O N G U N
In this chapter we introduce and model a device which aims to be a
deterministic source of highly non-classical light. The device, which
we call PhoG (“sub-Poissonian Photon Gun”), uses engineered dissi-
pation to implement a so-called Nonlinear Coherent Loss (NCL), the
steady state of which is a single-photon state. We first explore the
properties of decay into a Markovian reservoir of an initial coherent
state in a single-mode model, which involves one bosonic mode and
a reservoir, Sec. 6.2. We explore the forms of dissipation required to
deterministically generate useful quantum outputs, and show that
although the ever-present linear (single-photon) loss prevents us from
reaching perfect single-photon states, it is still possible to deterministi-
cally reach output states which are highly squeezed in photon number
Sec. 6.3. These so-called sub-Poissonian states are obtained over the
initial stages of the dynamics which is dominated by NCL and prac-
tically unaffected by linear loss. We then demonstrate that the NCL
may be effectively realised by more complicated models involving
multiple bosonic modes and the regular Kerr nonlinearity, Secs. 6.4-6.6.
The desired state is created in “signal” modes which are not directly
coupled to each other, and interact only dissipatively via coupling to
a shared reservoir, which may be simulated by a long “tail” of further
modes. Finally, we demonstrate that a modification in the coupling
ratio between waveguides can lead to a device which will generate
quadrature entanglement between modes. Since our proposed device
takes merely a coherent state input, it should prove to be a cheap and
flexible source of quantum sub-Poissonian and entangled states.
6.1 introduction
Engineered loss has, in recent years, become a powerful tool and an in-
tensely researched field of quantum physics. Rather than simply being
an enemy of the quantum state and its applications, controlled dissipa-
tion can be a helpful ally for generation, protection, and application of
quantum phenomena. Furthermore, there has been renewed interest
in engineered and non-standard loss mechanisms for the potential
to explore new regimes of physics in which unitary and non-unitary
dynamics compete or balance [176, 177]. For example, in Refs. [178–
181] dissipation is used both to generate quantum entanglement and
dissipation can even protect it [182]. Ref. [180] provides a scheme
in which entanglement is generated between atoms held in distant
cavities which interact solely via dissipation, while Ref. [183] allows
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for entanglement generation and stabilization against decay in systems
of superconducting qubits.
The recent work by Cammack et. al. [184] demonstrates that dissipa-
tion can help prevent decoherence. Their work involves a nuclear spin
coupled to an electron spin, which is then coupled to a reservoir. By
exploiting a difference in characteristic system timescales it is possible
to protect the nuclear spin against decoherence and thereby increase
the length of time it remains in a superposition state. Remarkably, in
this setup an increase in the reservoir temperature further protects co-
herence. In this Chapter we similarly exploit a separation of timescales,
and we discuss this further in Sec. 6.4.
Dissipation can generate superposition states, for example the
Ref. [185] proposes a dissipative scheme in which two-photon absorp-
tion drives a quantum state towards the Schrödinger cat superposition
state, and confines the total quantum state to states close to their
output state. Dissipation is even found to be useful for computation.
In Ref. [186], Verstrate et. al. describe how discrete systems, coupled
only locally to a set of reservoirs, can allow for universal quantum
computation even when the system undergoes no coherent dynamics.
The use of dissipation to enact coupling between modes also has
a long history. For example, in Braun et. al. [179] two modes coupled
to the same Markovian reservoir are led to interact with each other
through their correlated loss, and can generate entanglement. Such
dissipative coupling may also be used to transport quantum states
between separate modes in Refs. [187–191]. In Ref. [189], for example,
it was found that dissipation can increase the rate at which a quantum
state is transferred, and that dissipation can open up new types of
transfer, for example between stationary eigenstates. Their scheme is
particularly interesting and relevant for our work since they rely on
networks of integrated waveguides. Interestingly, it is thought that
such dissipatively coupled networks as Ref. [189] may even assist
biological processes in nature.
6.1.1 Engineering the loss
A key requirement for enacting such dissipation-assisted protocols is
that one should have precise control over both coherent and dissipative
dynamics, and the system should possess the desired (engineered)
dissipation while being relatively isolated from unwanted loss sources.
Cavity QED has proven a useful platform [180], as have trapped
ions [192, 193] which can allow for fine-tuning for master-equation
simulation. Superconducting circuits may be another useful platform
for precise and stable entanglement generation, quantum simulation
and quantum error correction for computation [183, 194].
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6.1.2 Integrated photonic waveguides
Each of the above systems allows for precisely controlled coupling
strengths and interaction times, and crucially they allow for high
effective nonlinearities to be realised. In photonic systems this is
more difficult. While integrated photonic waveguides have proven
useful for enacting tight-binding networks of modes, and therefore
for simulating solid-state systems [195, 196], the glasses typically
used have small nonlinearities and large linear (single-photon) loss.
Larger effective nonlinearities can normally be obtained by choosing
ultrashort pulses or by reducing the effective fiber mode area [169, 197],
but this may lead to other problems of confinement or higher-order
dispersion processes.
Despite these issues, integrated waveguides have recently become
an exciting platform with which to marry unitary and non-unitary
couplings between bosonic modes, and to use these to explore inter-
esting quantum effects. For example, recent works Refs. [195, 196]
exploit collective (nonlocal) losses on the system in order to simulate
a solid-state flat-band (dispersion free) state, while the integrated-
waveguide platform itself allows for precise control over coupling
length and strength. In any case, the generated state in Ref. [195] was
found to be robust to such imperfections. Such a system may be useful
for long-distance communication since it is in principle capable of
propagation without dispersion.
The recent work by Mukherjee et. al. [198] implements a chain of
dissipatively coupled waveguides, and finds that the system acts as
an effective equalizer of an input quantum state. The coupling to
a common reservoir smooths out phase and amplitude fluctuations
in the input state. The simultaneous action of both coherent unitary
dynamics and diffusive non-unitary dynamics lead the authors to
coin the term “Coherent Diffusive Photonics” to describe photonic
systems in which both unitary and diffusive action plays a key role.
In the paper it was also demonstrated that the CDP platform was
very robust to imperfections in both coupling strength and effective
coupling length.
6.1.3 Our contribution: Coherent Diffusive Photonics for quantum state
generation
In this Chapter, our aim is to take the CDP platform, which consists
of linear coupling and strong dissipation in an integrated waveguide
network, and add nonlinear effects. We shall see that adding the Kerr
nonlinearity, present in χ(3) glasses for example, allows our CDP
network to function as a deterministic generator of highly desirable
quantum properties such as entanglement, photon-number squeezing
and, in the ideal limit, single-photons. Our system, which we call a
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Figure 6.1: Hierarchy of models of the PhoG device, from principal basic
model (left) to waveguide array of modes for implementation
(right). We will discuss each model and relationships between
them throughout the rest of this chapter. I: Single-mode model. II:
Two-mode model. III: Three-mode model. IV: Multi-mode model.
V Multi-mode model embedded in glass.
PhoG (Photon Gun) device, is thus a passive1 system which is able to
create highly non-classical output from a coherent state input.
Our ultimate goal in this chapter is to model a full PhoG system
consisting of a network of integrated waveguides, laser-inscribed into
IG2 glass [199], Fig. 6.1 V. The network geometry which we build
up to is displayed in Fig. 6.1 IV, and consists of two “signal” modes
(pink) coupled to each other only vicariously via a long “tail” structure
(blue) of further modes. This tail effectively simulates a reservoir over
short times. In order to gain traction and insight into our system
we will initially consider simpler models of increasing complexity
(Fig. 6.1, I, II, III), which each explicitly consider a Markovian reservoir
R. We will explore key effects first under the single-mode model
(Fig. 6.1 I, Sec. 6.2) which relies on an exotic form of loss called
Nonlinear Coherent Loss (NCL). This single-mode model will prove
illustrative, and is a foundational building block to which we will
compare our more complicated models.
After demonstrating that the single-mode model with NCL suitably
allows for our desired states at the output, we will then show how this
model may be simulated using standard linear loss, linear coupling
between modes, and Kerr nonlinearity, Sec. 6.4. The presence of linear
loss on additional modes of the system will cause our ideal single-
photon output state to decay to vacuum. Despite this, strongly photon-
number squeezed light is still attainable if we restrict ourselves to
short evolution times.
The requisite nonlinearity may be introduced into a real physical
system by building our device in laser-inscribed waveguides in a χ(3)
glass, and with a future experiment in view we explore the relevant
parameters in Sec. 6.5. In Sec. 6.6 we show that even these realistic
parameters – low nonlinearity and high linear loss – are suitable to
allow generation of highly sub-Poissonian output. With an experiment
1 In the sense that it requires no driving.
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in mind we replace the Markovian reservoir with a long “tail” of
further bosonic modes, which effectively simulates the reservoir over
the short timescales of interest, and in Sec. 6.6 we show that this
multi-mode model including realistic glass parameters is still capable
to create a bright output state which is strongly squeezed in photon-
number.
Finally, in Sec. 6.7 we show that tweaking the coupling ratio between
the modes of our device can lead us to a different form of output
state, and so the PhoG device can also be a deterministic source of
entangled photons. We conclude in Sec. 6.8 with a short discussion
of how the output of PhoG may be used, and an outline of necessary
future work.
Throughout the Chapter we will use several different numerical
methods to model the PhoG device. The two key methods – direct
integration of the master equation, and quantum Monte Carlo – are
discussed in Appendix E, and a comparison between the efficiency
and utility of the methods is made there. Throughout the Chapter we
will indicate when either of these methods has been used to generate
specific results.
6.2 single-mode model
Figure 6.2: A single bosonic mode, a, decays into a Markovian reservoir R
by decay operator Â.
Consider the single-mode model displayed in Fig. 6.2 (c.f. Fig. 6.1 I),
which consists of a single bosonic mode, a, decaying into a reservoir





, and the density matrix2 containing all information about the
state of the mode is ρ̂a. This model will prove illustrative of several
principles which we will develop throughout the chapter.
2 As discussed in Sec. 1.2.1, the density operator ρ̂ is completely described by its
equivalent density matrix ρ, and so we will not distinguish between ρ̂ and ρ. It should
be understood that the state ρ is an operator which admits a matrix representation.
This will prove useful for modelling, Appendix E.
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Assuming that reservoir R is Markovian, the evolution of mode a













where we take the Hamiltonian Ĥ = ωâ†â ( h = 1). Equation 6.1 then



















In the remainder of this section, we examine the behaviour of an
initially coherent state, ρa (t = 0) = |α〉〈α| with amplitude α, as it
decays into R. We examine several choices for decay operator Â and
demonstrate that suitable choices of Â drive ρa towards highly non-
classical output steady-states. In Sec. 6.2.1 we let Â = â, in Sec. 6.2.2
we let Â = â2, and in Sec. 6.2.3 we examine the behaviour of decay





6.2.1 Â = â
First, we consider the case Â = â, which corresponds to a single-
photon loss with constant rate, which we denote γ. The evolution of
















where for convenience we have implicitly transformed into a rotating
frame so the free Hamiltonian term ωâ†â vanishes. Let us calculate































〈â†â〉 (t) = 〈â†â〉 (0) e−γt. (6.5)
The photon number exponentially decays in time with decay rate γ
from its initial value. We may derive similar equations for quadrature
expectations 〈x̂〉 (t) and 〈p̂〉 (t) and also find
〈x̂〉 (t) = 〈x̂〉 (0) e−
γ
2 t
〈p̂〉 (t) = 〈p̂〉 (0) e−
γ
2 t. (6.6)
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Since each of these is exponentially decaying to zero, we might guess
that the steady-state of Eq. 6.3 is the vacuum |0〉〈0|, and indeed we can
deduce that this must be the case by noticing that ddtρa = 0 when ρa
is vacuum. In Fig. 6.3a we plot the evolution of 〈â†â〉, 〈x̂〉, 〈p̂〉 which
decay towards zero, while the variances in x̂ and p̂ remain constant
throughout the evolution. This hints that the state ρa (t) remains a
coherent state with decreasing amplitude α→ 0, until it reaches the
vacuum state.
In Fig. 6.3b we plot the fidelities F between ρa (t) and both the
vacuum state |0〉〈0| and the single-photon state |1〉〈1|. We also show
fidelity between ρa (t) and a coherent state |α′〉〈α′|, which is defined
to have the same photon-number expectation as ρa at all times. We
observe that the fidelity to the vacuum state increases to 1 while
the fidelity to coherent state |α′〉〈α′| = 1 always. This confirms our
intuition that ρa remains coherent ∀t and that |0〉〈0| is the steady state.
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(b)
Figure 6.3: Â = â. (a) Operator expectation values calculated for state ρa (t)
as it evolves under master equation 6.3. An initial coherent state
with α = 3.0 decays to vacuum state |0〉〈0|. Quadrature variances
remain constant through time, implying that ρa remains a coher-
ent state throughout its evolution. This is confirmed in (b) where
the fidelity between ρa and |α′〉〈α′| is demonstrated to remain
1 for all time, while the fidelity to the vacuum state increases
to 1. The amplitude α′ is chosen to give a coherent state with
equivalent photon-number expectation to ρa (t). Horizontal grid-
lines are displayed in black, dashed. Numerical method: direct
integration.
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6.2.2 Â = â2
Next we consider a decay term â2, which describes two-photon loss
into the reservoir. Two photon absorption has been extensively studied,
for example in the context of light coupled to a non-interacting atomic
gas [201–204], for which the concepts of antibunched light were first
















which gives the evolution of photon number expectation as
d
dt
〈â†â〉 = −2γ〈â†â†ââ〉. (6.8)
This equation does not take a closed form, and so we cannot yet
directly calculate 〈â†â〉 (t) [201]. Similarly, equations for evolution of
〈â〉 (t) require terms to the third power in â, â†, and so are also not
yet closed. We will encounter some linearization techniques later in
Sec. 6.6.2 which allow us to deal with this.
For now, let us try to deduce the steady-state of Eq. 6.7 when we
begin with coherent state |α〉. We observe that once again the vacuum
|0〉〈0| must be a steady state, since then ddtρa = 0. Surprisingly we
now also have the single-photon state |1〉〈1|, and states of the form
|0〉〈1| , |1〉〈0| as steady states, since these also have ddtρa = 0. The general
steady-state should be a mixture of these, and takes the form
ρsteady = c1 |ψ〉〈ψ|+ c2 |0〉〈0|+ c3 |1〉〈1|
with |ψ〉 = |0〉+ e
iφ |1〉√
2
; c1, c2, c3 ∈ C. (6.9)
The state |ψ〉 is a so-called phase-state, and it has long been known that
two-photon absorption will lead to a phase state [207] (plus additional
mixing [208, 209] which reduces purity). The phase φ is related to the
phase of the initial coherent state.
It turns out that a full analytic solution of the master equation 6.7
is possible [203, 207, 209] when, instead of calculating the evolution
of expectations 〈â〉, 〈â†â〉, we focus on direct solution in terms of
ρn,m = 〈m|ρ|n〉. This is the approach taken by Simaan and Loudon in
Refs. [203], and picked up again by the Yamamoto group in Ref. [207].
In the Fock basis, Eq. 6.7 may be rewritten as
d
dt





[n (n− 1) +m (m− 1)] ρn,m (6.10)
for all n,m.
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The derivation now relies on the fact that the two-photon absorp-
tion operator â2 partitions the full Hilbert space into two separate
subspaces, depending on whether the state contains an odd or an even
number of photons. In other words, odd Fock basis elements couple
only to odd Fock basis elements, and likewise for even Fock basis
elements.
Operator â2 corresponds to photon subtracton, and can act on every
|n〉 except |0〉 and |1〉: we have already seen that these must correspond
to the steady state of the system. Considering only diagonal elements
ρn,n, and noting that Eq. 6.10 couples diagonal elements only to
diagonal elements, we deduce that
ρ0,0 (t→∞) = ∑
n even
ρn,n (t = 0)
ρ1,1 (t→∞) = ∑
n odd
ρn,n (t = 0)
Indeed, this is true more generally than just Eq. 6.7, and also occurs
for dissipative coupling via â2 to a reservoir at finite temperature in
which pairs of photons can be absorbed from the bath into system ρa
[203]. When the initial state ρa (t = 0) is a bright coherent state |α〉 〈α|
with α = |α|2 eiφ both ρ0,0 and ρ1,1 take the value 0.5 in the steady
state.
What about the coherences ρ0,1, ρ1,0? We may return to Eq. 6.10 and
apply an argument described in Ref. [204]. Let us rewrite ρn,m (t) =
ρn,n+µ (t) where µ ∈N > 0measures the distance between the matrix
element and the diagonal3. Because the operator â2 can only subtract
two photons at a time, µ is preserved during the evolution, which we





Θn (µ, t) , (6.11)




Θn (µ, t) =γ (n+ 1) (n+ 2)Θn+2 (µ, t)
− γ
[





Θn (µ, t) . (6.12)
and in the steady state we may set the left hand side of this equation
to zero. We have seen already that in the steady state the only nonzero
















Θn (1, t) = 0, (6.13)
3 For elements on the other side of the diagonal, i.e. those requiring m < n, we note
that ρn,n−µ is the complex conjugate of ρn,n+µ
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so this weighted sum of elements one position above the diagonal
is unchanged by â2. Therefore, our nonzero coherence in the steady
state may be written as












Θn (1, 0) . (6.14)
Considering again the specific example of a coherent state input,
Eq. 6.14 simplifies to
ρ0,1 (∞) = |α|2 exp(− |α|2 − iφ) I0 (|α|2) (6.15)
where I0 (x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind [210]. In
the limit of a bright coherent state input, Eq. 6.15 reduces to [204, 209]
ρ0,1 (∞) = exp (−iφ)√
2π
(6.16)
which is approximately 0.399 for real α 1. For an input α = 3.0, we
arrive at ρ0,1 (∞) = 0.405.
In Fig. 6.4a we plot the numeric evolution of 〈â†â〉, 〈x̂〉, 〈p̂〉 and
the quadrature variances. The photon number expectation no longer
decays to zero as it did for Â = â. In Fig. 6.4b we observe the fidelity
between ρa (t) and the final steady-state increases to 1, and the coef-
ficients of the steady state ρsteady in Eq. 6.9 are c1 = 0.810, c2 = c3 =
0.095, or in other words ρ0,0 = ρ1,1 = 0.5 and ρ0,1 = ρ1,0 = 0.405. This
agrees with the analytical derivation based on Refs. [203, 204, 207, 209].
Our numerics thus confirm that two-photon loss operator induces
a high degree of non-classicality in the system. We shall revisit this
decay operator â2 in Sec. 6.7 where we will demonstrate that it is
even capable of producing entanglement between spatially separated
modes of a larger system.
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(b)
Figure 6.4: Â = â2. (a) Operator expectation values for state ρa (t) as it
evolves under Eq. 6.7. Unlike Fig. 6.3, an intially coherent state
with α = 3.0 no longer decays to the vacuum state, and the final
photon-number expectation is 0.5. Quadrature variances no longer
stay constant, which implies that the state is no longer a coherent
state. This is confirmed in (b) where the fidelity between ρa (t)
and |α′〉〈α′| is plotted. The fidelity between ρa (t) and steady state
Eq. 6.9 increases to 1. Horizontal gridlines are displayed in black,
dashed. Numerical method: direct integration.
6.2 single-mode model 179




We have seen that the choice of Â can give drastically different steady
states of ρa, from the uninteresting vacuum to the highly quantum
phase-state. We therefore wish to consider which choices for Â will







may be interpreted as a single-photon loss at a rate which depends on
photon number n̂ = â†â. The loss rate will go to zero when applied
to state |1〉〈1|, and so we may suspect that the single-photon state |1〉〈1|
is a steady state of this loss mechanism.





â (n̂− 1) ρ (n̂− 1) â† −
1
2
ρ (n̂− 1) n̂ (n̂− 1) −
1
2




We examine the evolution of ρa in Fig. 6.5 and plot the evolution of
photon number and quadrature expectations 〈x̂〉, 〈p̂〉 in (a). We observe
a non-exponential decay of photon-number expectation to 1, while in





does indeed have a single-photon steady state.
Even after short times t < 0.1 the fidelity to an equivalent coherent
state has rapidly decreased, and the quadrature variances sharply
increase over similar timescale. This implies a rapid increase in non-
classicality of the system, which we shall explore and quantify later.




is a useful candidate
for driving our system towards the highly nonclassical single-photon
state. In the remainder of this Chapter our goal will be to find a
physical system which can efficiently implement this decay operator.




, let us first write














n+ 1 ρm+1,n+1 −
1
2







and consider some specific matrix elements. Immediately we see
that Eq. 6.19 couples diagonal elements m = n only to diagonal
elements and so an analysis of the photon-number statistics is possible
by only considering the diagonal elements. We obtain, for example
d
dtρ1,1 = 2γρ2,2 which is greater than zero, and so ∀t we expect the
single-photon contribution ρ1,1 to monotonically increase, c.f. Fig. 6.5b.






ρ0,1 = 0, and
d
dt
ρ1,0 = 0, (6.20)
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(a) Operator expectation values for state ρa (t)
as it evolves. An initially coherent state with α = 3.0 decays to a
state with 〈n̂〉 = 1, which we confirm as state |1〉〈1| by considering
the fidelity in (b). Horizontal gridlines are displayed in black,
dashed. Numerical method: direct integration.
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implying that these elements are constant in time. The single-photon
state requires zero in each of these elements, and so we may predict
that high fidelity between ρa and |1〉〈1| may only be obtained when
ρ0,0 (t = 0), ρ0,1 (t = 0), and ρ1,0 (t = 0) 1. This implies, in particu-
lar, that high fidelity with |1〉〈1| is not obtainable for coherent states
with small amplitude4. In Fig. 6.6 we show this explicitly.
Figure 6.6: The fidelity of ρa (t→∞) to single-photon state |1〉〈1| depends
on initial coherent state amplitude α since the density matrix
elements ρ0,0, ρ0,1 and ρ1,0 are constant in time.





. Based on the above discussion we might reasonably expect
the steady-state to be |2〉〈2|, and this is indeed what we see in Fig. 6.7,
where the fidelity to the two-photon state increases to 1.










are known as “nonlinear coherent states”
[211], while the operator itself may be considered as the annihilation
operator for a so-called f-deformed harmonic oscillator [212].
4 The requirement of large α for the input coherent state is not very restrictive, and as
we shall see in the next section there are additional reasons to prefer α 1




is a specific example of âf̂ (n̂) for operator-valued function
f̂. Glauber coherent states are obtained for the choice f̂ = 1̂.
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. The steady-state of this loss operator is |2〉〈2|.
The fidelity of ρa to this two-photon state increases to 1.
6.3 including loss




is a good candidate for driving an initial coherent state towards a
single photon state. Any system, therefore, which can implement





asymptotically and deterministically give rise to single-photon Fock
states, although we have seen that fidelities close to 1 are obtainable
even at finite time, Fig. 6.5b.
In a realistic situation however it is unlikely that a system can be




only. We must consider how the
system’s output states are affected by additional loss mechanisms. In
an optical system the single-photon (linear) loss can never be avoided,
so we will explore its effect on the nonlinear coherent loss mechanism.











with γ1 the decay rate via the single-photon loss channel â, and γNCL




. We can immediately see that |1〉〈1| is
only a steady-state of Eq. 6.21 when γ1 = 0, in which case we revert to
the analysis of Sec. 6.2.3. For all γ1 > 0, the vacuum is the steady-state
and the matrix elements ρ0,0, ρ0,1, ρ1,0 are no longer constant in time.
Physically we see that the presence of linear loss leads to a degra-
dation of the highly non-classical output states reached under NCL
alone, as the additional linear loss mechanism pushes ρa towards the
vacuum. We see this explicitly in Fig. 6.8b (c.f. Fig. 6.5), where an
intially increasing fidelity with |1〉〈1| eventually dies away, and fidelity
to the vacuum state increases to 1. Additionally, photon number ex-
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pectations decay to 0, and an initial increase in quadrature variances
decays back to the vacuum state variance, Fig. 6.8a.
Figure 6.8b suggests an interesting phenomenon: over short timescales





for example the fidelity between ρa (t < 0.05) and |α′〉〈α′| denoting a
coherent state with equivalent photon-number expectation. By con-
sidering this alone, for short times the behaviour is indistinguishable
from the case with γ1 = 0. Similar reasoning applies also to the fideli-
ties between ρa (t < 0.1) and |1〉〈1|, where the evolution is practically
independent of γ1 over short times.
From fidelity F (ρa (t < 0.1) , |0〉〈0|), Fig. 6.8 even suggests that large
γ1 might help drive ρa towards the single-photon state faster than
in the γ1 = 0 case. However we infer that loss actually is not helpful
here, since after about t = 0.05 the fidelity to |α′〉〈α′| begins to increase
again. This suggests that fidelity might not always be a useful measure
of our desired behaviour when both nonlinear dissipation and linear
loss are included.6
We examine the maximum attainable fidelity to |1〉〈1| in Fig. 6.9.
The maximum fidelity decreases with increasing γ1, but increasing
α appears to allow larger fidelities to be reached for the same γ1 (c.f.
Fig. 6.6). We will explore this phenomenon further in Sec. 6.3.3.
6.3.1 Mandel parameter Q
Although the fidelity has been a helpful measure for measuring the
ability of our system to produce single-photons, we have observed
in Fig. 6.3b a case where fidelity to the single-photon increases while
ρa remains entirely coherent. It is therefore worth considering which
other measures we might use to assess progress. One such measure is
























Intuitively, the Mandel parameter is a measure of the amount of





= 〈n̂〉, and so Q = 0 in this case.
States with Q < 0 have reduced photon-number variance and are
known as sub-Poissonian, while states withQ > 0 are super-Poissonian.
6 Of course, we could have guessed this based on Fig. 6.3b as the fidelity to |1〉〈1|
increases until t ≈ 0.25 while the state remains completely coherent.
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and linear loss â. Initial coherent state ampli-
tude α = 3.0, and γNCL = 8.0. (a) Operator expectation values.
Solid: 〈â†â〉. The presence of linear loss γ1 > 0 ensures that the
photon number decays to 0. Dashed: Var (x̂). Similarly, for γ1 > 0
we see the variance in x return to its initial value, hinting that
our state is being pushed towards vacuum. (b) Fidelities of ρa (t)
against vacuum (blue), single-photon state (red) and coherent
state with equivalent photon-number expectation (orange). Solid:
γ1 = 0. Dot-dashed: γ1 = 2. Dashed: γ1 = 20. The presence
of linear loss pushes ρa away from the single-photon state for
t > 0.1. For t < 0.1 the system is dominated by NCL. Numerical
method: direct integration.
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Figure 6.9: Maximum attainable fidelity between ρa and |1〉〈1| at different
linear loss levels γ1. Linear loss drives ρa towards the vacuum
and destroys the quantumness of our state, but over short times
the fidelity to |1〉〈1| appears independent of γ1, Fig. 6.8. Here,
we observe that after γ1 ≈ 7.5 the maximum attainable fidelity
is practically independent of linear loss rate, while it does de-
pend on α. We shall exploit this later. Numerical method: direct
integration.
In the limit of zero uncertainty in photon-number, 〈∆n̂〉 → 0 and so
Q→ −1 and we reach the Fock states.




and â2 give steady-states
with sub-Poissonian photon number statistics, while â gives rise to the
vacuum, which is Poissonian. We will therefore seek to find parameter




or â2 give Q < 0,
even in the presence of linear loss.




on Q is displayed in Fig. 6.10a under
several different linear loss rates γ1. We see that the effect of NCL is
indeed to drive ρa towards a Fock state, and Q→ −1 for γ1 = 0, only.
For all γ1 6= 0 we see that Q eventually returns to 0 as the system
tends towards the vacuum. However, even in this case large |Q| are
still obtained for finite t. In Fig. 6.10 we observe that the behaviour of
Q over the initial evolution of ρa is independent of linear loss rate γ1




as a deterministic generator of nonclassical states, since a restriction
to small times t is always possible.
We therefore alter our goals. Since Fig. 6.10 predicts Q (t) > −1





to generate single-photons. So, rather than finding
a system which deterministically generates single-photon states in
the long-time limit, we seek a system which will deterministically
generate highly sub-Poissonian states after a specified evolution time.
From now on we will take it as our goal to generate sub-Poissonian
light over the initial stages of the system evolution.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.10: Mandel Q parameter under both NCL and linear loss. With
γ1 = 0, Q→ −1 as the system approaches |1〉〈1|. For any γ1 > 0,
Q (t→∞) → 0, but significant Q < 0 are still obtained for
finite t. Solid: γNCL 6= 0. Dashed: γNCL = 0, i.e. just linear loss.
Numerical method: direct integration. (a) and (b) show the same
evolution, but (b) is displayed over a shorter timescale.
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Figure 6.11: The best attainable value of Mandel parameter Q is approxi-
mately independent of γ1 when the loss rate is nonzero. Larger
α allows for better Q to be reached. Numerical method: direct in-
tegration (α = 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0); quantum Monte Carlo (α = 8.0).
We examine the best attainable Q < 0 for a given linear loss rate γ1,
and plot in Fig. 6.11. As we see, although the best attainable Q is no
longer −1, it varies only slightly with increasing linear loss, and even
for large γ1 = 15 a Mandel parameter of Q ≈ −0.778 is still attainable,
while 3.2 photons remain in the state.
Figure 6.11 also appears to show that choosing larger initial α
allows for smaller Q to be obtained, and we saw similar effects previ-
ously in Fig. 6.9 when considering the maximum attainable fidelity
to the single-photon. While the large improvement in attainable Q
between α = 2.0 and α = 3.0 is primarily due to reduction in the
initial ρ0,0, ρ1,0, ρ0,1, the improvement between α = 3.0 and α = 4.0
cannot be explained in the same way. We will explore this further
using additional methods in the following sections, but for now let us
briefly adopt an analytical approach. Consider the Lindblad equation



























where ρn = 〈n|ρ|n〉. Terms in Eq. 6.25 involving γNCL are proportional
to n3, while terms involving γ1 are proportional only to n. Therefore,
for every nonzero choice of γ1,γNCL, there exists an n for which the
NCL dominates (γNCLn3  γ1n) and so Eq. 6.25 reduces to
d
dt
ρn ≈ −γNCLn (n− 1)2 ρn + γNCL (n+ 1)n2ρn+1, (6.26)
188 phog : photon gun
which is independent of γ1. Thus, a sufficient increase in the initial
〈n〉 will compensate for the effects of linear loss, which corroborates
Fig. 6.11. We thus have an additional tool, the initial coherent state
amplitude, to aid us toward generation of sub-Poissonian states via
NCL.
To summarise, the inclusion of linear loss γ1 causes our system
to be driven toward the vacuum rather than a single-photon state.
However, strong photon-number squeezing is obtained over the initial
stages of system dynamics, Fig. 6.10, and is roughly independent
of γ1, Fig. 6.11. Linear loss may further be combatted [213, 214] by
increasing the initial coherent state amplitude, thereby increasing 〈n〉,
which causes NCL to dominate over the initial stages of dynamics. A
strongly photon-number squeezed state is then obtained at the output
by stopping the evolution at an appropriate time.
6.3.2 Nonlinear decay
Finally, let us examine behaviour of photon-number expectation 〈n̂〉
when both NCL and linear loss are included. We have observed al-
ready, Fig. 6.8a, that linear loss causes ρa to decay to the vacuum
rather than |1〉〈1|, and so in the long-time limit we have 〈n̂〉 → 0.
We have determined however that we are primarily interested in the
early stages of dynamics over which NCL dominates, and so in our
system we might expect to see a signature of NCL behaviour on the
photon-number expectation.





interpreted as an intensity-dependent single-photon loss, with rate
proportional to n̂. This implies that a large coherent state amplitude
should give rise to quick decay of photon-number, while smaller
amplitude yields smaller decay. This is in contrast to linear loss in
which the decay of 〈n〉 is exponential with constant rate.
We vary initial coherent state amplitude α and plot the initial stages
of dynamics in Fig. 6.12, where we have initially set γ1 = 0 in order
to isolate the effects of NCL. Although each coherent state initially
possesses different average photon number, after a short amount of
time each state possesses the same average photon number since they
have experienced different decay rates. This “nonlinear decay” is a
key indicator of NCL [215, 216].
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Figure 6.12: NCL induces intensity-dependent decay rates, and so states with
initially different 〈n̂〉 quickly decay to a level where they possess
the same average photon number. This is a key demonstration
of NCL. Linear loss rate γ1 = 0.0. Numerical method: direct
integration.
6.3.3 Summary of NCL effects
The two signature behaviours of NCL which we have observed are
• Q < 0 Fig. 6.13a, and
• Nonlinear decay of 〈n̂〉 Fig. 6.13b.
These are good indicators that a system is undergoing NCL. Generat-
ing the condition Q < 0 is precisely our goal, while a system which
undergoes the nonlinear decay we might reasonably expect will also
generate Q < 0. Throughout the rest of the chapter we observe these
two signature behaviours in increasingly complex models, Fig. 6.1.
Let us conclude by displaying the two signature behaviours for
a system which has all three types of loss which were examined
in Sec. 6.2, namely single-photon loss â, two-photon loss â2 and




. We will use parameters which we

















with parameters γ2 = 0.0005, and γNCL = 0.002. We allow linear
loss rate γ1 to vary, while (for γ1 > 0) it remains the dominating
loss channel for the system. For γ1 = 0 in Fig. 6.13a we observe
that Q = −0.8 is the limiting value, independent of initial α. However,
larger input α enables the system to reach this limit faster. Figure 6.13b
displays NL decay in this system.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.13: Signature behaviours of NCL in a system obeying Eq. 6.27 with
γ2 = 0.0005, γNCL = 0.002 and an initial coherent state with av-
erage photon number 〈n̂〉 (0). (a) Generation of sub-Poissonian
light, as evidenced by Q < 0. Linear loss γ1 = 0 and so the max-
imum value of |Q| is obtained for most choices of α, but the time
taken to reach maximum Q decreases as initial α increases. (b)
Nonlinear decay of photon-number expectation 〈n̂〉. Intensity-
dependent loss causes states with large photon numbers to decay
very quickly, while states with similar photon numbers expe-
rience similar decay rate. Numerical method: quantum Monte
Carlo.
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Varying γ1 and α, Fig. 6.14, we see that although linear loss γ1
causes progressively worse values for Q, the dynamics are approxi-
mately independent of γ1 over short timescales. However, for a given
large γ1, larger values of |Q| can be reached by increasing the initial
coherent state amplitude. Therefore, our recipe for generating non-
classical states with highly sub-Poissonian photon-number statistics is
to design a system which obeys Eq. 6.27, and then allow an initially
bright coherent state to evolve for a very short amount of time. In
the limit γ1 → 0 this can generate states with up to Q = −0.8 (or
Q = −1 if γ2 → 0 also), while for all γ1 > 0 we can force Q → −0.8
by choosing α  1. The state is no longer close to a single-photon
state, e.g. the best Q in Fig. 6.14b occurs when the state with initially
〈n̂〉 = 700 has reduced to 〈n̂〉 = 285, and so the output state is both
bright and highly sub-Poissonian.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.14: Evolution of the Mandel Q parameter as γ1 and α are varied
in a system obeying Eq. 6.27 with γ2 = 0.0005, γNCL = 0.002
and an initial coherent state with average photon number 〈n̂〉 (0).
(a) Constant 〈n̂〉 (0) = 500 photons and varying linear loss γ1.
Larger γ1 causes progressively smaller values of |Q| to be ob-
tained, c.f. Fig. 6.11, although the dynamics are practically inde-
pendent of γ1 for small times. (b) Constant γ1 = 200. Even with
large linear loss, larger |Q| may be obtained by starting with
a brighter coherent state (larger 〈n̂〉 (0)). Numerical method:
quantum Monte Carlo.
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6.4 three-mode model
Having analysed the single-mode model in detail, and demonstrated




is a good candidate for determin-
istic generation of highly non-classical states even in the presence
of two-photon loss and strong linear loss, we must turn to consider
whether such an NCL operator can be effectively realised in practice.





simulated in a three-mode system via a combination of strong linear
loss, linear coupling between multiple modes, and the Kerr nonlinear-
ity. Our starting point is the three-mode model, depicted in Fig. 6.15,
in which two bosonic modes, a and b, are coupled to a third, c0, which
then decays into a Markovian reservoir R with decay rate γc.
Figure 6.15: Three-mode model of PhoG device. Two bosonic modes, a and
b, are each coupled to a third mode, c0. Mode c0 is then strongly






















where the subscript 3 denotes that we are dealing with this three-
mode model. We have additionally assumed that modes a and b to
be coupled to independent Markovian reservoirs with rate γ1 which



















The interaction Hamiltonian Ĥint3 describes linear coupling between
modes, while the Kerr Hamiltonian ĤKerr3 describes the self-Kerr inter-
action (self-phase modulation) on each mode. This Hamiltonian may
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be realised, for example, by evanescently coupled waveguides in a
χ(3) glass [217–219]. The constant U is the Kerr nonlinear interaction
constant, and we will relate this to glass properties in Sec. 6.5, below.
The three-mode model Eq. 6.28, while a physically useful start-
ing point for building a system which accurately simulates NCL, is
currently too difficult to analyse, either analytically or using the nu-
merical methods which proved useful for the single mode model in
Secs. 6.2, 6.3 (see Appendix E).
We may reduce the complexity of Eq. 6.28 by assuming that the
decay rate γc of mode c0 into the reservoir R is large enough that
mode c0 completely decays on a much faster timescale than modes
a,b. This will allow for adiabatic elimination of mode c0 via the










H(0,2) = 0, (6.30)






















b. The three-mode model has been reduced to a
two-mode system involving only modes a,b. Introducing the follow-















and rewriting Eq. 6.31 in terms of these new modes we arrive at the







+ [γ1L [ŝ−] + (Γ + γ1)L [ŝ+]] .ρ2 (6.33)
The subscript 2 denotes that each quantity is for this two-mode model.
We have defined the new decay rate as Γ = 4G2/γc. The Hamiltonian


















+s− (n− −n+ − 1) + h. c., (6.34)
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where n± = s
†

































The two-mode model obeying Eq. 6.33 is depicted in Fig. 6.16. Mode
s+ decays into reservoir R with decay rate Γ + γ1. In the absence of
linear loss, γ1 = 0, mode s− will decay only vicariously through
s+, and the coupling between modes is proportional to nonlinearity
parameter U. In a linear system, U = 0, the antisymmetric mode s−
will not decay and so in that case we may identify it as the dark mode
of such linear system, which is considered further e.g. in Ref. [220].
Figure 6.16: Two-mode model of the PhoG device. Having adiabatically
eliminated mode c0 from the three-mode model (Fig. 6.15) and
rotated to collective basis s−, s+ using Eqs. 6.32 we see that
mode s− will only decay into R by first decaying into s+. The
linear coupling between s− and s+ is proportional to U, and so
for a linear system U = 0 mode s− cannot decay into R. Decay
rate Γ = 4G2/γ1.
We have thus reduced the complexity of our system from three
modes to two. However, even two bosonic modes are computationally
very challenging to simulate when large photon numbers are required7,
although we shall encounter approximation methods in Sec. 6.6.2
which help us to deal with this.
We thus seek to adiabatically eliminate mode s+ from the system,
which will leave us with an equation for s− only. Let us assume that
the decay rate Γ + γ1 is the dominating decay rate of the two-mode
model, and that mode s+ decays to its steady state much quicker
7 For example, we note in Appendix E that a coherent state may be accurately modelled
on a Hilbert space size 2dα2e without adverse effects due to Hilbert space truncation.
In practice, initial 〈n̂〉 = 700, required in Fig. 6.14b to give large negative Q, will
require a Hilbert space size |H| > 794 on each mode, and so a total Hilbert space size
of 794× 794 = 630436. This is challenging to implement.
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than the typical timescale of the dynamics of s−. Then applying the



















































We see that Eq. 6.37 matches Eq. 6.27 except for the addition of the
Hamiltonian Ĥ1 = H(0,0), which does not affect the photon-number
statistics.
The effective decay rates γ2,γNCL in this single-mode model explic-
ity depend on coupling constants ga,gb (Fig. 6.15, Eq. 6.29). We see
for example that in the limit of symmetric coupling ga = gb, we have
γNCL = 0 and there will be no NCL for mode s−. Large γNCL can be
obtained however for strong asymmetry ga  gb or gb  ga.
Since it is NCL which drives ρ most effectively towards highly sub-





and define ga = xG,gb =
√
1− x2G for 0 < x < 1. Substituting these


















as the only solution8 0 < x < 1 which will yield a nonzero γNCL. So,






8 Note that x = 1/
√
2 is the only other solution with 0 < x < 1. This choice of x
will yield symmetric coupling ga = gb and hence γNCL = 0. We will return to this
scenario in Sec. 6.7.
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Taking this optimal choice,
γ2 =
U2
16 (Γ + γ1)
and γNCL =
U2
4 (γ1 + Γ)
, (6.42)
and we are finally able to give motivation for the choices of γ2 =
0.0005,γNCL = 0.002 used in Sec. 6.3.3 as the decay rates given by
Eq. 6.42 when Γ = 432g, U = 2g, γ1 = 0. The g is a dimensionless
scaling parameter which we here take to be 1. Altering g will only
serve to re-scale the time axis of Figs. 6.13, 6.14 but the qualitative
dynamics will remain unchanged.
To summarise, we have reduced the three-mode model (Eq. 6.28,
Fig. 6.15) to a single-mode model (Eqs. 6.27 , 6.37, Fig. 6.2) via sequen-
tial adiabatic eliminations of modes c0 and s+, which each rapidly
decayed into reservoir R. In essence, the behaviour of the antisymmet-
ric collective mode s− in the three-mode model simulates behaviour
of a single mode undergoing nonlinear coherent loss, two-photon loss
and single-photon loss, which were all considered in Secs. 6.2, 6.3. The
combination of Kerr nonlinearity, linear coupling and single-photon
loss allows for the effective NCL decay operator to be constructed.
We demonstrate in Figs. 6.17, 6.18 that both the three-mode model
and the two-mode model do indeed give rise to the same behaviour as
the single-mode model. Considering the two-mode model (Fig. 6.18a)
we see that initially mode s− does not have rapid decay. This is
because mode s+ is populated (Fig. 6.18b). However, once s+ begins
to decay, we observe good agreement between two-mode and single-
mode model. The two-mode model exhibits behaviours signature to
NCL.
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Figure 6.17: Evolution of Mandel parameter (a) and mean photon number
(b) of the antisymmetric mode s− computed via the three-mode
model (solid lines) and the single-mode model (dots) for param-
eters: gb/ga =
√
2− 1, U = 0.012gb, γc = 6.04gb, and γ1 = 0.0.
Picture credit: Anton Sakovich in Ref. [221]. Numerical method:
quantum Monte Carlo (three-mode model); direct integration of
Eq. 6.25 (single-mode model)
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.18: (a) Comparison of nonlinear decay for single-mode model (solid)
and two-mode model (dashed) with varying input 〈n̂−〉. Input
〈n̂+〉 = 0, optimal couplings ga,gb, γ1 = 10.0 and otherwise
equivalent parameters to Fig. 6.13. Finite (nonzero) decay time
(b) of mode s+ means that the adiabatic elimination of s+ is not
yet valid for t ≈ 0. Otherwise, there is good agreement between
models once s+ has begun to decay, and the two-mode model
exhibits the same signature behaviours of NCL.
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6.5 realistic parameters
Let us consider how the analysis we have performed so far connects to
real parameters of a physical system which is capable of implementing
the PhoG device. We have in mind a network of waveguides laser-
inscribed into highly nonlinear glass, e.g. IG2 [199], which will be
created using methods similar to the recent work Ref [198]. Our
envisioned system is depicted in Fig. 6.19.
Figure 6.19: 3D representation of finished PhoG device. Waveguides are
laser-inscribed into IG2 glass and allow for NCL to be simulated.
In order to proceed, we must consider two new things: (i) realistic
glass parameters and how they influence constants which enter into
our Lindblad equations 6.28, 6.33, 6.37; (ii) simulation of a Markovian
reservoir R by a “tail” of additional bosonic modes. We consider (i) in
this section, and (ii) in Sec. 6.6.
We will derive realistic parameters in this section, and they will
be used in Sec. 6.6 to show that the desired signature behaviours are
still observed. These order-of-magnitude calculations are intended
to illustrate feasibility of our device in real glass, but ideally the
parameters must be measured experimentally on the device itself
[222].
The important quantity to estimate is the Kerr nonlinearity param-
eter U which is used in our Hamiltonians. To do so, we will follow
the analyses put forth in Refs. [217–219], and assume that a pulse of
finite length Leff propagates through a waveguide with length L, such
that L  Leff. The waveguide in χ(3) glass is assumed9 to have no
dispersion and the pulse shape does not change. We consider only
the changes of the quantum state of the pulse caused by nonlinearity,
linear loss and nonlinear phase changes.
The Kerr nonlinearity parameter may be written as






9 We will briefly discuss relaxation of these conditions in Sec. 6.8.
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which is derived e.g. in Refs. [217–219] either in terms of nonlinear
refractive index parameter n2 or third-order susceptibility χ(3). Veff
is the effective mode volume which we take to be Veff ∼ AeffLeff, with
Aeff the transverse mode area. We take the effective refractive index
of the waveguide mode to be neff ≈ 2.5 which is typical for IG2 glass
[199]. IG2 also has n2 ∼ 3× 10−18W−1m2 [222, 223].
The effective mode area is yet uncertain and for implementation
must be measured on the realistic device. For an upper bound we
take Aeff to be the area of the waveguide which is on the order of
10−12m2 as in Ref. [198] for similar laser-inscribed waveguides capable
of supporting large pulse energies. Taking for example Aeff = 120×
10−12m2, for a 100 fs pulse at 1064 nm we calculate U ≈ 8.5× 10−8.
We may reasonably expect the final values of U to even increase in
a finished device owing to reduction in Aeff (e.g. in Ref. [198] the
waveguides are approximately 4µm × 4µm). Evolution under this
U = 8.5× 10−8 is modelled in Sec. 6.6. We should stress however that
the specific value of U must be measured on a final physical device,
and the values in this section are order-of-magnitude estimates only.
6.6 multi-mode model
In the previous sections we have demonstrated that the three-mode
model considered in Sec. 6.4 accurately simulates NCL and allows for
deterministic generation of sub-Poissonian light over the initial stages
of the dynamics. A natural next question to ask is “how might we
implement such a model?”.
One approach which was successfully demonstrated in Ref. [198] is
to replace the Markovian reservoir R with a “tail” of further bosonic
modes. Here we adopt this replacement in order to implement the
system in laser-inscribed waveguides. This replacement was recently
considered in Ref. [195, 198]. We therefore wish to analyse the multi-
mode model of the PhoG device, Fig. 6.20, in which two “signal”
modes are linearly coupled to the “tail” of further modes. The intra-
tail coupling gc should be chosen to mimic the effect of reservoir R,
and thus allow for the adiabatic elimination of modes c0 and s+. We
will solve this model and compare it to the models used previously
in order to demonstrate agreement between these approaches. The
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x̂†x̂†x̂x̂, j = 0, 1, . . . ,N. (6.45)
The Kerr nonlinearity constant is U, total number of tail modes is N,
and coupling constants are ga,gb,gc. We cannot hope to numerically
simulate Eq. 6.44 over the necessary parameter regimes of large input
α and large number of modes10. For the multi-mode model the only
decay route into a Markovian reservoir is via linear loss γ1 which
we take to affect every mode independently. We require the tail to
be long enough that state which has initially decayed into the tail
cannot return to the signal modes over the timescales of interest. This
traps us in the unfortunate scenario of having to make predictions
of the behaviour of a large number of coupled modes, with strong
nonlinearity and a necessarily large Hilbert space size of each mode.
Figure 6.20: Multi-mode model of the PhoG device (c.f. Fig. 6.1 IV) in which
the Markovian reservoir R from the three-mode model (Fig. 6.15)
is replaced by a long “tail” of additional bosonic modes.
To proceed we will consider two related approaches to approximate
the system Eq. 6.44: a meanfield approach (Sec. 6.6.1) and a quantum
linearization approach (Sec. 6.6.2). Each of these techniques will give
us a set of coupled differential equations for expectations of quantum
operators. The number of equations scales only polynomially11 in
N and so is much more manageable than the numerical methods
considered in Appendix E.1, E.2 and used in previous sections.
10 Even taking each mode as a qubit cannot help, as the total Hilbert space size is 2N
which remains intractable for N large.
11 Rather than the exponential scaling of the Lindblad master equation 6.44, see Ap-
pendix E.
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6.6.1 Meanfield approach
To illustrate the first of these approaches, let us use our master equa-

























which is an exact differential equation for 〈â〉 in terms of first- and
third-order expectations. Analogously, equations for second-order




will involve second- and fourth-order
expectations. As we noted in the discussion around Eq. 6.8, this system
of equations is not closed. In fact, when equations for expectations of
third- or fourth- order operator products are derived, we see that they
must be written in terms of fifth- and sixth- order operators, and so
on. This yields an infinite hierarchy of coupled differential equations
of progressively higher orders. We must seek a simplification.
If we write â ≈ 〈â〉 and substitute in to Eq. 6.47 we see terms
second-order or higher becoming much easier to handle. This allows
us to simplify higher order terms, for example:
〈â†ââ〉 ≈ 〈â†〉 〈â〉 〈â〉 , (6.48)
and so Eq. 6.47 becomes
d
dt
〈â〉 (t) = −iga 〈ĉ0〉− i
U
2
〈â†〉 〈â〉 〈â〉− Γ
2
〈â〉 (6.49)
solely in terms of first-order expectations12. The differential equations










|〈â〉|2 = −Γ 〈â†〉 〈â〉− i 〈â†〉 〈ĉ0〉+ i 〈â〉 〈ĉ†0〉 (6.50)
and so the system is completely specified by N+ 2 differential equa-




. . . . We display this full sys-
tem of equations in Appendix E.5.
The approximation â ≈ 〈â〉 is known as the mean-field approxima-
tion, which treats our quantum system as a quasi-classical one. This
system may be readily solved with any standard numerical package,
and we display the evolution of photon-number expectation 〈n̂−〉
in Fig. 6.21 for the multi-mode model (dashed). We include also be-
haviour of the single-mode model (solid), for comparison. We see that
even in the mean-field approximation, nonlinear decay due to NCL
may be observed. The slight discrepancy between single- and multi-
mode models for large initial amplitudes is due to finite (nonzero)
decay time for mode s+, and the impact of the tail.
12 Note that each expectation 〈â〉 is just a c-number.
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Figure 6.21: Nonlinear decay is observed even in mean-field approximation.
Solid: single-mode model. Dashed: multi-mode model. Initial
coherent states with 〈n̂−〉 (0) = 1.7×109, 1.4×109, 7.2×108 and
2.4× 108 were initialised in mode s−. Linear loss γ1 = 11.5, ga
and gb optimal and gc = 60m−1. U = 8.5× 10−8. Full systems
of equations are shown in Sec. E.3 for single-mode, and Sec. E.5
for multi-mode models.
While the mean-field approach is useful for observing the effect
of nonlinear decay, it cannot give any insight into the squeezing of



















which is identically 0. Note that in this equation we have implicitly
used a subtle feature of the mean-field approximation. Since the mean-
field approximation cannot capture phenomena arising from different
ordering of operators, we must specify that the approximation only
applies to expectations of normal-ordered operators.
6.6.2 Higher-order linearization
Since the mean-field approximation cannot capture the dynamics of
Q we must consider a different approach in order to reduce the order
of Eq. 6.47. We will adopt a linearization approach which is typical
for consideration of non-linear waveguide systems [224–226]. This is
essentially a linearization of the quantum correction to the previous
mean-field approach. We will derive the approach and then provide
useful formulae which can be substituted into Eq. 6.47 and any similar
equation.
Consider arbitrary quantum operators A,B,C. We will explicitly
demonstrate how 〈ABC〉 may be simplified, and then display the
results for a generalization to expectations of fourth-order operator
products.
6.6 multi-mode model 205
Let us expand each operator A,B,C into a mean-field term and a
quantum fluctuation term: A = 〈A〉+ δA, and we take 〈δA〉 = 0 to
ensure that 〈A〉 is well-defined. It is important to note that the 〈A〉
derived here in general behave differently to those derived in the
mean-field approach. Substituting these expansions into 〈ABC〉,
〈ABC〉 =
〈A〉 〈B〉 〈C〉+ 〈A〉 〈δBδC〉+ 〈B〉 〈δAδC〉+ 〈C〉 〈δAδB〉+ 〈δAδBδC〉 .
(6.51)
A key tool which we require is the cumulant expansion [227] for a set
of generic operators {O1, . . . ,On},











where P denotes all disjoint partitions of the set {O1, . . . ,On}, |P|
denotes the number of blocks in partition P, and p iterates over each
block in the partition. For example,
C (X, Y,Z) = 〈XYZ〉+ 2 〈X〉 〈Y〉 〈Z〉− 〈X〉 〈YZ〉− 〈Y〉 〈XZ〉− 〈Z〉 〈XY〉 .
(6.53)
We perform our linearization approximation on Eq. 6.51 by specifying
that C (δA, δB, δC) = 0, which implies additionally that 〈δAδBδC〉 = 0,
since 〈δA〉 = 〈δB〉 = 〈δC〉 = 0 by definition. Finally, using δA =
A− 〈A〉 we arrive at our final expression:
〈ABC〉 ≈ 〈A〉 〈BC〉+ 〈B〉 〈AC〉+ 〈C〉 〈AB〉− 2 〈A〉 〈B〉 〈C〉 . (6.54)
Expectations of higher-order operator products may be calculated
in the same way, with the only requirements assumed about the
fluctuations being the zero-mean condition 〈δA〉 = · · · = 〈δZ〉 = 0 and
the assumption on the cumulant of δ-operators14.
The replacement for fourth-order operators is derived similarly,
〈ABCD〉 ≈ 〈AB〉 〈CD〉+ 〈AC〉 〈BD〉+ 〈AD〉 〈BC〉− 2 〈A〉 〈B〉 〈C〉 〈D〉
(6.55)
while the replacements for fifth- and sixth-order operators are not





〈â〉− iga 〈ĉ0〉+2iU 〈â†〉 〈â〉 〈â〉−2iU 〈â〉 〈â†â〉− iU 〈â†〉 〈ââ〉 ,
(6.56)
and equations for the remaining expectations are calculated likewise.
The full system of equations is shown in Sec. E.6.
14 e.g. for a truncation of the system of equations to third-order, one would instead set
C (δA, δB, δC) 6= 0 but C (δA, δB, δC, δD) = 0, and so on.
15 Each expansion is derived identically to the third- and fourth-order expressions, but
the fifth-order one contains 26 terms, while the sixth-order one contains 31 terms.
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Figure 6.22: With the realistic parameters U = 8.5 × 10−8, gc = 60m−1,
tail length N = 28 and optimal coupling ratio Eq. 6.41, the
mode s− quickly evolves to a strongly sub-Poissonian state. A
coherent state with average photon number 〈s†−s−〉 is initialized
in mode s−, and all other modes are initialized into the vacuum.
(a) The dot-dashed, solid, dotted, and dashed lines correspond
to initial photon numbers 1.7 × 109, 1.2 × 109, 7.2 × 108 and
2.4× 108, respectively. We take linear loss rate γ1 = 11.5m−1.
Inset: the evolution of photon-number expectation, exhibiting
the nonlinear decay behaviour of the NCL mechanism. (b) The
Mandel Q parameter remains strongly negative even in the
presence of realistic linear loss γ1. The dashed, solid, dotted and
dot-dashed lines correspond to γ1 = 0.0, 11.5, 20.0, and 40m−1,
respectively, and 〈s†−s−〉 = 1.2× 109.
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We may rotate our output equations into the collective s−, s+ basis
and write Q as
QLinearized [ ˆs−] =




We plot the Mandel Q parameter of mode s− in Fig. 6.22 and observe
the characteristic Q < 0 behaviour we are aiming for. Even at realistic
parameters of small U and large γ1, desirable Q ∼ −0.8 is attainable
over short timescales for an initial bright coherent state containing
1.7× 109 photons. This corresponds to an input pulse energy of ap-
proximately 320 pJ. The feasibility of these energy levels in the context
of our setup is confirmed by the recent work Ref. [228] where waveg-
uides were written using femtosecond pulses with energy greater than
10 nJ at comparable wavelengths.
In Fig. 6.22a we see that the linearized multi-mode model qualita-
tively obtains the same scaling behaviour of better Q with increasing
input α, while γ1 in Fig. 6.22b causes Q to decay to zero. In the in-
set of (a) we observe the nonlinear decay characteristic of NCL. The
photon-number decay was reproducible in the mean-field approach,
while our new linearization approximation allows Q to be captured.
6.6.3 Comparison to single-mode model
Finally, we return to the single-mode model, Eq. 6.37, in order to
demonstrate the accuracy of our linearization approach. We have
demonstrated already that both mean-field and linearization approaches
are accurate at modelling the non-linear decay of photon number ex-
pectation, and so in Fig. 6.23 we make a comparison of Q under both
the linearization approach derived in Sec. 6.6.2 and quantum Monte
Carlo on Eq. 6.37. We refer to the reader to Appendix E.1 for more
information about this numerical method.
The linearization approximation (dashed lines) accurately predicts
the evolution of Q over the initial stages of evolution, and actually
underestimates |Q| in the later stages. Including realistic γ1 allows the
approximation to remain accurate as the nonclassical output state is
pushed towards the vacuum. Since when γ1 = 0 the linearization ap-
proximation remains accurate over the timescales of interest, and since
the presence of realistic losses makes the approximation increasingly
accurate, we may confidently apply the linearization approach over
the parameter regimes of interest – short times and realistic loss – even
in the case of a large number of modes. Indeed, we may even expect
linearization to be more accurate in the multi-mode case than in the
single-mode case, since the largest multi-mode expectation which is
truncated is originally of fourth-order, as opposed to sixth-order for
single-mode.
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Figure 6.23: Evolution of the Mandel Q parameter is accurately predicted
by the linearization method over the initial stages of evolu-
tion, while |Q| is underestimated at later stages. Dashed: lin-
earized approximation. Solid: exact solution Eq. 6.37, via quan-
tum Monte Carlo. U = 2g and Γ = 432g. (a) Initial photon
number 〈n̂−〉 = 100, 300, 500, 700 (top to bottom), with γ1 = 0.
(b) Initial photon number 〈n̂−〉 = 500, γ1 = 0, 20g, 200g, 400g
(bottom to top). With realistic linear loss rates γ1 our lineariza-
tion approximation remains accurate even in the late stages of
evolution. Both graphs use the same time scaling gt as Fig. 6.14
(g = 1), and solid lines are identical to Fig. 6.14.
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We have observed that even the full multi-mode model of the PhoG
device, with realistic U = 8.5× 10−8 and large linear loss γ1, is capa-
ble of producing highly sub-Poissonian light at the output. The main
feature of our system which we have exploited is that NCL dominates
(i) over short timescales, and (ii) for large photon number. By increas-
ing the input coherent state amplitude we force ourselves into the
regime of NCL. The amplitudes require pulse energies ∼ 320 pJ which
is feasible in similar glasses to IG2 [228].
6.7 modal entanglement
In the previous sections we have observed one of the remarkable fea-
tures of our device: that strong linear loss on one mode of a multimode
system, Kerr nonlinearity which is present in χ(3) materials, and linear
coupling, can be arranged and configured in order to simulate useful
loss operators. When no linear loss is present in the signal modes of
the system, we are able to deterministically generate a single-photon
steady-state at the output, while bright strongly sub-Poissonian states
are attainable even in the presence of linear loss. We have simulated




in our system, which required very
asymmetric coupling ga  gb or ga  gb (c.f. Eq. 6.38).
In this section, we will explore the quantum effects which occur
when this asymmetry is not met. Let us return to the two-mode model
of the PhoG device (Eq. 6.33, Fig. 6.16) and set ga = gb. This will
mean that the rate γNCL of NCL simulated by this model is now zero,
and so we cannot expect to reach strongly sub-Poissonian light, except
in the limit16 γ1 → 0.
Figure 6.24: Two-mode model of PhoG device. (a) Collective basis s−, s+,
Eq. 6.33. (b) Signal basis a,b, Eq. 6.31
However, even this symmetric system exhibiting two-photon ab-
sorption can be useful for generation of non-classical states. We will
demonstrate that a symmetric PhoG device is capable to produce
entanglement shared between signal modes a and b. The system we
16 The steady-state of Â = â2 has Q = −0.5
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consider is displayed in Fig. 6.24. Because we wish to allow for large
photon-numbers, we must resort to the linearized model described
in Sec. 6.6.2. This leaves us in a perfect position to access first- and
second-order expectations of creation and annihilation operators, and
thus consider the Gaussian entanglement shared between modes a
and b [13, 229, 230].
We proceed as follows. After using our linearization method to
solve for expectations of the form 〈â〉, 〈â†â〉, 〈âb̂〉, etc., we transform
these quantities into expectations of quadrature operators, Eq. 1.21.






















































Therefore, we can to construct a covariance matrix σ which describes
the quadrature correlations between modes a and b [13]. The matrix


















d = [x̂a, p̂a, x̂b, p̂b].
The Gaussian entanglement between modes a and b may then be
calculated in terms of σj,k via the Gaussian logarithmic negativity,
NG [229, 230]. This entanglement measure NG quantifies the extent
to which the state ρ described by σ fails the positive partial transpose
(PPT) criterion [230, 231]. Taking the positive partial transpose of mode





and we write σ̃ as this transformed covariance matrix corresponding
to ρTB .
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where λ̃ is the smallest symplectic eigenvalue of σ̃.







(0) = 2500, U = 2g, γc = 15g, γ1 = 11.5g and symmetric
coupling ga = gb = 60g (we take g = 1), the system evolves to
NG ≈ 1.25 within t ∼ 0.01g, while modes a and b each contain
approximately 18 photons. The maximally entangled state (TMSV
Eq. 1.51) requires squeezing parameter ζ = 0.62 and thermal photon
number n̄ = 0.44 to give the same NG, while a TMSV with n̄ = 18
gives NG = 4.3.
Thus, we see that the symmetric PhoG is able to generate entangle-
ment between modes a and b over the intial stages of dynamics, even
though it cannot produce photon-number squeezing.
17 Note the similarities between this and the logarithmic negativity [231] which is
defined directly in terms of ρTB .
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.25: Attainable logarithmic negativities NG in the symmetric two-
mode PhoG device. (a) Modes a and b each initialized in coher-
ent states with 200 photons. Symmetric coupling ga = gb = 10,
Γ = 432 U = 2.0 for comparison with Fig. 6.13. γ1 = 0, 5, 10, 20,
200, 400m−1. (top to bottom). (b) Modes a and b each initial-
ized in coherent states with 2500 photons. Symmetric coupling




In this Chapter we have introduced and analysed a device, which we
name PhoG, which is capable to produce highly non-classical states
at its output. The device requires just a coherent state at the input.
Depending on whether the device is configured with asymmetric
signal mode coupling (Secs. 6.2-6.6) or symmetric signal mode cou-
pling (Sec. 6.7) the device produces either a strongly photon-number
squeezed (sub-Poissonian) state, or an entangled state. In the limit of
no linear loss, γ1 → 0, the sub-Poissonian output of the asymmetric
PhoG tends towards a single-photon Fock state. However, even with
realistic loss and realistic levels of nonlinearity, the device is predicted
to create bright output states which are strongly sub-Poissonian, with
feasible predicted Mandel parameter Q & −0.8.
The device relies on realising an exotic form of dissipation, known
as Nonlinear Coherent Loss (NCL), and which is simulated in our
realistic multi-mode system via strong linear loss (realised by the
waveguide “tail”) and Kerr nonlinearity. Our hierarchy of models
agree in their observation of the two key behaviours of NCL and so
we are confident that Q < 0 should be observable in a full, finished
device. Our design of the PhoG device with a system of waveguides
laser-inscribed into bulk IG2 glass should serve as a practical design
for such deterministic sources of non-classicality. Since the glass is
comparatively inexpensive, since the device itself relatively easy to
produce, and since coherent states are deemed a “cheap” quantum
state to use, the PhoG device can find applications as a ready source
of nonclassicality for different imaging, measurement and metrology
tasks [232, 233].
In future work, we desire to undertake further modelling of the
realistic multimode PhoG device described in Sec. 6.6, in order to relax
several simplifying assumptions which we have made in this chapter.
The assumption made in Sec. 6.5, that the pulse shape is unchanging
over the course of evolution, seems unrealistic in a realistic system
in which linear (evanescent) coupling, self-phase modulation and
dispersion are all present. It should therefore be directly verified what
impact the inclusion of these effects has in a system where the pulse
shape is permitted to change. Furthermore, the pulse durations of
approx 100 fs considered in this Chapter are on the threshold for when
higher-order effects such as Raman scattering should be considered.
We have recently begun some preliminary work on this question.
In particular, we have begun investigating the spectral and temporal
properties of a pulse in a system identical to the multi-mode one,
Sec. 6.6, including chromatic dispersion, self-phase modulation and
self-steepening. We solve the so-called nonlinear Schrödinger equation
(NLSE):



























where Aj (z, τ) is the pulse envelope in the jth waveguide, γ1 is the





ω0 is the carrier frequency of the pulse, gj,k describes coupling be-
tween waveguide j and waveguide k, and the β are the first-, second-,
and third-order dispersion terms. The propagation direction is z and
this equation is valid in a frame co-moving with the pulse, with intra-
pulse coordinate τ. This equation may be solved via the split-step
Fourier method [197].
One should note that Eq. 6.60 is an entirely classical equation de-
scribing the evolution of the pulse’s envelope A, and so cannot give us
direct information about quantum effects such as the photon-number
statistics or entanglement properties. However we have begun to ob-
serve NL decay of the pulse energies contained within the signal
modes [221], and this provides a hopeful signature that NCL may
indeed be present.
There are several methods which may be used to quantize Eq. 6.60,
such as the back-propagation method [234–236] or a coarse-grained
approach [224, 226, 237–239]. An immediate next step will be to
employ either of these methods and check whether we indeed observe
a Mandel parameter Q < 0. The coarse-grained approach has been
successfully applied to similar systems and it has been observed [226]
that a similar setup can induce spectral entanglement within the pulse.
If this can be observed for our PhoG device it will be another proof
of its versatility to generate a broad array of nonclassical behaviours,
deterministically from a quasi-classical input.
Part III
A P P E N D I C E S

A
C RY P T O G R A P H Y: T H E R M A L N O I S E C H A N N E L
In this Appendix we will demonstrate how channel thermal noise
affects honest players’ measurement outcomes. This will allow us to
give an expression for the excess noise ξ as it is modelled in this
Thesis.
In Appendix B we introduce an expansion of the coherent state in
Fock basis, and use it to demonstrate that enacting a beamsplitter on a
coherent state gives a product of coherent states at output. It turns out
to be analytically tricky to perform similar operations in the presence
of thermal noise (though it is entirely numerically feasible).
Our main tool will be the Wigner function representation of the
quantum states. We will introduce various quantities and relations as
we need them, but the reader is referred to Refs. [1, 14, 36] for a more
thorough discussion of where such quantities come from. Our strategy
is to mix a coherent state with a thermal state on a beamsplitter, which
will model the channel. We will then heterodyne on the output in
order to give a final expression for the measurement outcomes.
modelling the channel A coherent state |α〉 with complex
amplitude α = (q0 + ip0) /
√























The total input Wigner function to the beamsplitter is therefore
Winput (q1,p1;q2,p2) =Wcoh (q1,p1)Wthermal (q2,p2) . (A.3)
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In other words, the beamsplitter simply enacts a rotation on the
quadrature variables, and the output Wigner function takes the same
form as the input Wigner function in the rotated quadratures. We have
τ =
√
T and ρ =
√
1− T where T is the channel transmission.













× exp [Bq2 ]× terms in p, (A.6)








1+ 2n̄ (1− T)
. (A.7)
In the protocols discussed in the main Thesis body, the transmitted
state is given to the honest player, while the dishonest player receives
the reflected state. Tracing out the reflected state (mode 2) we arrive at
Whonest (q,p) =
1















1+ 2n̄ (1− T)
 ,
(A.8)
as the state held by the honest player after the thermal channel.
heterodyne measurement The honest player performs hetero-
dyne measurement on their state. As we saw in Sec. 1.4.2, heterodyne
measurement corresponds to projection onto a coherent state [13, 14].
It will be illustrative to show that this is equivalent to a “double-
homodyne” setup.
To perform the double-homodyne measurement, the state will be
split at on a balanced beamsplitter. Homodyne detection in q is per-
formed on one output arm, while homodyne detection in p is per-
formed on the other output arm.
The calculation proceeds identically to the previous section: rotation
of quadrature variables then tracing out the unwanted mode. The first
output mode from the balanced beamsplitter is then given by
W1 (q,p) =
1

















1+ n̄ (1− T)
 ,
(A.9)
and the second output mode is identical.
Ideal homodyne measurement corresponds to projection onto a
quadrature eigenstate, i.e. 〈q|ρ|q〉 [13, 14]. It can be shown [1] that in
cryptography : thermal noise channel 219








−∞ dq dp W1 (q,p)W2 (q,p) , (A.10)
where the F̂1, F̂2 are arbitrary operators, and their corresponding
Wigner functions are W1,W2.




e2ip(q1−q)δ (q1 − q) (A.11)
where δ (q1 − q) is the Dirac delta function, and the overall Wigner
function is derived by substituting ρ = |q1〉〈q1| into Wigner’s formula
Eq. 1.28 and using 〈q|q′〉 = δ (q− q′).
The probability to receive homodyne outcome qout = x on W1 is
then
P (x) = tr [|x〉〈x| ρ] = 1√









1+ n̄ (1− T)
 .
(A.12)
Similarly, the probability to measure y on the other output mode is
P (y) = tr [|y〉〈y| ρ] = 1√









1+ n̄ (1− T)
 .
(A.13)
Defining the complex variable z = x + iy, and noting that P (z) =
P (x)P (y), we arrive at
P (z) =
1




1+ n̄ (1− T)
 , (A.14)
where we have used α = (q0 + ip0) /
√
2.
The equation A.14 is the probability of heterodyne measurement
giving z, when an input coherent state α is distributed through a
thermal noise channel, transmission T and thermal photon number
n̄. Setting n̄ = 0, Eq. A.14 reduces to the noiseless case which is used
already in the Thesis body.
For a QDS protocol the probability perr may be calculated via
Eq. A.14 identically to the Thesis body.
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Excess noise
We define the excess noise ξ as the measured variance of a state above
the vacuum level. In Ch. 5 we defined it as




where clearly from Eq. A.12 (setting n̄ = 0) the vacuum variance is
1/2. The variance in position homodyne measurement outcome is
1+ n̄ (1− T)
2
, (A.16)





with an equivalent expression for ξp. In Chs. 3, 4 we assume that





Finally, we note that ξ depends both on n̄ and T . For a given ξ the
corresponding n̄ varies with T , and fixing n̄ will give drastically
different behaviour from fixing ξ. Thus, we are careful to distinguish
between channels for which n̄ is fixed and those for which ξ is fixed.
B
C RY P T O G R A P H Y: N U M E R I C A L M E T H O D S
b.1 truncation
In this Appendix we display the full form of the quantum states which
are used in Chapter. 3 to analyse eavesdropping attacks. Each state is
calculated as described in Sec. 3.6, and is conditioned on the honest
player possessing c = qout + ipout ∈ C, for heterodyne outcomes
qout,pout.
We denote each state as ρ̃B | c , where B denotes that the state
belongs to dishonest Bob, while B | c makes explicit that this state
depends on c. Since each state ρ̃B | c is a conditional quantum state








= P (c) is the
probability that Charlie measures c. The tilde denotes that the state is
sub-normalized, and we will define the normalized state as




It is the normalized forms ρB | c which are used in the main body of
this Thesis.
Each of the states required to calculate Holevo information χ in-
volves sums of the form ∞∑
n=0
, (B.2)
since each state lives in a Hilbert space H with a countably infinite
dimensionality |H|. It is impossible to exactly encode such a state
numerically, and so we must resort to a truncation of the Hilbert space







We will briefly discuss such truncation again in Appendix E in the
context of the PhoG chapter. It is still an open question [141] as to
whether this will afford an eavesdropper additional powers. In lieu
of an answer to this, whenever we numerically encode any of the
following states we will choose |H| large enough such that the state
living on the truncated space is normalized. Additionally, in each
of the calculations in the main body of this Thesis, we gradually
increased the Hilbert space size |H| until we converged to a a constant
output χ which does not further vary with |H|. For a coherent state
amplitude α 6 2 we typically chose |H| . 10, though we note that
often much smaller |H| were often possible (Tab. E.1). We note that this
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strategy is the same one as was adopted in the recent state-of-the-art
work Ref. [141].
Each of the following expressions for output states ρ̃B | c were
encoded in the displayed Fock basis in a custom script1 in Mathemat-
ica 11.3. The overall state is then a matrix in M|H|×|H| (C). The Von
Neumann entropy S () of the state is found by taking eigenvalues and
using Eq. 1.83.
b.2 attack bs0
Beamsplitter attack BS0 is described in Sec. 3.6.1. The total input state


















is Alice’s input coherent state, with αk chosen from the QPSK alphabet.
Enacting beamsplitter relation Eq. 1.57 on ρinput and performing
heterodyne detection on Charlie’s mode, we arrive at
























|n− l〉〈m− l|. (B.6)
Rearranging2 the summation indices we arrive at Eq. 3.41 from the
main body.
b.3 attack bs1
Beamsplitter attack BS1 is described in Sec. 3.6.1. The total input state






|αk〉〈αk|A ⊗ ρthermal. (B.7)
with
1 Making extensive use of the SparseArray[] function for speed.
2 See e.g. page 142 of Ref. [3]























Enacting beamsplitter relation Eq. 1.57 on ρinput and heterodyning on
Charlie’s mode we arrive at












































(n+ p− k1 − k2)!
×
√
(m+ p− l1 − l2)! |n+ p− k1 − k2〉〈m+ p− l1 − l2| . (B.9)
b.4 attack ec
Entangling cloner attack EC is described in Sec. 3.6.2. The total input






|αk〉〈αk|A ⊗ |TMSV〉〈TMSV|B , (B.10)
















(tanh ζ)n |n,n〉B . (B.12)
Enacting beamsplitter relation Eq. 1.55 on ρinput and heterodyning on
Charlie’s mode, we arrive at































)n2+m2−k2−l2 √(n1 +n2 − k1 − k2)!√(m1 +m2 − l1 − l2)!
k1!k2!l1!l2! (n1 − k1)! (n2 − k2)! (m1 − l1)! (m2 − l2)!
× |n1 +n2 − k1 − k2〉〈m1 +m2 − l1 − l2|⊗ |n2〉〈m2| . (B.13)

C
C RY P T O G R A P H Y: L A R G E R Q D S A L P H A B E T S
In this appendix we will demonstrate how the QDS protocol discussed
in Chapter 3 may be modified to allow for a general NPSK alphabet
of N coherent states equally distributed around the origin of phase
space. We display an example of an NPSK alphabet in Fig. 1.4. For
reasons which will become clear, we are forced to take N = 2k,k ∈N.
The QPSK alphabet used throughout this Thesis is simply an NPSK
alphabet with N = 4.
During the protocol with NPSK alphabet, Bob and Charlie eliminate
precisely N/2 coherent states to form their eliminated signature, using
the same strategy as in Fig. 3.4. This means for example that the
integration limits used for a particular eliminated signature element
should vary. Besides this, the running of the protocol remains identical.
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(C.1)
once we have taken into account that H
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∣∣ φj) 6 h (pe) and the fact that Bob and Charlie eliminate
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where we have taken into account the ability to relabel elements yjn of
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follows immediately (c.f. Eq. 3.40).









must also be altered to reflect the NPSK alphabet. Alice’s input state






from which all other quantities may be calculated.
We display the signature length L under several different NPSK
alphabets in Fig. C.1. At each channel transmission T the signature
length has been optimized over α. Choosing an alphabet size larger
than N = 4 decreases the optimal αopt while slightly increasing the
required signature length L. As the alphabet size increases it be-
comes closer to a Gaussian distribution, and so the beamsplitter and
entangling-cloner attacks become increasingly optimal. The largest
jump in protocol efficiency occurs from N = 2 to N = 4.
Figure C.1: Signature length L under QDS protocol discussed in Chapter 3
under BS0 attack. At each T , length L has been optimized over
amplitude |α| of the alphabet. We have considered NPSK alpha-
bets with N = 2, 4, 6, 8. Dot-dashed: N = 2. Black, solid: N = 4.
Dashed: N = 6. Gray, solid: N = 8. Inset: the corresponding
optimal αopt.
D
P H O G : A D I A B AT I C E L I M I N AT I O N
In this appendix we will derive Eq. D.14 which is used in Sec. 6.4 to
simplify the analytical description of a multi-mode bosonic system
when one of the modes takes its steady-state. Our analysis will use
notation following Ref. [216].
Consider a system involving a highly lossy bosonic mode, c. We
assume that c decays into a Markovian reservoir with decay rate γ,
and that the system contains additional modes with possible losses,
couplings and nonlinearities.
After t  1/γ the mode c is empty, and it is assumed that this
timescale is much faster than all other timescales in the system. Then,
for t 1/γ the mode c can be assumed to be in its steady-state and
so, for example, ddt ĉ = 0. This will be used in order to simplify the
description of our original system.














where ρ is the density matrix describing the entire system and Ĥ is the
system’s Hamiltonian, on which we will later derive some restrictions.
The term proportional to γ denotes strong loss of mode c into the
reservoir, and the term in Γ denotes potential other sources of loss
which do not affect c. We shall ignore terms in Γj until the very last
step, since they do not affect our analysis and will always be present.
It is easiest to proceed in Heisenberg picture, and so we transform
to the adjoint master equation [15] which describes the evolution of


















and expand Ĥ and Â in terms of normal-ordered powers of creation

















Operators Ĥ(p,q), Â(p,q) are, in general, operators acting on the re-
maining modes of the system. Let us take Eqs. D.3, D.4 and substitute
into Eq. D.2. Grouping terms in ĉ†, ĉ we see that
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d
dt







+ terms in γ, Γ .
(D.5)




A(p,q) (t) c†pcq = i
∑
p,q,k,l
F (p,q,k, l; t) c†pcqc†kcl+ terms in γ, Γ ,
(D.6)
where
F (p,q,k, l; t) = H(k,l)A(p,q) (t) −A(p,q) (t)H(k,l).
The differential equation for A(0,0) is such that there are no operators
in mode c remaining on the right hand side of Eq. D.6. Clearly this
occurs when p = q = k = l = 0. It can also occur for other values of
p,q,k, l, owing to constant terms appearing via the commutators of ĉ
operators. Additionally, since the Lindblad operator L is second-order
in ĉ we can see immediately that there will be no terms proportional
to γ in the equation for A(0,0).
Writing Eq. D.6 in normal order using the commutator,
d
dt




F (p,q,k, l; t) c†pc†kcqcl







we observe that additional contributions to A(0,0) are possible when














= 9c†c†cc+ 18c†c+ 6,
... (D.8)
while commutators with q 6= k cannot give a constant term.
For ease, and because the largest terms considered in Ch. 6 are of
the form c†c†cc we will restrict ourselves to 0 6 q,k 6 2. This gives
d
dt




+ F (0, 1, 1, 0) + 2F (0, 2, 2, 0)
)
,









+ 2H(0,2)A(2,0) − 2A(0,2)H(2,0)
)
. (D.9)
Let us return to Eq. D.2 and substitute Eq. D.4 into the γ term. By






















since A(p,q) is dominated by the decay. Assuming that t is such that
A(p,q) has reached its steady-state we set ddtA
(p,q) = 0 and so






provided that p 6= 0 or q 6= 0. By substituting this equation for A(p,q)











































This Eq. D.14 is our key equation for performing the adiabatic elimi-
nation of the highly lossy mode1. The recipe to apply it to a general
system is to identify the H(0,0) and H(0,p) terms, which can take
arbitrary form, and then substitute them into Eq. D.14. The only re-
quirement for the use of Eq. D.14 is that Ĥ must have its largest term
in lossy mode c of the form ĉ†ĉ†ĉĉ, i.e. two creation and two annihila-
tion operators. More general forms of Eq. D.14 may be considered by





has constant term n!, allowing for different maximum combinations
of ĉ operators
1 Mode ĉ in Chapter 6.

E
P H O G : N U M E R I C A L M E T H O D S
In this appendix we will briefly overview the numerical methods
which are used in Chapter 6. The first two methods, direct integration
in Sec. E.1, and quantum Monte Carlo in Sec. E.2, are standard meth-
ods for handling the Lindblad master equation. The final two methods,
mean-field and linearization, Secs. E.3, E.4, E.5, E.6, are discussed at
length in the main body of the Thesis, Sec. 6.6, and so we will just
reproduce the final systems of equations in this Appendix.
e.1 direct integration
The dynamics of a quantum system coupled to a reservoir is governed






















where Ĥ acts only on ρ and Ĉn are the collapse operators governing
decay into the reservoir. Here we take Ĉn =
√
γnÂn where Ân is an
operator acting on ρ. This is the operator through which ρ couples to
the reservoir in the original system-reservoir Schrödinger equation.
The derivation of this Lindblad equation including requisite approx-
imations is discussed extensively in many canonical texts such as
Refs. [6, 15].
There are many routes which one can take to solve Eq. E.1. One such
approach is to interpret ρ, Ĥ and Ĉn as matrices. Let our underlying
Hilbert-space be denoted H and have dimension |H|. Then ρ, Ĥ and
Ĉn each have dimension |H|
2 and may be interpreted as a matrices
in M|H|×|H| (C). In this approach, the Lindblad equation E.1 can
be interpreted as a coupled system of |H|2 first-order ODEs, which
can then be solved via an appropriate numerical method [240], the
efficiency and power of which will depend strongly on the choices of
Ĥ, Ĉn and initial condition ρ (0).
It should be noted that such an approach will only ever give an
approximation to the true systems which we study in this Thesis.
The key reason for this is that the quantum states we begin with are









where |n〉 is the n-photon Fock state. The sum in Eq. E.2 runs from
zero to infinity and so the required Hilbert space size is countably
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has both |〈ψ|ψ〉|2 ≈ 1 and 〈α|ψ〉 ≈ 1. Thus, truncating the countable
Hilbert space to a large but finite one should be possible. In this
Thesis we use truncation values such that all states are appropriately
normalized and that no ill effects are introduced from the truncation
to a finite |H|. A good rule-of-thumb is to pick
|H| > d2α2e (E.4)
which ensures that the coherent state Eq. E.3 is correctly normalized
and a good approximation of the full Eq. E.2. For all simulationsNwas
then increased until there was no change in the resulting dynamics.
In this Thesis we make use of open-source QuTiP package1 [241] in
Python to perform such numerical solutions. The coherent state must
be defined in QuTiP specifying the “analytic” option to qutip.coherent_dm,
which ensures that |α〉〈α| uses the expression Eq. E.3. The default op-
tion, “operator,” instead finds the eigenstate of annihilation operator
â. As |H|→∞ these two forms of coherent state become equivalent,
but for small |H| they can differ significantly. We have found that the
analytic form gives much more accurate behaviour in the parame-
ter ranges considered and requires smaller |H| to give an accurate
representation of the resulting dynamics.
Direct integration of the ODE system is performed using the qutip.mesolve
command, which itself calls scipy.integrate.ode. On a standard
home-use laptop2 a single-mode system with |H| = 35, initial ρ (0)
a coherent state with α = 3.0, decay rate γ = 1.0, collapse operator
â and free Hamiltonian Ĥ = ωâ†â with ω = 1.0 can be solved in3
41.7 ms ±11.7 ms. Setting |H| = 50 takes 92.6± 3 ms, |H| = 200 takes
829 ms ±191 ms.





tional power required, and |H| = 35 takes 11.3 s ±1.64 s, and |H| = 100
takes 110 s. We see then that this approach is highly dependent on
both the form of Ĥ, Ĉn and the Hilbert-space size. Indeed, a Hilbert
space size |H| yields |H|2 coupled ODEs4 to solve. We compare tim-
ings between direct integration and quantum Monte Carlo methods
in Tab. E.1.
1 QuTiP version 4.4.1; Numpy version 1.16.4; Scipy version 1.3.1; Cython version 0.29.13;
Matplotlib version 3.1.0; Python version 3.7.4.
2 Intel(R) Core(TM) i5− 3230M CPU @2.60 GHz; 8.00 GB RAM.
3 Timed via iPython %timeit magic command.
4 Including more modes in our model means the number of equations increases even
faster. For two modes, living on Hilbert spaces HA,HB, the total system size is
|HA ⊗HB| = |HA|× |HB|.
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e.2 quantum monte carlo
We have seen that direct integration of Eq. E.1 requires a system of
|H|
2 coupled ODEs to be simultaneously solved. This is possible in
the limit of small |H|, but quickly becomes difficult as |H| increases.
An alternative approach does not solve a matrix differential equation,
rather a vector one, and so instead scales as |H|.
We will outline the quantum Monte Carlo (QMC) approach and then
discuss its implementation and use in this Thesis. The key principle




|ψ〉 = Ĥ |ψ〉 , (E.5)
instead of the Lindblad equation. The Schrödinger equation is an
equation for ket vector |ψ〉 rather than density matrix |ψ〉〈ψ|, and so
requires fewer computational resources. The Hamiltonian Ĥ = Ĥeff
should be chosen as
Ĥeff = Ĥsys + Ĥnon-Hermitian (E.6)
where Ĥsys is the system Hamiltonian, identical to the Ĥ used in the







is a non-Hermitian Hamiltonian which causes dissipation to the state
|ψ〉 via collapse operators Ĉn. The non-Hermitian Hamiltonian does
not conserve the norm of |ψ〉. QuTiP leverages this behaviour into the
following algorithm which models a single trajectory of evolution of
|ψ〉 [242–245].
Choose a number r ∈ (0, 1) uniformly at random. This number
is related to the collapse probability of |ψ〉 caused by the Ĉn. The
Schrödinger equation Eq. E.5 is numerically integrated5 and the norm
〈ψ (t)|ψ (t)〉 is monitored.
At time τ such that 〈ψ (τ)|ψ (τ)〉 = r, project |ψ (τ)〉 onto Ĉn |ψ (τ)〉
and re-normalize. This is referred to as a “jump”. So
|ψ (τ)〉 → Ĉn |ψ
(τ)〉√
〈ψ (τ)| Ĉ†nĈn |ψ (τ)〉
. (E.8)
Draw another r ∈ (0, 1) and continue the evolution using the new |ψ〉
as the starting point. This process is repeated until the entire temporal
range is covered. This gives us a single trajectory of the evolution of
|ψ〉.
The above procedure is repeated many times, and observables
should be averaged6 over many trajectories. It can be shown that this
5 QuTiP calls scipy.integrate.ode
6 Simply using numpy.mean at each timestep
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procedure implements the corresponding Lindblad master equation [1,
242] by noticing that the evolution from |ψ (t)〉〈ψ (t)| to |ψ (t+∆t)〉〈ψ (t+∆t)|
is effectively a mixture over whether a jump occurred or not:
|ψ〉〈ψ| (t+∆t) = ∆P
∣∣ψJump〉〈ψJump∣∣+ (1−∆P) ∣∣ψNo Jump〉〈ψNo Jump∣∣
(E.9)
The state |ψJump〉 is given by Eq. E.8, while |ψNo Jump〉 is found by
explicitly enacting the non-Hermitian effective Hamiltonian on |ψ〉
for ∆t. By substituting in our expressions and allowing ∆t→ 0, this
reduces to a Lindblad equation of our original form.
Let us consider the performance of the QMC method and com-
pare it to direct integration. QMC may be implemented by using
qutip.mcsolve and specifying Ĥsys, |ψ (0)〉, Ĉn and the operators Ên
whose expectations should be measured. Let us solve an identical sys-
tem to the one discussed in Eq. E.1: a single-mode system consisting of
an initial coherent state with α = 3.0, decay rate γ = 8.0 with collapse





For |H| = 35, the QMC method takes 12.40 s to model 500 trajecto-
ries. This performance is worse than for direct-integration, owing to
the high overhead to average a large number of trajectories. Function
qutip.mcsolve also naturally uses parallel-processing functionality7
which has high overhead. |H| = 50 takes 11.61 s and |H| = 200 takes
19.08 s.
We compare the speed of the direct integration and QMC ap-
proaches to solve Eq. 6.37 with γ = 1.0, varying initial coherent state




in Tab. E.1. All states were
correctly normalized, which implies that the earlier condition Eq. E.4
is only a rule-of-thumb. We compare the QMC and direct integration
methods for accuracy in Fig. E.1.
7 Provided by multiprocessing.Pool
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Run parameters Timings
|H| α DI [s] QMC [s]
35 3.0 0.048 10.33
50 5.0 0.145 11.05
100 8.0 0.319 14.84
200 12.0 4.04 29.68
500 20.0 332.32 143.84
750 25.0 - 224.00
1500 37.0 - 753.05
1950 38.0 - 1361.72
Table E.1: Run-times to solve Eq. 6.37 with γL = 10.0, γ2 = 0.0005, γNCL =
0.002, input coherent state amplitude α and 500 QMC trajectories.
Missing direct integration entries returned memory errors.
Figure E.1: Comparison of accuracy between direct integration and quan-
tum monte carlo methods with varying number of monte carlo
trajectories ntraj. Solving Eq. 6.37 with γL = 0.0, γ2 = 0.0005,
γ3 = 0.002, |H| = 100, α = 5.0. Dashed: direct integration. Solid:
quantum monte carlo. For ntraj small the behaviour is qualita-
tively similar to the full solution, but we must choose large ntraj
in order to make accurate quantitative predictions. For this thesis
we take ntraj = 500 unless otherwise stated.
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e.3 mean-field single-mode model
Applying the mean-field approximation discussed in Sec. 6.6.1 to the
single-mode PhoG model Eq. 6.37, we arrive at the following equation






〈s−〉− iσ1 〈s−〉− iσ3 〈s−〉− 2iσ1 〈s†−〉 〈s−〉 〈s−〉







−〉 〈s−〉 〈s−〉 〈s−〉
(E.10)
with 〈s†−〉 = 〈s−〉
∗. The system may be readily solved for 〈s−〉 (t).
e.4 linearized single-mode model
By applying the linearization approximations derived in Sec. 6.6.2
to the system of coupled ODEs derived from single-mode Lindblad
equation 6.37 we arrive at the following closed system of ODEs:
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∂t〈n−〉 = −γ1〈n−〉+ c5
(

















with n− = s
†





− 〉, 〈n−〉 and the results are shown as dashed lines in Fig. 6.23
of the main Thesis.
e.5 mean-field multi-mode model
Applying the mean-field approximation outlined in Sec. 6.6.1 to the
multi-mode PhoG model Eq. 6.44, we arrive at the following system
of equations for first-order expectations.
d
dt









































for 0 < j < N,
d
dt




The system may be readily solved.
e.6 linearized multi-mode model
We will derive a linearized and closed system of coupled differential
equations capable of modelling the multi-mode PhoG device. In fact,
our equations will be capable of modelling any collection of coupled
modes with on-site Kerr nonlinearity and Markovian reservoirs. Our














where we here take Ĥ = ĤCoupling + ĤKerr. In this Appendix we label
all modes as âk, with the subscript denoting which mode in the PhoG
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device is meant. In particular, a1 ↔ a, a2 ↔ b, and ak>3 ↔ ck−3 in























We have introduced a “coupling matrix" G which contains all infor-
mation relating to the linear coupling between modes of our system.
Coupling matrix element Gj,p denotes the coupling strength between
modes j and p, and Gj,p = 0 if the modes are not coupled to each other,
which is the case for most pairs (j,p). We display some examples of
coupling matrices below.
e.6.1 Example coupling matrices G
G =

0 g 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
g 0 g 0 . . . 0 0 0








0 0 0 0 . . . 0 g 0
0 0 0 0 . . . g 0 g
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 g 0

Figure E.2: Example coupling matrix G for a straight line of bosonic modes.
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G =

0 0 g1 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 0 g2 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
g1 g2 0 g3 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 0 g3 0 g3 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 0 0 g3 0 g3 . . . 0 0 0










0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 g3 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . g3 0 g3
0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 g3 0

Figure E.3: Example coupling matrix G for the PhoG system.
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e.6.2 Linearized equations
Letting n,m ∈ [1,N+ 2] ,n 6= m, we derive a closed system of coupled
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∂t〈â†nâ†m〉 =
(
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